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Francois Vreÿ1 & Thomas Mandrup1
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been undergoing constant 
development since the establishment of the African Union (AU) itself officially in 
2002 in Durban. The results have thus far been mixed in the sense that, whereas the 
AU was deemed successful in establishing institutions like the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) only two years after the 
establishment of the AU in 2002,2 the implementation of the other elements of the 
APSA has been slower, and less convincing.3 
Different attitudes to the nature and roles of the AU in African conflicts continue 
to characterise the slow and differential progress of the APSA and brought about its 
own set of tensions in how to merge the human security and state or regime security 
agendas. In essence one finds laudable goals of being liberal and human rights driven 
pitted against leaders with security and interest driven agendas more often than not 
dominating the agenda. AU member states persistently argue for “African solutions 
to African problems”, but continue to rely on international actors to finance and 
facilitate the preferred “African solutions”. Whether this is a mere consequence of 
global responses to global threats to international security is a question of opinion, 
but one also open to academic inquiry. Difficulties facing the AU’s Rapid Deployment 
Capability4 pathway, alternative thought and competing institutions, as well as slow 
progress or regression in the regional communities, collectively call for closer scrutiny 
in the aftermath of repeated failures to meet AU instituted time-lines.
In spite of calls for Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the AU’s rapid reaction 
forces, and setting of repeated time-frames, non-compliance with the corresponding 
operational goal posts set by the AU persists and still constitutes a challenge. 
Competitive and exclusionary agendas hinder the desired progress towards combat 
ready African Standby Forces (ASF) for the AU. The discussions offered here frame 
and explain important inconsistencies operating at the institutional, regional and 
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national levels. They play a collective role in the AU not achieving the envisaged 
2010 and 2015 objectives of operational capabilities through ASF arrangements. In 
spite of a clear declaratory AU stance on future objectives for the ASF, operational 
arrangements at the regional and national levels in particular remain out of step with 
the time-line and rapid deployment status envisaged by the AU. Both institutional as 
well as regional matters serve to explain slow progress and overall perception of non-
compliance. The discussions first attend to the conceptual inconsistencies operating 
at institutional levels, before moving to an explanation of difficulties at the regional 
level where standby arrangements and readiness levels fall victim to sets of local 
dynamics in the respective regional communities.
THE AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Collaboration within the area of security was from the outset one of the cornerstones 
underpinning the economic integration of Africa. It was seen as a way of creating the 
necessary peace and stability to provide room for economic growth and development. 
It was also important for the dominant states on the continent in the sense that the 
institutionalisation of relations is always a means of stabilising and disseminating a 
particular order. Such institutions invariably depict the power relations prevailing 
at the time of their establishment, which can, however, change over time.5 Through 
the Cairo decision of 1993 the members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
had expressed the ambition that that organisation, and consequently from 2002 the 
AU, should be able to deal effectively with the mounting challenge of conflict and 
destabilisation that afflicts the continent.6
The establishment of the AU in 2002 also signalled a paradigmatic shift in the way 
that the continental body envisioned acting upon and viewing security-related issues 
in the future. Moving away from non-interference to a principle, at least in theory, 
of non-indifference became a popular but difficult change factor in the continental 
outlook.7 Two sets of principles – state centric and human security – were set to 
underpin the new organisation, principles that were not necessarily compatible. The 
AU Constitutive Act called for a common vision of “a united and strong Africa”,8 while 
at the same time it acknowledged the obstacles this “development and integration 
agenda”9 faced as a result of conflict and underdevelopment. The AU’s main objective 
was to “achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the people 
of Africa”.10 This was to be done by introducing new principles in the field of peace 
and security and by ensuring respect for human rights. The AU Constitutive Act 
also introduced a number of principles that were heavily influenced by the widened 
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concept of security to include softer and non-military issues as part of the (in-) 
security discourse. The Constitutive Act therefore stressed the principles of peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and non-use of force as one of the barring principles in the 
future AU.11 
The new human security discourse that accompanied the AU Constitutive Act 
included norms of respect for human rights, sanctity of human life and democratic 
principles, and good governance. This was significant in the sense that it accentuated 
principles that member states signed up to, requiring of them to reform domestically 
and to comply with these principles. In addition to establishing the rejection of 
impunity and unconstitutional changes of governments as fundamental principles 
on the continent, the AU was given the right to intervene in a member state in the 
case of grave circumstances. All the above principles signal that the AU, and thereby 
the member states on the continent, has taken a step away from the African past of 
the Westphalian logic of non-interference.12
However, there remains a tension between these new principles and the Westphalian 
principles in the sense that they are included in the same document, and African 
states through their leaders have been divided on how to interpret and prioritise these 
somewhat contradictory principles. The authoritarian regimes (for example, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe) tend to focus on the (regime’s) right to non-interference and self-
determination, while the reform-minded states, led by South Africa amongst others, 
stress principles of peaceful resolution of disputes, good governance and rule of law. 
The resultant tension has been visible in the setting up of the security architecture 
and responses of the AU to threats to peace and security. On a positive note the 
AU has, compared to its predecessor the OAU, been more active in attempting to 
settle conflicts and deploy peacekeepers to secure post-conflict situations. However, 
in its responses so far the AU has shown that while it has some capacity in military 
deployments, there are capability deficiencies where deployments are more often than 
not dependent on external support and funding.13 This external dependency remains 
unresolved, a focus of debates, and an issue defying a simplistic overarching solution. 
THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
The July 2002 establishment of the ASF was the culmination of a long process in 
which African states had expressed the ambition of creating a military capacity and 
thus of providing themselves with a tool to deal with and manage conflicts on the 
continent. Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC as one 
of the AU’s institutions stated that:
10
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“In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its 
responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions 
and intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, 
an African Stand-by Force shall be established. Such a Force shall be 
composed of Stand-by multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and 
military components in their countries of origin and be ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice.”14
It was therefore stipulated that the ASF should include standby multi-disciplinary 
components with civilian, police and military components located in home countries.
Each of the AU’s five economic regions (not identical to the existing sub-regional 
organisations in Africa) became responsible for setting up an extended brigade-
size formation of up to 6 000 military and civilian personnel. The first phase of the 
formation ran until June 2005. In Phase 2, from 2005 to 2010, the AU and its regions 
were scheduled to build capacities enabling them to handle situations like the ones 
outlined in scenarios 5–6 listed below. The AU developed early on six scenarios 
describing the types of missions that it expected to be deployed on. The following six 
missions and scenarios to be achieved by 2010 informed the ASF structure:
 ◆ Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment 
required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.
 ◆ Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission. 
Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.
 ◆ Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required 
within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.
 ◆ Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive 
deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment required within 30 days 
of an AU mandate resolution.
 ◆ Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping 
missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed 
deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate resolution, with the 
military component being able to deploy within 30 days.
 ◆ Scenario 6: AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the 
international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU 
would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days.
Furthermore, the first road map plan for the ASF stipulates that in the case of 
genocide (scenario 6), the ASF contingents must be able to deploy within two weeks, 
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and not the 30 days required for the military component of traditional Peace Support 
Operations (PSO) missions. This means that brigade HQ capacity and logistic 
support must be in place at all times, i.e. the ASF structure needs its own permanent 
logistical capacity in order to be able to deploy within this timeframe. It is moreover 
acknowledged that individual members – in effect certain regional powers – are the 
only states possessing this capacity.15 
In 2009 the concept of Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC) was introduced by AU 
members, partly to be able to live up to the ambition in scenario 6, which requires a 
14-day deployment time. The existing ASF brigades did not have that capability and 
it was also realised that, because of the difficulties of setting up standby brigades, it 
would be easier to set up national standby RDCs – one in each region.16 The RDC 
went from being a supplement in the ASF structure to being the key element, but one 
showing limited progress. A number of AU member states in 2013 decided to establish 
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) as a temporary 
measure until the RDC and ASF concepts have reached full operational capability.17 
The ACIRC doctrine is in many ways a more functional and operational structure 
than the ASF’s RDC ambitions, because it cuts across the existing regional structures 
and refers directly to the continental AU level.18 ACIRC holds the potential to be 
more responsive to AU needs and a lesser drag as its funding derives from voluntary 
participation by African states and sharing of the costs and other burdens.19
It was realised early in the process of setting up the standby brigade structure that 
if the AU and its regions were to be able to live up to the ambition of intervening 
with military capabilities in crisis situations within a short response time, there was 
a need for a supplementary structure within the existing ASF brigade model. The 
AU Commission therefore created the RDC concept, consisting of self-contained 
battalion-sized nationally owned units. In East Africa, for example, Kenya, Uganda 
and Rwanda have set up national RDCs for the use of the East African Standby Force. 
The concept envisages the establishment of a rapidly deployable, robust capability 
within each region. The capability needs to be flexible in its composition and capable 
of reacting to urgent situations with the right tools on 14 days’ notice. The RDC by 
its very nature is a reaction capability, and will be replaced by a regular follow-on 
PSO force. As part of developing and operationalising the RDC concept a number 
of elements was identified by 2011 for the ASF structure to reach Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) by December 2015. The Road Map III plan of action argued that 
the following concerns must be dealt with:
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 ◆ The AU should organise a roster to ensure that at any one time there will be two 
different regions providing this standby capability, through a cycle of training 
and standby and, where necessary, deployment and recovery.
 ◆ Each of the regions has developed RDCs to a greater or lesser extent.20 What is 
now required is refinement of the concept, harmonisation where there are issues 
that need to be harmonised, and detailed operational planning between the AU 
and REC/RMs on deployment and logistic planning.
 ◆ It is recommended that the RDC concept should be tested, evaluated and made 
operational by 2012.21
One of the problems facing the ASF system, including the RDCs, is different 
perceptions on the distribution of power and roles between the regional and 
continental levels. The AU would like to be responsible for the doctrinal development 
and training. However, it lacks the capacity to do so and this has furthermore been 
met with resistance from the regions. Are the ASF/RDC structures something that 
the regions set up for the use of the AU, or are they forces that are controlled by the 
regions? Either way, regional RDCs reflect difficulties and complexities generally not 
unknown in the history of setting up and employment of rapid deployment forces.22 
The ASF, or even ACIRC for that matter, are not exempt from such difficulties in their 
creation, sustainment and deployments. Rapid deployment forces face uncertainty, 
dangerous missions, high-intensity operations and generally missions that sap their 
institutional, psychological and physical make-up.
This chapter informs and sets the research frame for the individual chapters. The 
different authors have been asked to relate to the question of full FOC of the AU 
ASF-forces. Is it possible for a group of states, where many of them suffer from 
different levels of state fragility themselves, to set up an effective standby capability, 
and thereby providing the AU and its member states an effective tool for achieving 
the ambitions of “African Solutions to African Problems”? The different authors 
have been asked to address this question from different angles, but related to this 
basic question. The benchmark for the concept of FOC is AU’s formulated sets of 
standards and ambitions, which each chapter uses as a reference. This allows for a 
general conclusion in the end, answering the stated question. 
Two broad themes inform the following chapters: first, aspects relevant to bringing 
about particular institutions and capabilities within the APSA and the complexities it 
raises, and, secondly, overviews of progress or stasis in four selected regions. For the 
latter, Southern Africa, West Africa, East Africa and North Africa are covered as they 
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present a combination of progress, stasis and sources of information that made their 
coverage possible. Unfortunately such coverage and information were not readily 
forthcoming for Central Africa and this leaves a void in the regional contributions 
sought by this publication.
Chapter One by Michelle Nel and Pieter Brits (Stellenbosch University) employs the 
legal basis for intervention and posits a dissonance between the AU’s non-indifference 
and non-intervention stances. By shifting to non-indifference, it appears that the AU 
claims powers that seem to supersede those of the UN. The shift from non-interference 
towards non-indifference took place with the launch of the AU, replacing the OAU, in 
2002. The Constitutive Act of the AU, authorising intervention in the internal affairs 
of member states under certain prescribed conditions, was followed by a Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(PSCAU) in July 2002 (PSC Protocol). This protocol established the African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA), a framework inter alia providing for an African 
Standby Force to enable the AU to carry out its mandate. The aforementioned shift 
to non-indifference was even more remarkable considering that not even the UN has 
such far-reaching powers. Therefore, can a supranational organisation like the AU 
thus overrule the UN, especially if the UN Charter determines that in the event of 
any conflict between the obligations of states in terms of the Charter and any other 
international agreement, the Charter must take precedence?
In Chapter Two Thomas Mandrup (Stellenbosch University & Royal Danish Defence 
College) questions the relationship between the United Nations and the African 
Union as the UN-styled peace operations concept and instruments are perceived as 
out of step with the realities of African armed threats. The AU has come to realise 
that it is more often than not confronted with an asymmetric opponent, requiring a 
mandate and military tools different to those preferred in traditional UN-led PSOs. 
For this reason, the AU is determined to set up robust rapid response capabilities 
across the continent and has already deployed military contingents to several African 
conflict zones. However, what is the consequence of the AU’s increased use of force 
to stop or prevent conflict, and what results might this have for future mandates of 
UN PSOs in Africa if the AU employs more robust and intrusive styled missions that 
the UN mandates allow?
Taking the debate forward, Chapter Three by Cedric De Coning (Norwegian Institute 
for International Affairs (NUPI), Irene Limo, James Machakaire (ACCORD) and 
Jidifor Okeke (AU) highlights the growing presence of civilian components and in 
AU missions in particular. The authors underline the progress, but low awareness of 
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the role of a civilian component in missions such as Somalia and the Central African 
Republic (CAR). Different perceptions reign on whether the civilian component is 
necessary or if missions are about military and hard security matters with little room 
for civilian contributions. The AU is unclear on this component, although it is catered 
for in the ASF Civilian Policy Framework. Civilian participation is not opposed, has 
increased in spite of uncertainty, and offers scope for assessment of its contributions 
within AU/ASF missions.
In keeping with requirements for expertise and professional services to rapid 
deployment forces, Gideon van Dyk (Stellenbosch University) and Roscoe Kasujja 
(Makarere University) enquire in Chapter Four about the absence of the international 
practice of assisting soldiers on peace missions through military psychology. The 
chapter conceptualises combat readiness and analyses the factors that will challenge 
combat readiness levels and the state of mind of ASF soldiers. In this vein current 
developments in Africa bring to bear dangerous security challenges to military forces, 
and ASF brigades are not exempt. Complexities and dangers of future operations (as 
demonstrated in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali and the Sudan) are bound to test the combat 
readiness levels of ASF soldiers, and of those involved in future rapid deployment 
operations even more so. The lingering demand is to develop, support and sustain 
combat readiness through professional military psychological services for the ASF 
and its rapid deployment forces in particular.
Chapter Five by Eeben Barlow (Chairman of STEPP International) offers a 
practitioner’s view, gained from practical field experiences while working in the 
private security industry in Africa. This contribution steers away from the academic 
theories underpinning most chapters in favour of operational experiences. Unless 
countries on the continent co-operate and share common values and goals, they risk 
losing out to those who seek Africa’s demise. Africa’s leaders need to reach consensus 
on their nations’ futures, their values and the direction they intend to take politically, 
economically and socially. The continent’s leadership must translate their visions into 
action, and embed them in the AU. The status quo is problematic and conflict-prone, 
giving rise to the ASF as well as ACIRC, reflecting the inability of the continent’s law 
enforcement agencies and national armed forces to fulfil their mandates. Alongside 
an apparent weakness, the AU’s unwillingness or inability to engage in preventive 
and coercive diplomacy in the embryonic stages of conflict, threats escalate rapidly. 
Driven by political and military will and guided by actionable and predicted 
intelligence, the ASF represents a future asset that can be deployed to deter, intervene, 
contain and/or neutralise contemporary threats.
15
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In Chapter Six Malte Brosig (University of the Witwatersrand) and Norman 
Sempijja (North West University) address ACIRC and review some of the challenges 
rapid response is encountering. They outline the development of rapid response 
mechanisms as a way to overcome the slow and often frustrating timelines of 
traditional peacekeeping reactions. Sovereignty and non-interference for a long 
time have been near sacrosanct concepts, this despite mass atrocities, war crimes 
and even genocides occurring. However, in the post-Cold War era the need to 
make states more accountable for internal matters has become compelling. One 
instrument of stopping gross human rights abuses like war crimes and genocide has 
been to set up rapid intervention tools within international organisations. Indeed 
traditional peacekeeping has often been slow and insufficient in halting these 
crimes as deployment times are long. A number of efforts to institutionalise rapid 
intervention have been put in place, such as the EU battlegroups, the UN Standby 
High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), the AU’s ASF and most recently ACIRC. All of 
these instruments have been problematic to some extent. 
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (University of the Witwatersrand) turns the attention in 
Chapter Seven to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Making 
and keeping of the peace – and rebuilding broken states and communities – are a 
task for Africa and reflect a timeline of growth. The AU introduced a new approach 
and energy to challenge its predecessor’s lethargy. It established the African Standby 
Force as part of a comprehensive approach entitled the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA). Following the principle of subsidiarity, Africa’s various regions 
and regional bodies were given complementary tasks in conflict management. In 
the case of Southern Africa, the SADC in 2008 established a SADC Standby Force 
(SADC SF or SSF). Leaving aside the question of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
APSA and ASF, this chapter examines the state of readiness of the SADC to address 
conflict in the context of the broader regional challenges of poverty alleviation and 
development. Initial progress was encouraging, but SADC had to contend with aspects 
that drained away attention as competing priorities such as differential strategic 
cultures and South Africa’s inherent capability, but unwillingness, to assume a lead 
role collectively acted as a brake on bringing about an operational regional  RDC.
Chapter Eight by Mustapha Abdallah and Joana Osei-Tutu (Kofi Anan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre) reviews the rapid response brigade of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Originally established as a regional 
integration scheme, ECOWAS was transformed from an economic into a political-
security organisation to respond to multiple security challenges. Through its Peace and 
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Security Architecture, ECOWAS is mandated to prevent, manage and restore peace 
and security through peace support operations and peace-building interventions. A 
critical component of the architecture is the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). As one 
of the five building blocks of the ASF, the ESF is crafted to respond to crisis situations 
in West Africa and contribute to the ASF as a continental response mechanism. 
Although the ECOWAS architecture with its standby force, in its current status 
(2016), is arguably well developed, the emergence of violent extremist and terrorist 
groups, especially in mission theatres, has the potential to hinder the ESF and ASF to 
effectively respond to conflict situations. This raises critical questions, such as to what 
extent are ECOWAS structures, particularly its Standby Force, ready and capable to 
respond to regional threats in West Africa?
Chapter Nine is by Musambai Katumanga (Nairobi University). He attends to East 
Africa and the case of the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) in particular. Several 
contingents from the EASF milieu are engaged in peacekeeping and enforcement 
under both multilateral and state-centric initiatives. The fact that none are deployed 
under the auspices of the East Africa subsystem’s security architecture points to both 
challenges and the need for creating a durable FOC within the EASF. This chapter 
reviews the process while describing its current geopolitical, economic, strategic 
and security dilemmas. The chapter builds upon the impact of the apparent military 
overstretch of EASF core states when it comes to force generation, readiness and 
financial sustenance in relation to achieving FOC for the EASF. While the existence 
of multiple economic and military asymmetries provide a challenge for the security 
architecture, if innovatively exploited, they can serve as platforms for constructing a 
viable regional security architecture.
Mohamed Hatem Elatawy (Cairo Centre for Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution 
in Africa) contributes in Chapter Nine by discussing the progress of the North 
African Regional Capability (NARC). Given the recent events in North Africa, an 
operational North African mechanism would have been the logical vehicle for 
regional action. However, instead of playing this role the regional setup specifically 
designed by the ASF suffered a setback because of disruptive developments in some 
North African countries. The chapter reviews how the NARC was established as the 
regional mechanism for North Africa within the APSA as opposed to the defunct 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) that was not integrated. It will also outline the initial 
expectations from the NARC proportionate to the military, political and economic 
capabilities of some of its member states. The initial steps taken to operationalise 
NARC will be reviewed, as well as the challenges that followed its establishment, 
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especially after the upheavals in North Africa in 2010/2011. Current attempts to 
revitalise the NARC and a future outlook conclude this chapter.
Violent African conflicts feature side by side with extensive institutional growth, 
planning activities, hyper- coordination, intricate deployment schedules and 
eventual employment of dedicated or hybrid African intervention forces. In all cases 
African governments are primary catalysts for the success or failure of the use of 
coercion in all its different forms to attain mostly political outcomes. African threat 
complexities are increasingly mirrored in the difficulties raised by multinational 
intervention forces and, added to this, one finds the intricacies of setting up and using 
multinational rapid deployment capabilities compounding the difficulties. Adding 
regional idiosyncrasies of co-operation and competition, African decision-makers 
are faced with home-grown difficulties. The resultant complexities lead to a crucial 
crossroads of turning to simpler but more unilateral RDC forces such as ACIRC or 
continuing down the very difficult pathway of regional ASF brigades to uphold the 
RDC status quo that the AU embarked upon.
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A Legal Basis for Legitimate AU 
Deployments: A Cautionary Tale
Michelle Nel1 & Pieter Brits1
BACKGROUND 
Although the first joint field training exercise of the African Standby Force (ASF) 
started in South Africa on 19 October 2015,2 the idea of a joint military force for 
the continent enjoyed support even before the establishment of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Already in 1961 the Casablanca group of African states,3 
under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, advocated the 
creation of a federation of African states with joint institutions and a joint military 
command with powers not only to defend African States but also to intervene in 
inter-state as well as intra-state conflicts.4 Despite assurances that intervention in 
internal conflicts would take place only on invitation of the host state, the majority 
of states present at the establishment of the OAU remained wary of any imposition 
on their new-found independence.5 Preference was given to the gradualist approach 
of the Brazzaville group6 (later the Monrovia group), who advocated a looser unity 
with the emphasis on national sovereignty, and states opted for a far less authoritative 
OAU Defence Commission instead.7
In October 1963, at the first meeting of the OAU Defence Commission in Accra, the 
Ghanaian delegation presented an elaborate proposal for a unified military structure 
with a Joint Supreme Military Command Headquarters as well as four Joint Services 
Regional Headquarters for the four free regions of Africa (North, East, Central and 
West).8 Once again Nkrumah’s proposal was rejected, due to concerns that a unified 
military structure would jeopardise states’ independence.9 Although the idea of a 
unified continental military force flared up from time to time, states preferred to 
rather concentrate on greater economic co-operation.10
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The tide started to turn in the early 1990s.11 The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the 
consequent withdrawal of the superpowers from Africa sparked an unprecedented 
increase in violent conflicts on the continent,12 threatening the goals of the recently 
concluded 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.13 The 
challenges posed by these armed conflicts led to the establishment of an OAU 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993, paving the 
way for the future creation of the ASF.14 Despite its good intentions the Mechanism 
proved ineffective to, among others, halt the genocide in Rwanda (1994), to stop 
the civil wars in Sierra Leone (1991–2002) and Liberia (1990–1997), or to put an 
end to the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1994–2003).15 
While inadequate financial resources played a role, it should be noted that the OAU’s 
continued endorsement of the principle of non-intervention without the consent of 
the host state proved to be fatal to the adequate addressing of human rights abuses.16
An opportunity to address the shortcomings presented itself at the end of the 
millennium, when on 8 and 9 September 1999 a record of 43 heads of state and 
government gathered in Sirte, Libya, to discuss the establishment of a “United States 
of Africa” with its own central bank, military and parliament.17 The meeting led to 
the adoption of the Sirte Declaration,18 which provided for the establishment of the 
African Union (AU).19
The legal unit of the OAU thereupon drafted the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union (AU Act),20 followed by three further summits: the Lomé Summit (2000), 
which adopted the AU Act;21 the Lusaka Summit (2001), which drew up the plan 
for the implementation of the AU;22 and finally the Durban Summit (2002), which 
launched the AU.23
The period preceding the formation of the AU was characterised by two serious 
human tragedies: the Rwandan Genocide (1994) and the Bosnian War (1992–1995), 
which reached its peak with the Srebrenica Genocide.24 Following these events, the 
international community began to seriously debate how to react effectively in the 
event of gross human rights violations. The growing international concern and 
consequent importance attached to human rights was also reflected in the AU Act.25
While the OAU was not perceived as a collective security organisation and its 
Charter hardly contained any provision in this regard,26 the AU Act introduced huge 
normative changes in the areas of peace and security, human rights, democracy 
and intervention.27 The objectives clause, Article 3, provides for the promotion and 
protection of “peace, security and stability on the continent”,28 the promotion of 
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“democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”,29 
and the promotion and protection of “human and peoples’ rights in accordance with 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments”.30 The principles clause, Article 4, provides for the promotion of “gender 
equality, respect for democratic principles, human rights, the Rule of Law and good 
governance”31 as well as “respect for the sanctity of human life”.32 Member States that 
fail to adhere to these standards may be subjected to sanctions.33
None of the changes were as drastic as Article 4(h) and 4(j), which introduced the 
right to intervene in a Member State. While Article 4(h) deals with intervention by 
the AU on its own initiative, Article 4(j) deals with intervention by the AU on request 
of Member States. Article 4(h) limits intervention to three “grave circumstances”, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Article 4(j), which 
provides for “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union to 
restore peace and security”, should not be confused with the OAU’s “intervention 
upon invitation of the guest state”. Any Member State or group of Member States can 
request the Assembly of the AU to intervene in any situation that may disturb peace 
and security, irrespective whether it is of intra-state or inter-state nature.34 This opens 
the scope for intervention considerably.
On a procedural level intervention will be subject to approval by the Assembly, 
which makes decisions by consensus, failing which a two-thirds majority of eligible 
Member States is required.35 It should be noted that while the crimes mentioned in 
Article 4(h) had already been defined by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which came into operation during the same month that the AU was 
launched in Durban, the AU Act itself contains no guidelines to clarify the “situations” 
mentioned in Article 4(j).36 Concerns were raised with the proposed Amendment 
Protocol to the Constitutive Act, expanding the grounds for intervention to include 
“a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability in the Member State 
of the Union …”, which is regarded by some as a means of a regime to hold on to 
power where its citizenry is forcing change,37 but this view has not yet enjoyed wide 
support in the literature. It is, however, a concern that warrants some consideration 
against the background of African states’ history of keeping regimes in power in spite 
of the existence of grounds for intervention.38 Article 4(h) is not the only potential 
challenge. The absence of definitions of the “situations” in Article 4(j) may lead to 
instances where unclear grounds are used as an excuse not to intervene due to a lack 
of political will – dressed up and excused as unclear guidelines.
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The movement from non-interference or non-intervention to non-indifference has 
been described as “groundbreaking” and a “paradigmatic shift … from state security 
to human security”.39 According to Kioko, it is a movement from non-interference or 
non-intervention to what can be referred to as the doctrine of “non-indifference”.40 It 
becomes even more remarkable when realising that, unlike the AU, the UN itself has 
no institutional right to intervene in Member States’ domestic conflicts.41 Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter clearly states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the 
UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state.”
At first sight the right to intervene created in Articles 4(h) and 4(j) may appear to be 
contradictory to Article 4(f), which prohibits use of force or threat to use force among 
Member States, and Article 4(j), which prohibits the interference of any Member 
State in the internal affairs of another. In trying to explain this dichotomy, Abass 
& Baderin argue that the distinction lies in the nature of the persona that may not 
interfere. Although Member States are restricted in accordance with the customary 
international law principle of non-intervention, Article 4(h) awards a right to the AU 
itself to intervene, turning the AU into a supra-national organisation with greater 
powers than the component States that established it.42 Article 4(h) thus establishes a 
right to intervene on a collective basis, rather than a unilateral basis.43 This argument 
does not, however, satisfactorily address this contradiction.
The absence of any legal requirement to obtain UN Security Council permission for 
intervention in terms of Article 4(h),44 a point initially keenly emphasised by AU 
members,45 raised the question whether the AU could possibly have an inherent right 
to intervene outside the UN framework.46 Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides 
for the Security Council to take enforcement action in cases of a threat to or breach 
of international peace and security. Article 53 of the UN Charter states: “The Security 
Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of 
the Security Council.” Considering that the AU is classified by the UN as a regional 
organisation,47 Article 53 determines that no enforcement action can be undertaken 
without approval of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Article 103 of the 
UN Charter is also clear that in the event of any conflict between the obligations of 
States in terms of the Charter and any other international agreement, the Charter 
must take precedence. This means that even if Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act 
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does not explicitly require UN authorisation, the AU does in fact have to obtain 
authorisation in terms of Article 53 of the Charter.48
Although the past is not free from examples of intervention without previous UNSC 
approval, it is submitted that these examples are very limited in number and by 
no means represent international state practice. In 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) intervened in Kosovo. In answer to allegations that the 
intervention was illegal the United States Secretary of State invoked the doctrine 
on humanitarian intervention as an alternative source of legitimisation.49 In 
spite of using the need for humanitarian intervention as justification, the Kosovo 
Commission still found that the NATO intervention was “illegal but legitimate”.50 A 
similar justification was offered when the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia in 1991 and in Sierra Leone in 1999.51 While 
it seems that the UNSC never seriously objected to the usurping of its powers and 
various explanations have been offered,52 it is also true that no one considered it a 
serious threat to the continued existence of the Security Council’s role as protector of 
international peace and security.
Despite the fact that as late as April 2005 it still claimed that it did not need to adhere 
to the letter of Article 53 of the UN Charter, but could obtain approval ‘after the fact’ 
in urgent circumstances, the AU to date has not yet invoked Article 4(h) to override 
the will of a sovereign government.53 It has sought UN Security Council support for 
all its missions and not only for “enforcement action”.54
Rather than being a challenge to Article 53 of the UN Charter and the authority of the 
UNSC, Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Act reflected a perceived sense of frustration 
with the UNSC’s bureaucratic procedures and the lack of a mechanism that could be 
utilised towards speedy resolution of conflicts on the continent.55
With the normative framework in place, the next step was the development of an 
institutional framework to enable the AU to carry out its mandate. This was done 
through the adoption of a Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU) in July 200256 (PSC Protocol). The 
PSC Protocol established a framework known as the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), consisting of the AU Peace and Security Council as central 
institution supported by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an 
African Standby Force and a Military Staff Committee.57
The AU PSC, established to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and 
crisis situations in Africa,58 consists of 15 members59 and functions as the standing 
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decision-making organ of the AU tasked with the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts.60 The Council, which exercises its powers in conjunction with 
the Chairperson of the AU, may anticipate and prevent potential disputes, undertake 
peace-making and peace-building actions, authorise the deployment of peace 
support missions, support and facilitate humanitarian action where necessary, and 
recommend to the AU Assembly intervention in a Member State pursuant to Articles 
4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Act.61
To enable the Peace and Security Council to carry out its responsibilities with respect 
to the deployment of peacekeeping missions and intervention pursuant to Articles 
4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Act, the PSC Protocol provides for the establishment of an 
African Standby Force62 as well as a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Council on all questions relating to military and security requirements.63
In terms of Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol the ASF shall be composed of “standby 
multidisciplinary components, with civilian and military components in their 
countries of origin”. Although it may contain a small permanent component with 
its headquarters in Addis Ababa,64 it is important to note that the ASF is not a fully 
centralised Pan-African army as envisaged by Kwame Nkrumah, but is built around 
an African version of the UN Standby Arrangement Systems in terms of which States 
select and prepare specific units for AU operations and keep them ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice.65 The Force itself is provided by five Regional 
Capabilities, a brigade each from the Southern African Development Community, 
the Economic Community of West African States, the East Africa Standby Force, the 
Economic Community of Central African States and North Africa. The five regional 
headquarters together with their planning elements collaborate with the AU’s 
Peace Support Operations Directorate (PSOD) to act as clearinghouses for national 
contributions and ensure interoperability as well as common training standards.66
The PSC Protocol sets out the function for the ASF,67 which found voice in the Policy 
Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff 
Committee (ASF-MSC) Part I in the form of six possible scenarios.68 The possible 
ASF mission scenarios are as follows:
 ◆ Scenario 1: AU/Regional advice to a political mission.
 ◆ Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.
 ◆ Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.
 ◆ Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and other preventive 
deployment missions.
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 ◆ Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping 
mission with low-level spoilers.
 ◆ Scenario 6: AU intervention in cases of grave circumstances where the 
international community does not comply.
Scenarios 1 to 5 do not deviate from the type of missions the AU have historically been 
involved in. These scenarios mainly relate to peace support and would generally be in 
line with the prescripts of the UN Charter.69 These are also the type of operations easily 
justifiable in terms of international law. In general the PSC Protocol acknowledges 
the UNSC’s supremacy in taking responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.70 More importantly though, it retains responsibility for peace-
making and peace-building functions on the continent, while still acknowledging 
the respect for the sovereignty of Member States and non-interference in the internal 
affairs by any Member State.71 Taking responsibility for Africa’s peace and security, 
even where the UN does not agree with the intervention is, as stated, prima facie 
contrary to the UN Charter.72 Therefore, deployment of the ASF in scenario 6 instances 
is more challenging to justify. This scenario refers to the Article 4(h) instances where 
specifically defined circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, trigger an intervention.73 Unlike the other five scenarios, this scenario 
does not necessarily require UN authorisation before the ASF is deployed. This 
raises the question of whether these types of deployments would be regarded as legal 
and legitimate.
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION
To answer this question it is necessary to analyse the legal basis for the AU’s 
interventionist approach. The African formalisation of a right to humanitarian 
intervention not only represented a major qualitative deviation from the approach 
of the OAU, with its emphasis on non-intervention and territorial sovereignty of its 
members,74 but it also accentuated the underlying tension between state security and 
human security,75 that was so accurately described by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Kofi Anan:
“We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence 
of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must 
be supported. Alas that does not tell us which principle should prevail 
when they are in conflict.”76
Humanitarian intervention is not a recent concept in international law, having found 
acceptance as early as the 1800s.77 During the ages, however, especially after the advent 
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of the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention has become a controversial concept.78 
Considering the fact that the Charter was adopted in the wake of the Second World 
War, it is no surprise that the Charter was drafted with the absolute prohibition on the 
use of force against the “territorial integrity and political independence” of any of its 
Member States.79 The sovereign integrity of states was paramount. State sovereignty in 
this context referred to concerns in the protection of the state’s interests. Traditionally 
the manner in which the state treated its citizens was regarded as a domestic issue 
and therefore fell outside international jurisdiction.80 States had no authority to 
interfere in each other’s domestic matters. Allowing any use of force in another’s 
territory, even for a lofty goal of humanitarian concern, created the possibility of an 
abuse of power. Chen postulates that “humanitarian intervention is a weapon for the 
powerful and is highly susceptible to abuse and misuse”.81
A number of international humanitarian atrocities and the UN’s inability to stop 
them resulted in a paradigm shift towards accepting the need for intervention. 
The Canadian government took the lead in creating an Independent International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer the question 
posed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan:
“[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity.”82
The resulting report that coined the concept “Responsibility to Protect”83 (R2P) in its 
title redefined the concept of “sovereignty” from sovereignty to control to sovereignty 
as responsibility.84 In terms of this redefined concept states as responsible members 
of the international community carry the responsibility to protect the people within 
their borders. It acknowledges that international order is still best maintained by 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, but R2P adds the characteristic 
of “respect for human rights” in its understanding of sovereignty as a concept.85 If 
a state is therefore unwilling or unable to protect its people, the responsibility shifts 
to the broader international community.86 Massingham articulates R2P best where 
he states that “R2P effectively makes a promise to the world’s most vulnerable 
people that when their own governments fail them, the international community 
will intervene to protect them”.87 This promise echoes those made by African nations 
after the Rwanda genocide glaringly exposed the shortcomings in the OAU’s non-
interventionist approach.
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It is important to note that R2P remains a policy document and does not have the 
legal weight of a treaty. It did not change the legal doctrine of non-intervention 
that permeates the UN Charter. It also did not legitimise the use of force, even for 
humanitarian reasons. R2P may be morally legitimate but cannot be seen as a legal 
use of force.88 Although it has received extensive support from the international 
community,89 it is still regarded by some as a “loose policy narrative in the UN 
Charter [that] vaguely encourages international institutions … to intervene … in 
order to protect civilians against regimes alleged to be committing human rights 
abuses”.90 This perception is strengthened by Africa’s experiences of mass atrocities 
in a number of states over a period of decades, underscored by the UN’s inability to 
intervene. Since Africa could not depend on the UN to solve its peace and security 
challenges it has taken up the challenge in its Constitutive Act.
It is acknowledged that the AU Act reflects Africa’s acceptance and incorporation of 
the R2P principle.91 The African version of this principle finds expression in the “non-
indifference” principle and the AU is the only international and regional organisation 
that officially prescribes this principle for its members.92 By incorporating the principle 
in its Constitutive Act, the AU attempted to create a legal basis for interventions in 
Member States in situations of grave breaches or by request from a Member State.93 
In contradiction, a number of Articles in the Constitutive Act seemingly still support 
non-intervention.94 A number of systems having been adopted within the APSA 
to support and enhance peace and security on the continent – the ASF being most 
pertinent to this discussion – it is necessary to investigate the legality in international 
law of possible and future use of the ASF.
As mentioned, the UN Charter does not allow for the use of force or intervention in 
the territory of its Member States. The general acceptance of R2P at the 60th World 
Summit and subsequent adoption of Resolution 1674,95 where the UNSC officially 
referred to the R2P principle for the first time,96 did not change international law 
in this regard. There is no international consensus on the legality of this type of 
humanitarian interventions – it is more a support of morality than law.97 Since 
international law is based on consent, this creates quite a challenge for proposed 
interventions. By allowing an intervention in the territory of Member States, even 
without UN sanction, the AU has in effect usurped more powers than even the UN 
is endowed with – in spite of the fact that the AU is a regional organisation vs the 
supra-organisation of the UN. With the ASF as a manifestation of the AU’s means to 
intervene it begs the question – what is the legality of future deployments of the ASF 
in the instances of scenario 6 situations? Are 1–5 less problematic or unproblematic?
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The first hurdle the AU needs to clear is the contradiction in its Constitutive Act and 
the PSC Protocol regarding its understanding of support of sovereignty. While Article 
3(b) and Articles 4(a), (b), (f) and (g) of the Constitutive Act and Articles 4(e)–(h) 
of the PSC Protocol can be regarded as pro-sovereignty, it is contradicted by Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act and Articles 4(j) and 6(d) of the PSC Protocol.98 If one 
accepts the R2P interpretation of sovereignty as “sovereignty as responsibility” rather 
than “sovereignty to control”, the pro-sovereignty clauses can still be interpreted in 
such a way as to embrace the responsibility to protect since protection of citizens 
where the state cannot still remains true to the principle of sovereignty – albeit the 
sovereignty to protect.
Whether African countries in fact support the R2P interpretation of sovereignty 
can be contested. The AU and some of its Member States have been very critical of 
the UN’s R2P principles. Arguments in this regard centre on the disproportionate 
application of the principle to African states.99 Even applying the R2P principles 
by AU Member States in the African context of non-indifference raises questions 
regarding acceptance of a definition of sovereignty. Not all African countries are in 
agreement regarding what sovereignty entails.
Witt100 elaborates on the different approaches proposed by the 18 African delegations 
that addressed sovereignty at the 2005 World Summit. The approach to sovereignty 
as a responsibility was generally supported by countries such as South Africa, 
Nigeria, Somalia and Sierra Leone.101 Support for sovereignty as possession (control) 
was expressed by countries such as Libya, Zimbabwe and Sudan.102 The divergent 
approaches clearly demonstrate that the AU Member States are not in agreement 
on the R2P sovereignty principle. The continent was eventually able to reach a 
common position by converging the two contested approaches in what came to be 
known as the Ezulwini Consensus.103 Although this did not solve all contestations, 
its representation of “African solutions for African problems” seems to be more 
acceptable on the continent.104
Considering the divergent understanding of sovereignty, the question can be 
raised whether there was a de facto paradigm shift from non-intervention to non-
indifference. Although the pervasive opinion is that the new approach of non-
indifference was indeed accepted,105 Welz argues that no comparative empirical 
material supports this assertion. He discusses a number of instances where the AU 
has indeed showed a willingness to deploy in spite of a lack of resources.106 The 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) as well as the peacekeeping missions 
in Darfur, Somalia and the Comoros reflect the AU’s willingness to ensure “peace, 
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security, and respect for human rights”.107 Unfortunately there are also a number of 
instances where the AU has failed to intervene, such as the situation in Zimbabwe in 
2008. Welz regards this as a manifestation of some AU states’ continued support for 
a non-interventionist approach.108 This results in situations where some AU states 
may still regard sovereignty in the context of sovereignty as control, unwilling to 
submit their sovereignty to the AU.109 Although the Constitutive Act legally limits 
the sovereignty of its Member States, this may not necessarily reflect the de facto 
situation. “Diplomatic sensitivity” may result in a continued unofficial support of 
non-intervention.110
It is generally accepted that the “intervention” referred to in both the Constitutive Act 
and the PSC Protocol refers to military intervention.111 Military intervention denotes 
a use of force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is clear on its prohibition on the use of 
force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations”. There are only 
two exceptions to this prohibition: (1) the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 
51 of the UN Charter; and (2) the use of force with the authorisation of the UNSC in 
terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.112 A combined force will therefore be able 
to intervene only with the consent of the UN. The conflict between Article 4(h) and 
Article 53 of the UN Charter has briefly been discussed above. In no instance does 
the UN Charter allow for military intervention without UNSC approval.
Since Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act does not expressly require UN authorisation, 
it may be politically convenient for African states to turn a blind eye to requesting UN 
authorisation. It should be kept in mind that Africa historically has not experienced 
the UNSC in a positive light. When the UN Charter was adopted and the UNSC was 
formed, African states – at that time still labouring under colonial rule – were not 
adequately represented in the UN. Five superpowers received veto powers, enabling 
them to influence decisions and exercise their veto powers to the detriment of the 
African continent, leaving the continent without proper recourse. At the end of the 
Cold War, when their political situation created a number of conflicts on the African 
continent, these same superpowers failed to assist in circumstances that could partly 
be attributed to their political agendas. The recent deterioration of AU–UN relations 
only exacerbates the problem.113
In the absence of UNSC authorisation, two arguments have been raised regarding the 
legality of such interventions.114
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First, is has been argued that intervention on humanitarian grounds or R2P would 
make such interventions legal. The discussion above has shown that the R2P, being a 
principle and not a treaty, did not in fact change international law. R2P can at most 
support an argument for moral obligation but does not make the intervention legal.
The second argument is based on the premise that intervention would be legal owing 
to the fact that AU Member States signed the Constitutive Act, thereby consenting to 
the possible use of force within their states. The concept of consent in international 
law is an important one. International law depends on the consent of those states that 
are governed by it.115 Accepting that AU states have consented to intervention could 
circumvent the prohibition against the use of force found in Article 2(4).116 The use 
of force against another state would be classified as an internationally wrongful act,117 
but the consent of the other state in question would preclude “the wrongfulness of 
the act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the 
limits of the consent”.118 It is argued that by ratifying the Constitutive Act the AU 
Member States have consented to AU intervention, accepting limitations on their 
sovereignty for this purpose.119
Two valid questions flow from this assertion:
 ◆ Can consent to intervention be given in advance?
 ◆ Can consent, once given, be withdrawn?
The grounds for intervention envisaged by the Constitutive Act are grave breaches 
of human rights – war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Protection of 
human rights is owed to all. Kuwali120 argues that the AU states have empowered their 
multinational organ, the AU, to intervene internally to prevent or end such mass 
atrocities. Consequently, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act is regarded as an “a 
priori invitation in the form of a statutory intervention to prevent or halt mass atrocity 
crimes”.121 The AU states have therefore consented in advance to the intervention 
where those states allow genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.122 It is 
further an accepted principle in international law that treaties signed by current 
governments are enforceable on successive governments.123
The exposition on consent as a legal ground for intervention is based on the 
widely held view that AU members readily agreed to all the terms as set out in the 
Constitutive Act – their unanimous adoption and swift ratification a manifestation 
of this agreement.124 Witt125 raises a persuasive argument to the contrary. She argues 
that the perceived consent is not a reflection of the actual truth. The subsequent 
developments and disagreements within the AU is a clear indication to the contrary. 
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A number of amendments were proposed within a year of the adoption of the 
Constitutive Act, a clear indication that some states did not agree with the original 
terms. Gadhafi was one of the Heads of States that argued that the Constitutive Act 
was not comprehensive enough and postulated that it was “only adopted in order to 
avoid delays”.126 The overall climate of change brought about during the necessary 
transition from the OAU to the AU created a perception of “African unity and 
renewal”, which in reality lacked a consensual basis.127 The divergent views of state 
sovereignty and R2P as discussed above should also be kept in mind. The lauded 
consent as legal ground allowing intervention in spite of the UN’s prohibition on the 
use of force may consequently not be as clear as originally perceived.
Where a state does not agree with the provisions of the Constitutive Act and refuses 
to submit to intervention and the Constitutive Act’s limitation of sovereignty, it 
may withdraw from the AU. The prescribed procedure for withdrawal from the 
Constitutive Act requires notification to the Chairperson of the AU Assembly and 
the state will still be subject to all its rights and duties for a period of 12 months after 
notification.128 This means that even if a country attempted to prevent intervention in 
its sovereignty owing to grave breaches, it could still be subjected to the intervention 
within that 12-month period, theoretically allowing the AU – utilising the rapid 
deployment of the ASF – to at least stop the atrocity. After the 12-month period 
the AU would have to withdraw. The Constitutive Act does not allow for partial 
withdrawal. If a state wishes to withdraw its consent for an Article 4(h) intervention, 
it will have to withdraw from the whole Constitutive Act.129
A matter of future concern may be the proposed Amendment Protocol to Article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act discussed above. Once the required number of ratifications 
is lodged, Member States will be able to approach the AU and request assistance 
“to [prevent] a serious threat to legitimate order [or] to restore peace and stability 
in the Member State of the Union”. Considering the AU’s commitment to reject 
unconstitutional changes of government,130 this stance should be lauded. It is 
generally accepted that such unconstitutional changes of government refer to coups 
d’etat, but Witt raises a valid concern regarding “constitutional manipulations”.131 
There are several instances within the AU where a serving government has changed 
the constitution to allow the incumbent president and government to remain in 
power. Human Rights Watch have reported on countries such as Equatorial Guinea, 
Zimbabwe and, most recently, President Nkurunziza of Burundi, to name a few 
examples. Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo similarly seeks to extend his 
reign, in spite of protests in Brazzaville that were met with lethal force by government 
forces.132 On whose side will the AU – possibly using the ASF – act?
32
the african standby force
In spite of muddied legal waters regarding the legality of interventionist deployments, 
it is no longer a question of whether the ASF should be deployed:133
“Sometimes … the use of military force may become necessary to 
defend human rights. But the grounds for its use in international law 
urgently need clarification … Finally, the legitimacy of such use of force 
will always be controversial, and will remain so, so long as we intervene 
to protect some people’s lives and not others.”134
The question is rather one of when it should be deployed. Political support of the ASF 
deployment is critical for legitimacy.135 The AU is faced with a challenge in deploying 
its forces in the event of grave breaches (scenario 6 deployments). Although African 
conflicts are mostly inter-state in nature, one must accept that regional actors 
will always be involved. This has a very detrimental effect on regional stability.136 
It creates a quandary. Due to regional instability, intervention may be required to 
maintain peace and security. The AU may need to deploy the ASF, composed of a 
regional brigade with troop contributors from within the unstable region. Such an 
intervention may be very difficult to accept where neighbouring countries may have 
additional agendas apart from the protection of human rights. Although, as argued 
above, states may not be in a position to refuse the intervention, this may create a 
situation where the state is vehemently opposed to the intervention, resulting in the 
ASF in conflict with government forces and unable to execute their mandate in terms 
of peacekeeping.
Burundi is a case in point. Burundi has had a long history of conflict. The latest 
crisis resulted from President Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term in power.137 The AU 
has been sending out peacekeeping missions since 2003, when AMIB deployed its 
first operation wholly planned and executed by the AU.138 On 17 December 2015 the 
PSC recommended that a peacekeeping mission be deployed to Burundi, requesting 
UNSC authorisation.139 To date the AU has not entered into any peacekeeping 
mission or intervention without the consent of the host country, in spite of Article 
4(h) allowing it to do so. Burundi is vehemently opposed to the deployment and has 
argued before the 26th Ordinary Summit of the AU that they would see any move to 
send peacekeepers to Burundi as an invasion. On 31 January 2016, after two days 
of deliberations, the AU announced that it would not be deploying peacekeepers 
in Burundi.140 This would have been the ideal opportunity for the AU to prove its 
commitment to human rights and non-indifference. What it has shown is a continued 
support for a non-interventionist mindset – realising the concerns raised above.
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Arguments for the legality of interventions have been made and although international 
law may be vague in this regard, the history of regional deployments, with or without 
UN authorisation and R2P, has shown the international community’s tacit acceptance 
of these interventions. This newest decision by the AU regarding Burundi has shown 
a lack of political will, analysts postulating that African nations are wary of setting 
a precedent of deploying troops against a state’s wishes.141 This does not bode well 
for the future of humanitarian interventions on the continent. With the political 
will reflecting an outdated OAU mindset it would seem as if many African leaders 
have still not made the shift from regime security to human security. Strong political 
leadership is necessary to ensure decisive action in support of non-indifference.142 
Unless the AU leadership shows the political will, the old culture of non-intervention 
will remain, limiting the ASF’s effectiveness before it has the opportunity to reach its 
full potential beyond 2015.
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From “Inhumanitarian  
Non-intervention” to Protection 
of Civilians (POC) – A Paradigmatic 
change in AU and UN Peace Missions?
Thomas Mandrup1
INTRODUCTION
“Robust peacekeeping should not be considered a new form of peacekeeping, 
but rather be normalised in a non-permissive environment.”2
The overarching theme of this book focuses on level of operational capability (FOC) 
of the African Standby Force (ASF). However, it is also an attempt to scrutinize and 
unpack the doctrinal and operational realities that carries and informs the design 
of the force. The current state of readiness was tested with a brigade-size field 
exercise, AMANI II, held in October/November 2015. It was the positive feedback 
from this exercise that led to the announcement in January 2016 that four of the five 
regions had managed to reach FOC. The validation of the FOC was delayed, and 
only happened in 2017. This shows how far the process of establishing the ASF has 
come, and stands in contrast to much of the literature on the ASF and the AU in 
general. In 2013 Antonia Witt, among other critics, argued that “the initial euphoria 
has somewhat vanished and been replaced by a rather pessimistic assessment of the 
future of the African Union”.3 Since this critique was raised the AU has experienced 
significant progress in its operations in Somalia (AMISOM), where together with 
the Somali National Army, it has managed to exercise presence in most parts of 
south-central Somalia, something that a few years ago would have been considered 
very unlikely.4 To illustrate this success, the regional organisation on the Horn of 
Africa, the Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), held its summit in 
Mogadishu, and national elections have been relatively successfully organised. The 
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AU has in recent years sanctioned and launched peace-operations in for instance 
the Gambia, in Sahel and the regional anti-Boko Haram force, whilst African 
soldiers constitute more than 50 per cent of the deployed soldiers in current UN 
operations. This illustrates that the AU, and its regional entities, have come a long 
way in implementing the security architecture, and providing the AU and its member 
states with an effective tool handling and addressing the security challenges and 
conflict still facing the continent. It also illustrate that the AU have evolved from 
the first unarmed observer missions in Darfur and the peace-keeping mission in 
Burundi, to undertaking more robust operations. However, the ASF has been long in 
the making, and the tasks, mandates and operations the African and UN led peace 
missions are asked to undertake have changed. Current mandates are seemingly 
increasingly robust, and have more to do with peace-enforcement, than more 
traditional peace-missions. The operations in Somalia, Mali and Northern Nigeria 
are cases in point. This raises a number of issues for the AU and UN, something 
that was also highlighted in the so-called 2015 Hippo Report. The ASF was initially 
not designed to undertake these types of operations, which also led to the initiation 
of the Maputo 2020 reform process. It furthermore also led to the establishment of 
the interim ACIRC intervention force, spearheaded by South Africa that is thought 
of as a tool to deal with robust operations, something that Brosig addresses later 
in this book. This chapter therefore scrutinises the development of mandates that 
the AU will be expected to undertake in the future, and what role the AU likely will 
be asked to undertake in future operations. The chapter furthermore also addresses 
some expected consequences of the increased use of force in peace missions, why 
the missions are mandating increasingly robust operations, and whether softer tools 
have been lost on the way?
THE ASF
The ASF constitutes one element in the combined AU African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) and is mentioned in Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Peace and 
Security Council Protocol, which constitutes the legal framework for the APSA and 
consequently the ASF.5 The APSA therefore constitutes an institutional framework in 
which the different tasks involved in handling peace and security have been given to 
the various elements of the APSA. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s 
stated ambition of creating an African renaissance has been confronted with a reality 
in which the development and the institutional capacity-building of the AU and the 
APSA have been slower than anticipated. Furthermore, the political will amongst 
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the AU member states to find consensus on both implementing and establishing of 
the APSA and ASF structures, and on how to use them has often been difficult to 
achieve. The publication of policy documents such 2020 Silencing of the Guns, and 
the 2063 – The Africa we want, are important normative documents that gives some 
guidance and indication on the direction the AU want’s to strive for. It also provides 
guidance for the use of the ASF, and its military instruments. 
One explanation of why the establishment of the ASF has been slower than planned 
is found in the impact that the Arab Spring and the fall of the Libyan and Egyptian 
regimes, formerly staunch economic and military AU supporters, had on the AU. 
These two countries, together with Algeria, South Africa and Nigeria, have so far paid 
the largest share of the contributions to the AU.6 
Despite its shortfalls, since its formation the AU has become increasingly important 
in handling peace and security on the African continent, both in its own name and 
as part of so-called hybrid missions. Its increased involvement features on several 
levels, as both diplomatic initiatives and actual military deployments. This has 
altered the structures that handle peace and security on the continent, as well as the 
power balance within Africa. As Møller et al7 argued in 2009, dissatisfaction with 
the structure of the international system and its lack of representativeness mean 
that the principle of subsidiarity has been a significant driving force in setting the 
new agenda of the AU. The AU is today a political force to reckon with, driven by 
the mantra of “African Solutions to African Problems”, as well as the principle of 
local ownership. However, this principle is so often driven more by national interests 
than by a normative idea of pan-Africanism, a term in which this principle is often 
rhetorically wrapped.
THE PSC
When it comes to the AU’s ambition to increase its capacity to pre-empt, prevent and 
eventually stop conflicts, the African Peace and Security Council (PSC) has become 
the forum that mandates and stipulates the AU’s political ambitions. Its experiences 
have meant that the AU increasingly provides the military forces it deploys under a 
robust mandate. In trying to get the UN Security Council (UNSC) to provide what 
are considered to be the “necessary” mandates, the reasoning used is to ask why we 
should deploy a peacekeeping force when there is no peace to keep. In June 2015 the 
Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations published the so-called “Hippo Report”, 
in which it argued that:
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“There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked 
of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. This 
gap can be – must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organisation’s 
peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to 
the challenges to come. With a current generation of conflicts proving 
difficult to resolve and with new ones emerging, it is essential that UN 
peace operations, along with regional and other partners, combine 
their respective comparative advantages and unite their strengths in the 
service of peace and security.”8
However, the AU is a product of its member states and their interpretations and 
policy ambitions for the future. Algeria for example has continuously supported 
the principle of non-interference and opposes the new principles of human security 
and non-indifference being promoted in the AU Charter.9 Algeria also illustrates the 
difficult balance that has been struck between supporting the principle of the non-
acceptance of unconstitutional changes of government, and the decision to alter the 
constitution to allow President Boutiflika to secure a third term in office in 2008.10 
Another example of this double standard was the decision to appoint Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni as the mediator in relation to the constitutional crises 
in Burundi and in the DR Congo, even though he himself had altered the Ugandan 
constitution to be able to stay on as president. 
Furthermore, the problems of insurgency and international terror facing the Sahel 
region have once again challenged the norms promoted in the AU Charter. As 
Williams argues, and as seen in the reaction of the dominant non-Western states to 
the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the R2P norm has been accepted by UN 
member states only to the extent that it does not make possible interventions outside 
the UN system.11 After the Libyan intervention, for instance, BRICS member states 
made it very clear that they do not support the concept of R2P in its present form, 
since it is seen as a tool whereby the more powerful states in the current international 
system can target other states and political systems they find problematic.12 Another 
example of the difficult relationship between norms and real politics in Africa was 
the announcement by South Africa, Burundi and Gambia in October 2016 that they 
were leaving the Rome Statute and therefore the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
a decision South Africa had to retract from due to domestic political and judicial 
issues. However, it illustrates the ongoing normative battles amongst AU member 
states, and which informs the decisions on how and when to use military tools. Since 
the AU’s inception, politics and security have meant a constant struggle between the 
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norms of human security, including the right to intervene and R2P, set against the 
principle of non-interference with sovereign state actors. 
UN PEACE-MISSIONS AND THEIR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
“A number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment 
where there is little or no peace to keep … the strain on their operational 
capabilities and support systems is showing, and political support is 
often stretched thin.”13
The UN and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) 
have concluded that, beyond of a certain level of battlefield violence, peacekeeping 
operations generally cease to be capable of significantly influencing the course of 
events.14 Along the same lines, Nadin, et al. in 2015 concluded that:
“The current UN operations constitute the worst of two worlds, 
decentralised military command, and strong political control …”15
The latter is, of course, a harsh judgement that is also very dependent on the context 
within which operations are carried out and also on what one believes to be the 
operational role and responsibility of the military. Naturally this statement also 
needs to be viewed in light of the fact that never in its history has the UN deployed 
as many soldiers in peace-missions as it is doing in 2017, with more than 100 000 
being deployed around the world, but primarily in Africa.16 However, this level of 
deployment was based on experiences from UN and AU PSO operations since the 
publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000, which put forward a whole range of 
reform proposals, many of which were never implemented, or overtaken by the new 
reality of more robust and complex mandates. 
In late 2014 the UN decided there was a need for another review of its peacekeeping 
operations, so it established a panel under the chairmanship of José Ramos Horta. The 
UN missions have changed dramatically, as was evident, amongst other things, from 
the sheer rise in the number of casualties among UN peacekeepers (38) in 2014. In 
addition, the increasingly complex mandates, including demands for, and execution 
of the Protection of Civilians (POC) being integrated into mission mandates, played 
a role as well. The increasingly robust tools being mandated moved beyond the 
principle of using force in only in defence of the mission, which characterised earlier 
peace-missions. The UN deployed increasingly into so-called stabilisation force 
operations, with the purpose of neutralising an often strategically asymmetric enemy 
and promoting and protecting the legitimate political order.17 However, it is also 
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important to recognise that stabilisation missions in UN terminology, for instance 
the United Nations Mission to the Congo (MONUSCO). Congo, has since 2010 
been called a stabilisation mission, which was supposed to signal a move from a 
more dominant and robust UN role, to a more passive and less robust role. A second 
tendency was that UN peacekeepers have increasingly been the target of attacks by 
insurgents. This also has to do with the increasing numbers of troops the UN has 
deployed since the end of the Cold War, often into non-permissive environments.
It was former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld who, with the establishment 
of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in 1956, laid down the principles 
for what became known as UN peacekeeping operations right up to the end of the 
Cold War. The only exception was the UN force (United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC)) in post-colonial Congo in the 1960s, the first multidimensional 
UN peacekeeping operation.18 The principles that characterised these typical Chapter 
VI operations included consent from the parties to the conflict, impartiality and the 
non-use of force except in self-defence.19 This norm came to constitute the framework 
for UN PSOs and can still be found in many interpretations of mandates in the 21st 
century. The consequence was, and still is, that UN peacekeepers have generally been 
lightly armed, since they were not being deployed to enforce compliance.20 
Current UN operations are multidimensional and comprehensive, and there is 
close co-operation between military and civilian efforts. Nonetheless, the norm of 
the non-use of force is still prevalent in the international system, and the Brahimi 
Report stressed the fact that military peacekeeping cannot replace political efforts or 
the process of solving a conflict or crisis peacefully. However, the argument here is 
that military means are increasingly being used to create the space for a negotiated 
settlement. This is in line with Galtung’s argument that a conflict needs to have reached 
a certain “ripeness” before it can be solved. The parties to a conflict need to have 
reached a point where they believe that the cessation of hostilities and a negotiated 
settlement best serve their interests. However, this also calls for a comprehensive 
approach to this type of mission, since the robust military tool can only solve certain 
military-related tasks, such as neutralising or clearing an enemy force while other 
types of institutions need to hold and rebuild the freed areas.
The trend of providing the UN mission with more, often Chapter VII mandates, started 
in 1992 in the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) and later the UNISOM II forces 
deployed to Somalia to counter the collapse of the Somali state and the consequences 
of the ensuing multi-actor civil war.21 The reason for sending in the UNITAF force 
was that one of the main actors in the civil war, Mohamed Farah Aidid, withdrew his 
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consent to the deployment of the initial UN force, which had severe consequences 
for the delivery of food aid to the civilian population. Instead of withdrawing the 
UN force, the UN Security Council decided to expand it and its mandate, with 
the focus on the protection of the civilian population and the delivery of food aid. 
The UNISOM II force, which replaced the short-term UNITAF force, was, among 
other things, given a mandate to disarm the different militia groups, something that 
proved rather difficult. The clash on 5 June 1993, when 24 peacekeepers lost their 
lives trying to access one of Aidid’s weapons caches, was an important event since it 
started a process of “mission creep” that turned the deployment into an enforcement 
operation under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This meant giving up the principle of 
impartiality, imposing peace in the midst of war and implementing the terms of a 
peace agreement.22 As Nadin et al. argues, this type of operation resembles fighting 
a war, and the lessons learned from this ill-fated operation were to be included 
in the Brahimi Report. One of the conclusions argued that the UN was good at 
peacekeeping, but that peace enforcement was more difficult, since it depended on 
troop contributions from its member states. 
The UNISOM II experience, operating in parallel to the US Task Force Ranger, 
provided other important lessons for future UN operations, namely that this type 
of force needs to be under joint command, or at least co-ordinated in its efforts. 
This later became relevant when the SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was 
deployed to the DR Congo as a supplement to the existing MONUSCO force. 
Another change in the UN’s operations in Africa after the end of the cold war has 
been that AU forces have often been deployed as Chapter VIII operations and then 
later been re-hatted into a UN operation, as happened in Mali, Darfur and CAR, but 
not in Somalia.23 Then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
Edmond Mulet, averred that AMISOM was too dangerous a mission for the UN to 
undertake. However, this does not mean that the AU has been left to its own devices 
– rather, it illustrates a new division of labour in which AU member states provide the 
troops on the ground, whilst international actors like the USA, UN and EU provide 
the funding and enablers to operationalise the mission. This division of labour was 
partly mentioned in the Brahimi Report, which produced important doctrinal 
recommendations for future operations, including what was to become known as 
the “new impartiality”, which implied impartiality in relation to the objective of the 
mandate, but not necessarily impartiality in relation to the parties to the conflict. 
However, the Brahimi Report also recognised that for UN missions to be successful 
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there was a need for a commitment to peace amongst the actors on the ground, or 
alternatively a need for alternative solutions.24 
The role of UN missions has been changing in the sense that, in deploying contemporary 
military forces, the international community has become more ambitious. Thus the 
deployed forces are there not just to oversee a negotiated peace settlement between 
two or more opposing parties, but often have a peace-making element built into the 
mandate. Post-Cold War operations have increasingly been conducted without the 
consent of all the parties to the conflict and before any settlement has been reached. 
Since 1990 there has been a paradigmatic change away from state-based military 
interventions to a situation in which more than 50 per cent of all military interventions 
in Africa are being conducted by the UN, the AU or regional organisations like the 
EU and more often than not with interlocking institutions.25 However, it is not only 
on the practical side that increased co-operation between these three institutions 
can be detected. Norm convergence emerged as well to the extent that the protection 
of civilians has become the core business of peacekeeping.26 This norm has trickled 
down from the UN into the policies of the two other institutions. 
With the approval of the R2P concept in the UN General Assembly in 2003, the 
protection of civilians in PSOs was also institutionalised as an integral part of the 
mandates issued to deployed PSO operations. A good example of this is the UN 
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (), which, since the start of the civil war in 
2013, has opened camps to provide protection and shelter for the civilian victims 
of the fighting. However, despite the fact that UNMISS has seen POC as one of its 
primary duties, the force Commander, Lt Gen Ondieki of Kenya, was relieved of his 
duties by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for failing in this task. POC has also, 
for instance, affected the Indian contingent in MONUSCO, which has been criticised 
for a similar failure. In November 2008, in North Kivu, the force failed to intervene 
to stop what has become known as the Kiwanja massacre, which left 150 villagers 
dead in a village located just half a kilometre away from an Indian peacekeeping 
base. Human Rights Watch subsequently published a report The UN’s Inability 
to Protect Civilians, which was highly critical of the UN Peacekeepers’ role in DR 
Congo.27 Adding to the UN’s embarrassment was the fact that then force commander 
MONUC, Lt Gen Gaye, in his force commander’s directive of January 2008, had 
stressed the importance of the deployed forces’ responsibilities for protecting the 
civilian population against threats and actual violence.28 Consequently, there were no 
excuses for the deployed force not intervening. However, this also has to be combined 
with the fact that the Special Representative of the Secretary Genral (UN) (SRSG) for 
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MONUC, Alan Doss, had continually warned that if the MONUC force did not get 
the additional 3 000 troops and sixteen helicopters it had been promised, it would 
seriously hamper the force’s flexibility, response time and operational capability, and 
consequently the ability of the operation to fulfil its mandate.29 The Kiwanja tragedy 
had several consequences in addition to the embarrassment it caused the UN in 
general, especially for the MONUSCO mission, which was severely criticised for its 
inability to protect the civilian population. It was no longer acceptable for the UN 
to witness atrocities passively without interfering. Such experiences prompted the 
negative attitude often found among African military and political leaders, who calls 
for robust answers and asks why peacekeepers are sent in if there is no peace to keep.
THE AU MISSIONS AND THE APSA – STRUCTURE
In the Constitutive Act of the AU, its mission is stated as the creation of
“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own 
citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”.30
Since the formation of the AU in 2002, the organisation has deployed or mandated 
twelve PSOs, either as hybrid AU/UN missions or as pure AU operations.31 The AU 
has therefore been a game changer and has actively attempted to manage security 
challenges and conflicts on the continent. However, the debate on the effectiveness of 
these deployments, especially the FOC of the forces, has been called into question, as 
the quote above illustrates. The AMANI II exercise showed that in conjunction with 
one of the continental powers, willing AU member states can field relatively effective 
military forces. However, the deployments undertaken by AU member states so far 
tell different stories about their capabilities and effectiveness to conduct and sustain 
military operations. It can also be argued that a serious question mark hangs over 
the ability of the AU to play the role envisaged for it in the Hippo Report as the 
UN’s strategic partner in promoting peace and security. It is doubtful whether AU 
member states have the strategic assets to conduct robust military operations over 
longer periods of time, or to project military power over long distances due to limited 
strategic lift capabilities and air assets in general.
The legal framework is in place in the Constitutive Act of the AU to mandate and 
deploy for robust operations. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act allows the AU 
to intervene without prior consent from the government of the state in question – 
a so-called humanitarian military intervention. However, the AU and its member 
states have yet to authorise any such mission, and for various political reasons it is 
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seems very unlikely that they will be willing to do so in the near future.32 The AU 
Summit in January 2016 was an interesting illustration of this, despite the changes 
in the organization’s attitudes towards interventions that were also evident. However, 
the concept of Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), and subsequently the interim 
force labelled the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), will, 
in principle, provide the AU and its regional actors with a tool capable of performing 
such a task, something that has been absent until now. During the escalating crisis 
in 2015 in Burundi the AU PSC actually threatened and prepared an intervention to 
stop a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation from turning into genocide. 
This was vehemently opposed by the Burundian government, which argued that 
it had the situation under control and would consider any intervention an act of 
aggression against Burundi. The threat to use force did not materialise, since there 
was no political appetite amongst AU member states for an intervention without 
Burundian consent. 
This example is interesting at several levels, since it shows the weakness of the AU in 
handling crises by using military force, alongside a shift towards the rhetoric of the 
AU becoming increasingly forceful and robust, something that was previously not the 
case in what was a consensus-based political environment. Burundi also illustrates 
the increasingly important role that the PSC is playing in the daily handling of peace 
and security issues in Africa, a development in which the AU is making greater use 
of robust military measures. Again, the mantra that has emerged within the AU is 
that there is no need to send in a peacekeeping force if there is no peace to keep. As 
mentioned earlier, international and regional peacekeeping since the end of the Cold 
War has often failed and been unable to effectively protect civilians against attacks 
from armed actors, i.e. fulfil its POC mandated tasks. Such deployments create a 
false feeling of security and protection, since in many cases the deployed forces have 
failed to protect the very civilians they were sent there to protect in the first place. 
The regional, AU and UN forces in CAR, Mali, Sudan and DR Congo are excellent 
cases in point. If one then adds the problems that several AU and UN missions have 
had with alleged cases of sexual abuse, the feeling that deployments do not serve the 
interests of local populations become even more compelling.
The raison d’être for the establishment of the ASF as an element of the APSA was to 
create a tool that could be used and introduced to pre-empt or stop violent conflict 
from erupting or to intervene under grave circumstances.33 However, the ASF also 
functions as a tool that can be used to support the other elements of the APSA, this 
flexible use of the ASF being foreseen in the Protocol. This has been the case ever 
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since the AU has deployed forces (yet to be in the regionally envisaged formation) 
in many different types of operations, ranging from observer missions to peace 
enforcement. It was written into the protocol that AU missions, and therefore the 
ASF force, should be multidimensional and nationally owned and established, but 
during a mission it should be the responsibility of the Chairman of the PSC, which 
also has the responsibility for providing the funds for the operation.34
Since its creation the AU been heavily involved in both classic PSO operations and, 
in recent years especially, in so-called stabilisation and even enforcement operations. 
The organisation has conducted and deployed for hybrid operations in co-operation 
with the UN (in the form of regional operations) and for AU operations, with a 
force drawn from a coalition of willing African partner states. The APSA structure 
has a whole range of tools available to it, which means that, for instance, it can 
send in its Panel of the Wise to mediate and pre-empt conflicts or prevent them 
escalating, but it also has military tools ranging from unarmed observers to an 
envisaged strengthened battalion-sized RDC. In reality the AU and its five regions 
lack the necessary capabilities, especially enablers that would allow them to operate 
independently. This means that, for AU forces to deploy, they need international 
financial and logistical support. 
In 2015 more than 90 per cent of the costs of AU operations was covered by 
international donors, who provide the majority of the funding available in the 
African Peace Fund. The AMISOM forces in Somalia is a good illustration of 
this reality. However, does this mean that the AU forces are defunct? Yes, and no. 
The different regions are at very different stages of development in setting up the 
structures for the regional brigades to be operational: the EASF declared its force 
fully operational in December 2014, whereas North Africa has hardly started. 
However, this only applies to the technical side of things, since the importance of 
the creation of increased interregional trust and co-operation, which has resulted in 
several of the regions, should not be underestimated. Eastern and Southern Africa 
are both excellent examples of this, regions that have been plagued by conflict and 
hostility between states since independence, but where this has to some extent been 
replaced by increased co-operation in the handling of a whole range of cross-border 
challenges, such as smuggling and cattle-rustling, and therefore not just co-operation 
on military issues.
One of the immediate realisations of AU members when it came to designing the ASF 
and writing its doctrine was the need for a more robust force than the doctrine for 
the UN Standby Force (SHIRBRIG) had allowed, since the post-Cold War trend in 
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UN operational mandates had been to increase the use of force, as well as introducing 
an element of responsibility for the protection of civilians since 2003. In April 2013, 
African leaders realised – among other things as a direct consequence of the AU’s 
inability to intervene in Mali and the failure of the South African intervention in 
CAR – that to be able to live up to the POC principles there was a need to create 
a continental rapid-response capacity. Accordingly ACIRC was established, 
though amidst controversy.35 Critics in AU member states themselves argued that 
establishing such a capacity would undermine attempts to establish the ASF and 
its RDCs. However, what this also demonstrated was the existence of an ideational 
commitment to the norm of protection of the civilian population.36 Missions realities 
are unfortunately another story, where the AU, according to Dembinski & Schott, 
finds it difficult to live up to the principle of doing no harm.37 The difficulties faced 
by AU forces were illustrated by the first AU mission to be deployed with an explicit 
mandate to protect the civilian population, the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), which 
was sent to Darfur to stop atrocities taking place. In 2004 the mandate was expanded 
with a protection element. A key to this development was also the mantra, at least in 
theory, that the establishment of the AU was a move away from the principle of non-
interference to one of non-indifference. By 2013 the AU had deployed an impressive 
total of more than 80 000 peacekeepers in either AU or hybrid missions in Africa.
THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT: WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING – BUILDING OR 
BUYING PEACE?
“However, in the face of these advances, Al-Shabaab continued to adapt, 
launching asymmetric attacks and blocking access to some of the newly 
recovered areas. It also expanded its presence in Puntland and became a 
more significant threat within the sub-region.”38
It is always good to start with some positive facts. The number of wars and conflicts 
in Africa has declined tremendously since the end of the Cold War and reached 
an all-time low in 2005. However, in recent years conflicts have increased again, 
but is still significantly lower than the average level in 1990–1999.39 However, the 
difficulties and casualties experienced by AMISOM forces in Somalia in late 2015 
and early 2016 at the hands of Al-Shabaab illustrate the problems highlighted above. 
Furthermore, the attacks are an illustration of the fact that PSO operations have 
become increasingly dangerous for peacekeepers. It is also important to note that 
violence in armed conflicts serves a strategic purpose and should not be considered 
an irrational consequence of war.40 However, several states in Africa continue to be 
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plagued by war, and then AU Commission Chairman, Dr N Zuma, concluded in her 
opening speech to the IGAD summit in 2015 that, for instance, South Sudan was 
facing one of its worse food-security crises in its history, a direct consequence of the 
continued internal struggle between the different factions of the SPLM.41
Some of the concepts we are often faced with and that constitute conventional wisdom 
in contemporary military planning –“hybridity” and asymmetry for example – are 
seen as threats and as constituting new and different security threats to national 
security and to participants in so-called “multi-dimensional” peace-missions. But 
the questions that need further scrutiny are, first, to what extent this really is the case; 
secondly, what is meant by “hybridity” and “strategic asymmetry” to begin with; and, 
thirdly, what implications this might have for African PSOs, if any. The logic seems 
to be that, because of the changes mentioned above, a very different approach to the 
organisation and training of their security forces is needed. The reality for the force 
commander is often that, in this type of environment, it can be difficult to determine 
who the civilians needing protection are, who the combatants are, where the zones 
of conflict are.
THE OPPONENTS FACING EXTERNAL INTERVENTION FORCES
“A United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia would be a ‘high-
risk undertaking’, considering the threats posed by Al-Shabaab militants 
and despite advances made by the African Union Mission in the 
country (AMISOM) … ‘Progress would not have been possible without 
the continuing sacrifices of AMISOM troops and the Somali National 
Army. Their heroism deserves our collective tribute.42
The AU’s recent peacekeeping experiences in, for instance, CAR, Somalia and Mali 
suggests dangerous missions and that the strategic response, subsequent military 
planning and tactical implementation must and will be very different. For instance, 
in CAR 300 highly specialised and well-trained RSA special forces and paratroopers 
were faced with a much larger and relatively well-equipped Seleka rebel force 
consisting of an estimated 7 000–10 000 effectives. The AU MISCA force and the 
French forces were faced with mobs and militias spread out all over CAR, requiring 
mobility and a large number of troops. In the latter case it can be argued that the need 
is for a larger number of police or gendarmerie-type forces (FPU), because in general 
soldiers are not trained to conduct police work.43 In short, the experience of CAR 
highlights the need for a conventionally robust force and an agile or mobile force with 
specialised units, including a large police element. At the same time, it is necessary 
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to take the size of the deployed force into account, as argued in Noel Anderson’s 
article on AMISOM and Paul D Williams’s paper on African peacekeeping.44 That 
is, if the deployed mission is to be effective in achieving its mission, it needs the 
necessary mandate and the means, in terms of both numbers and quality, to fulfil its 
mandate. This is most often not the case as some conventional African forces can win 
the war against a supposedly asymmetric enemy, but have difficulties in winning the 
peace. Nigeria’s experiences in northern Nigeria tells a similar story, namely that a 
well-trained and mobile force can win the military confrontation with relative ease 
against an asymmetric enemy, but if the state does not fill the governance vacuum 
left behind, the insurgents will regain their lost territory. The Chairman of STTEP 
International, Eeben Barlow, stated at a seminar in Copenhagen that the biggest 
challenge in winning the war was getting the state party to win the peace, i.e. to fill 
the institutional vacuum after a successful military intervention.45
In Somalia, as in Mali, the opposition has assumed many shapes and forms, including 
that of internationalised Jihadist insurgencies.46 AMISOM is fighting a counter-
insurgency war with a very robust engagement strategy. This mission is not a peace 
mission, and it can be argued that robustness and the use of force are common 
denominators when talking about African PSO deployments. The Ethiopian and later 
the Ugandan experiences in fighting the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and later Al-
Shabaab, provide important lessons regarding the need for tactical house-to-house 
searches and a trench war in Mogadishu against an often invisible enemy. Has the 
AMISOM mission been a success? Maybe. Has Al-Shabaab been beaten? Not likely. 
It has been weakened, but is still capable of regaining strength, “sleeping” and waiting. 
The cases above have illustrated the importance of military momentum and of not 
prolonging military operations because one’s opponent will then learn one’s modes of 
operation. This illustrates that the rebels have time on their side, whilst an occupying 
force like the AU has only limited time to resolve the situation. This is an important 
factor about how you must structure your force, and especially what components 
need to be included, comprehensiveness being the key issue. In a later chapter in this 
publication, Eeben Barlow argues that Western-led military training programmes 
most often train African armies to fail, since this training is not based on what is 
needed locally, but on the donor countries’ conventional model army – an army that 
African states often cannot afford and which very often are not called on to fight an 
asymmetric opponent. Some African military leaders make the same kind of mistake 
in organising their forces around a conventional Western military model that is not 
affordable within the existing budgetary framework and also not in the years to come. 
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Another matter of concern in the Somali case is the increased internationalisation 
of the conflict and its actors. Consequently, to view a conflict like that in Somalia 
as a “national” conflict is too limited. Another lesson is that the decision to deploy 
regional troops into a conflict zone is often problematic, not only in respect of solving 
the conflict but also because of the destabilising effects this might have on the troop 
contributors themselves – Kenya being a prime example. Another issue is the extent 
to which the intervention is conducive to supporting the host government. For a 
long time the idea of the formal state has been the driving force in post-conflict 
reconstructing, but in the case of Somalia it can be argued that the central government 
is a key problem in solving the conflict, indeed the problem! In addition, local 
ownership is an issue that negatively influences all operations, especially AMISOM, 
where a high number of recruits have deserted, and it might be argued that local 
ownership does not exist or is limited. 
The Somalia analyst Joakim Gundel recently commented that it was fine for the 
Somali government to call for more international support in curbing and fighting 
the challenge from Al-Shabaab, but it would be better if it had started by using the 
vast resources made available to it, paid its military forces and created the capabilities 
it needs. This actually points to another dimension of shaping deployed forces, which 
is that military leaders should use the funds made available to them efficiently – an 
excellent point made by Gerhard Louw concerning South African forces – but also 
that it is not enough to do what you do efficiently: it is also necessary to do the right 
things efficiently.47 
In Mali the PSO forces have been faced with yet a different kind of enemy, but with 
some similarities to the type of conflict we have seen in other regions in Africa, a 
local conflict that has become part of a global struggle, or what Mark Shaw refers 
to as “glocal”. Using rhetoric and concrete elements and support from international 
jihadists groups and their ideas, the marginalisation of the Tuareg has become an 
international problem. The struggle itself has had several phases: an initial insurgency 
or rebellion, a more conventional phase, and an insurgency against an invisible 
enemy using asymmetric fighting tools. Similar to CAR, and Somalia for that matter, 
the geography to soldier ratio for the occupying force is problematic. In the case 
of Mali, the UN force finds it difficult to dominate and sustain its operations in the 
north of the country. Another problem for African and international forces is that, 
as the conflict becomes internationalised, the methods used by the opposition also 
become more sophisticated, such as the advanced use of IEDs, which means that 
the international force needs different kinds of equipment, such as armoured cars in 
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place of soft-skinned vehicles. The question then is the extent to which this is new 
and different: if you ask South Africans about their early experiences in Angola and 
northern Namibia, they would recognize several of these points.
THE OPERATIONS
“The… prognosis is not good. Analysis reveals that AMISOM is 
undermanned; that the Federal Government of Somalia fields too few 
Somali National Army units, that both AMISOM and Somali forces lack 
the resources and force enablers needed to accomplish their objectives, 
and that neither force possesses the capacity to sustain combat 
operations over the long term… [T]he optimism many have expressed 
for the mission is misplaced.”48
The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established under a UN Chapter 
VII mandate in February 2007 as a replacement for the Ethiopian occupation force 
in south-central Somalia It was a campaign that had cost the Ethiopian forces heavy 
losses, the urban fighting in Mogadishu proving especially difficult for them.49 
AMISOM was initially represented as an AU peacekeeping mission, which, of course, 
it was not. Peacekeeping requires, among other things, consent, impartiality and 
the use of force only in self-defence or in defence of the mission.50 It was also not 
a peace enforcement operation, which would traditionally be defined as “coercive 
action…to restore or maintain international peace and security”.51 However, peace 
enforcement is reactive in its use of force, whereas a counter-insurgency (COIN) 
operation will typically focus on attacking the enemy. David Galula once argued that 
COIN focuses on:
“Destroying or expelling from an area the main body of guerrilla 
forces, preventing their return, installing garrisons to protect the 
population, tracking the guerrilla remnants – these are predominately 
military operations.”52
In Iraq and Afghanistan the COIN strategy was based on a people-centric approach, 
the key words being “clear, hold, and build”.53 In Somalia the AMISOM approach has 
been inspired by a similar strategy of separating the population from the insurgents 
and providing it with protection. This, of course, has to be combined with effective 
and well-coordinated information campaigns, all of which have been visible during 
the multidimensional AMISOM mission, which has been combined with a civilian 
UN and EU presence.
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AMISOM is illustrative for several reasons. It was an operation deployed with the 
expectation amongst certain members of the AU that the UN would take over 
responsibility for it after the initial AU deployment – a modus that can be seen in 
several similar operations in Africa. However, the UN never promised to re-hat 
the AMISON mission, and the mission has to large extent become a much-needed 
success story for the AU, and indeed for the whole narrative of “African Solutions 
to African problems”. By adopting a US-inspired counter-insurgency strategy 
the force has managed to turn the negative momentum of the war against the Al-
Shabaab insurgents. 
The background to this relative success can be found on several levels. There was the 
determination on the part of the AU and the coalition of states to make this a success. 
There has been massive international support for the operation in both logistics and 
training, as well as, especially, financing. However, this illustrates an important point, 
namely that most African countries cannot deploy themselves without international 
support because, among other things, they lack the necessary enablers and the 
logistical supply chains. This highlights one weaknesses of the current ASF structure, 
namely that it will be able to operate and sustain an operation only if it receives 
international support. The AMISOM operation also illustrates the lack of capacity 
in the civilian dimension of the ASF, which has so far been narrowly focused on 
the military dimension. However, the question of course being to what extent this 
is a capacity that the AU should build itself. Alternatively, should it rely on foreign 
partners like the UN or the EU to provide and undertake the civilian responsibility 
and focus on the military and police dimension?
In DR Congo the SADC countries operationalised an old plan that meant sending in 
a robust regional force, the SADC FIB, to effectively handle the rebel groups that were 
disrupting the potential for peace in that country. When the UNSC passed Resolution 
2098 on 28 March 2013 it created history in more than one respect. The deployment 
of a parallel force of 3 000 soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania as a 
robust supplement to the existing UN stabilisation mission, MONUSCO, meant that 
a combat force had been deployed to effectively handle the militias that were creating 
continued instability in the eastern DR Congo.54 Experiences from UNISOM II had 
shown that a parallel operation between a UN blue force and a green force possesses 
a number of challenges, especially if the two operations are not properly co-ordinated 
and are under separate command structures.55 However, the recent FIB deployment, 
the operations in Mali and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 
show that this combination can work. 
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The deployment of the FIB is interesting for several reasons. It is an example of the 
increased use of robust means that the AU has been calling for, representing, one 
could argue, the “militarisation of peacekeeping”, with its increased reliance on the 
use of force. This is a not unproblematic, since it signifies a decreasing faith in non-
violent means of conflict resolution. The more robust tools also do not necessarily 
deliver the desired result unless they are supported and accompanied by other 
types of engagement, such as a political process and dialogue, civilian presence and 
capacity-building. The FIB is also illustrative on another level, since it is an example 
of the type of division of tasks between regional organisations and the UN that are 
envisaged in the Hippo review. The FIB is a robust instrument, regionally owned, 
with a separate mandate, whilst the MONUSCO force still operates as a regular UN 
PSO under a Chapter VII mandate. The FIB is also illustrative in another way, since its 
initial success against the M23 rebel group has not provided the desired momentum 
against some of the other rebel groups. One of the problems facing the FIB, and 
MONUSCO in general, has been opposition from the host government, making it 
difficult to deploy and operate.
THE CAPABILITY AND NUMERICAL GAP
“… [M]any peace operations in Africa have suffered from a gap between 
expectations and capabilities.”56
In a seminal report from 2010 Paul D Williams argued that, for a peacekeeping force 
to be effective in a zone of crisis, the ratio of deployed forces needs to be around two 
to ten per thousand affected civilians, meaning that the actual UN force in North 
Kivu should not have been the 6 000 total actually deployed, but between 10 000 and 
50 000 troops, depending on how you measure the affected zones and individuals.57 
This is, of course, a problematic way of estimating the required number of forces, 
since the nature of the forces, the capabilities that they bring and the extent to which 
they are tailored to the actual needs of the operation are equally important factors. 
In addition, there are problems related to the time lines of deployments, since many 
Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) are slow to commit and then deploy troops 
late, making it difficult to reach the full authorised force strength. In addition, the 
forces made available to the UN and AU mostly come from less-developed countries, 
which often lack the strategic enablers required. However, and more importantly, 
developments within the field of PSO operations during the last decade also point 
to the fact that distinctions have to be made between the different types of operation, 
that is, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and COIN, which are conceptually and 
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doctrinally different. It is, of course, of the utmost importance that the forces deployed 
are trained and configured to handle these types of operations, which is often not the 
case. The AMISOM, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and UNMISS operations are all recent 
examples of this, where, for instance, the requested air assets have not been made 
available by the troop-contributing countries.
CONCLUSION
One of the biggest threats to security is the lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the situation on the ground. A good example of this is the operations in DR Congo, 
Somalia and CAR, where knowledge at the outset of the operation was outdated, so 
that it was not known what was actually going on. Consequently, one of the challenges 
for future operations is to collect proper intelligence, tactical-level information and 
understanding of the situation on the ground. Calling all rebels jihadist is dangerous, 
but underestimating the importance of these religious elements is equally dangerous. 
Another issue we need to take into account is the categories we tend to use in our 
attempts to explain “the facts” we see, such as criminal/legal, formal/informal etc. 
The way ahead in future peace missions may well be the “intervention brigade model”, 
but this has its limitations, one of which is the consequences of the increased reliance 
on the use of violence. The militarisation of peace-building and peace initiatives also 
entails the risk of aggravating the situation on the ground, with dire consequences for 
the civilian population. The robust approach can never stand alone, as conflicts need 
strong civilian tools to operate in parallel with the military, an area where the APSA 
still needs to increase its capabilities.
The threat of terrorism is widespread and increasing in Africa, a continent that is 
attractive to terrorists for the simple reason that security is less tight. This type of 
threat also illustrates another point, which is that conflicts are becoming increasingly 
complex, so that intervention forces need to be able to handle a broad spectrum 
of opponents, ranging from a small militia in CAR to Islamist insurgents and 
conventional armies like that in Burundi. There is therefore an real need for a reform 
of the ASF concept and doctrine, as well as a show of willingness on the part of 
African states themselves to put real content into the concept. The ASF, the ACIRC/
RDCs and the APSA need to be fully developed and transformed from a good idea 
into real functional tools. Several regions have managed to create certain capabilities, 
but they still need to show ownership and a willingness to sustain the concept. As 
long as the ASF FOC and the political will amongst African leaders to intervene in 
conflict is limited, it is doubtful whether the AU can play the role envisaged for it in 
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the Hippo report, and therefore whether the suggested distribution of labour between 
the AU and UN is actually possible. Another question is whether AU member states 
will continue to be willing to deploy their soldiers into these high-risk operations, 
which also means increased risk and dangers for the deployed African personnel.
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INTRODUCTION
The AU has struggled to develop a narrative of why it includes a civilian component 
in its peace support operations (PSOs). It is well established in the United Nations 
(UN) and European Union (EU) contexts that PSOs are essentially political and need 
to be multidimensional if they are going to effectively sustain peace. This common 
wisdom is also reflected in the AU’s Constitutive Act, its Peace and Security Protocol 
and its ASF concept and doctrine. However, some of the AU’s partners see the role 
of AU PSOs as limited to ensuring physical security and stability, whilst they take 
the lead on the political and developmental dimensions of a broader international 
strategy. Some senior officials in the AU Commission (AUC) have a somewhat similar 
view, namely that AU PSOs is a physical security instrument, whilst other elements of 
the AU provide the political, governance and socio-economic elements of a broader 
AU strategy. There is thus a lack of consensus within the AUC and among the AU’s 
partners regarding the role of AU PSOs, and as a result, the AUC has not been able to 
consistently and convincingly articulate why it needs multidimensional PSOs. In this 
context it is thus perhaps not surprising that the AUC has also not been able to create a 
convincing narrative that explains how the AU’s civilian components relate to similar 
civilian functions in UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions.
The Report of the 2013 Independent Panel of Experts on the African Standby Force 
(ASF) observed that, despite some progress achieved towards the establishment of 
the civilian component of AU PSOs, the role that civilians play in these PSOs is 
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still little known. Further work is required to explain the necessity, form, timings of 
deployments and comparative advantages of deploying civilians as part of AU-led 
PSOs. The Report recommended that there is a need for a clear articulation of the 
role of civilians, including in high-intensity AU PSOs like the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM). Unfortunately, there has been little progress on this front 
since 2013. In February 2017 at the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
ten-year lessons learned workshop, the assessment was that the mission’s civilian, 
police and military elements are weakly integrated, and that the role of the civilian 
component was not clearly defined or understood.2
ACCORD, with encouragement from the AUC, decided to follow up on the 
recommendations of the ASF Panel of Experts, and undertook a research study into 
the roles that civilians performed in the AU PSOs in the Central African Republic 
(MISCA) and Somalia (AMISOM) that started in late 2014 and concluded in early 
2017. The aim of the study was to identify and analyse the actual roles that civilians 
played in these PSOs in order to determine whether the 2006 AU Policy Framework 
on the civilian dimension of the ASF needs to be updated or further developed.
The ASF Civilian Policy Framework of 2006 was aspirational, although it was 
informed by some of the experience the AU had gained from its civilian components 
in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB). Although the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU (PSC Protocol) provides for a multidimensional AU PSO 
capacity, at the time, the civilian and police components were not yet developed. 
The 2006 policy was thus aspirational in that it set the foundation for the future 
development of the AU’s civilian PSO components. Subsequently the AU deployed 
multidimensional PSOs to CAR, Mali and Somalia. In the following sections we 
analyse the actual roles, functions and contributions of the civilian components in 
two of these missions, namely the AU mission in CAR (MISCA) and the African 
Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
We start with a general introduction of the role of civilian capacities in PSOs, and 
then address the civilian components in AU PSOs provided for in the ASF’s Civilian 
Dimension Policy Framework. In the following section we analyse the civilian 
components in MISCA and AMISOM. In the last section we analyse the two cases to 
identify shared challenges and conclude with a number of policy recommendations.
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CIVILIAN CAPACITIES IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The end of the Cold War era brought about a significant shift in the nature, scope and 
prevalence of international PSOs. The change from interstate to intra-state conflict 
meant that peacekeeping operations had to adapt from a role of observing and 
monitoring ceasefire agreements between states to assisting with the implementation 
of comprehensive peace agreements. This required new skills and expertise in 
areas such as political analysis, negotiation and mediation, legal and constitutional 
development, elections, human rights, reconciliation, justice and Rule of Law (RoL), 
institutional development, governance, and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Many of 
these new skills had to be drawn from people with experience in the civilian public 
sector or in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). During deployment some 
of these experts were seconded by their governments, but the UN, AU and others 
mostly hired civilians with the required education, knowledge and experience. For 
the UN, this resulted in the original military concept of peacekeeping operations 
being expanded in the early 1990s to embrace a new multidimensional approach to 
PSOs, with military, police and civilian components, served by a separate mission 
support component and headed by a civilian head of mission.
Today civilians make up approximately 20% of all UN peacekeeping personnel and 
perform many roles that are critical for achieving mission mandates.3 Civilians also 
perform most of the roles in the mission support component, which include functions 
such as finance, human resources, logistics, administration, engineering, information 
technology, communication and security.4 As of 30 September 2014, 70% (11 700) of 
16 961 civilians in UN PSOs were local personnel.5 Of these, approximately 90% of 
national staff are from Africa, and approximately 60% of the international staff are 
from Africa.
Both the PSC Protocol and the policy framework establishing the ASF provide for 
a multidimensional PSOs capacity, including a civilian component. In 2006 the AU 
developed a Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF, which remains 
the guiding framework for roles and responsibilities of the civilian component in 
AU PSOs.
The ASF Policy Framework provides for a civilian component for AU PSOs that 
include functions such as Political Affairs, Public Information, Planning and Co-
ordination, Human Rights, Humanitarian Liaison, Legal Advice, Conduct and 
Discipline, Child Protection, and Gender. These functions are essential tasks that 
should be performed in each AU PSO, regardless of the mandate. In addition, and 
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depending on the mandate, further functions may include RoL, Electoral Affairs, 
Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Civil Affairs, and SSR. As 
part of the civilian component, the policy framework also provides for mission support 
functions in human resources, and financial management, logistics, procurement, 
engineering, geographical information services, information technology and 
communications. In addition, transport, contingency owned equipment, security 
and integrated training services to the military, police and civilian components of 
the mission are equally important mission support functions. A proposed civilian 
component per brigade and per roster are illustrated in the table below as set up by 
an AU-ASF workshop held in Kampala, Uganda in 2008. In practice however, the 
numbers of the civilian components per mission are fluid, unpredictable and difficult 
to set out.
Table A: Proposed ASF Brigade Civilian Capacity6
Function Position in regional Brigade Number in roster
SRCC 1 x ASG/D1 10
DSRCC 1 x D1/D2 10
Special Assistant to the SRCC 1 x P3 10
Administrative Assistant to the SRCC/
DSRCC
1 x GSA 10
Personal Protection for SRCC/DSRCC 8 persons ranging from P4 to P1 30
Legal Advisor 1 x P4 10
General Advisor 1 x P4 10
Protection Advisor 1 x P4 10
HIV/AIDS Advisor 1 x P4 10
Conduct and Discipline Advisor 1 x P4 10
Post-conflict Reconstruction Advisor 1 x P4 10
Planning and Coordination Unit, 
including Humanitarian Liaison
6 persons ranging from P5 to P3 20
Political affairs unit 6 Persons ranging from P5 to P3 20
Human rights unit 6 Persons ranging from P5 to P3 20
Public Information unit 3 persons ranging from P5 to P2 20
Training Unit 1 x P3 10
Mission Support 20 persons ranging from D2/P5 to P3 80
Totals 60 300
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THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA 
(AMISOM)
Since 2007, AMISOM has played and continues to play an invaluable role in stabilising 
the country. In 2017 AMISOM is still the largest peace operation in the world, with 
approximately 22 000 personnel including military, police and civilian components. 
AMISOM assisted the government to gain control of Mogadishu and large parts of 
the rest of the country. However, Al Shabaab remains a dangerous threat.
The AU, with the support of the international community, supports the vision of the 
Somali government to consolidate the stability gained and advance the peace and 
security efforts in the country. The role of the civilian component of AMISOM is to 
support and facilitate peace- and state-building processes in Somalia. The mandate 
of the civilian component of AMISOM was extended from minimal support to the 
government to providing capacity-building assistance to Somalia’s main institutions.7 
The civilian component of AMISOM has served as a pioneer for the AU’s experience 
in peace- and state-building initiatives.8
AMISOM operates with very limited resources in a very unstable, fluid and 
unpredictable environment. The working environment is rendered dangerous by the 
operations of the extremist Al Shabaab insurgency. These security challenges have 
constrained the civilian components of this mission in performing some of their 
roles and functions, because movement outside the secured airport area can only 
take place in armed conveys, and routine civilian meetings with counterparts are low 
on the list of priorities. AMISOM civilian components have instead tried to arrange 
most meetings in the secured area, which means their counterparts needed to come 
to them.
Mission management
The AMISOM mission is headed by a civilian head of mission, the Special 
Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC). The 
SRCC is appointed by the Chairperson of the AUC and reports to the PSC via the 
Chairperson. The SRCC is supported by a Deputy Special Representative of the 
Chairperson of the Commission (DSRCC), who is expected to act as head of mission 
when the SRCC is away from the mission. The DSRCC also has a special responsibility 
for the civilian component of the mission, including the mission support component. 
The SRCC and the senior leadership team is supported by a mission Chief of Staff, who 
is responsible for the co-ordination of mission-wide planning and reporting processes. 
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The senior leadership team is made up of the SRCC, the DSRCC, the Chief of Staff, 
the Head of Mission Support, the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner.
Substantive components
The civilian component of AMISOM consist of seven units, namely: the Political 
Affairs; Public Information, Humanitarian Liaison; Protection, Human Rights and; 
Civil Affairs, Security and Safety, and Mission Support Units.9
The Political Unit is responsible for operationalising the AU PSC’s political decisions 
on Somalia. The section monitors, interprets and reports on the political developments 
and provides advice to the SRCC on political dynamics in Somalia. At times the unit’s 
focus has been to assist the Somali government in building its capacity for public 
service. Between 17 and 29 May 2014, for instance, the Political Unit of AMISOM 
conducted a ten-day intensive training for 80 Executive Leaders and Managers in 
the Somalia Civil Service. As of March 2017 the Head of the Political Affairs section 
position has been vacant for more than a year, and the unit was staffed by one senior 
political affairs officer and one political affairs officer. 
The Humanitarian Liaison Unit (HLU) serves as a bridge between AMISOM and 
humanitarian agencies. It co-ordinates, facilitates and liaises with the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and other UN agencies as well as 
Somali and international NGOs. The unit also works closely with AMISOM’s military 
component, and especially its Civil–Military Coordination (CIMIC) cell, to respond 
to requests for support from the humanitarian community. As of March 2017, the 
unit was staffed by two seconded consultants.
The Human Rights, Gender and Protection Unit is mandated to implement the 
AU’s commitments and policies on human rights and protection as well as gender 
equality and other related issues. The Unit ensures the mainstreaming of human 
rights, protection and good gender practices in AMISOM and supports the Federal 
Government of Somalia. This Unit has been involved in the pre-deployment training 
and verification of troops before they deployed especially in the domain of adherence 
to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HL). As of March 
2017, the unit’s head acted as the mission’s Chief of Staff, which meant that another 
officer had to act as the head of the unit. The Unit was staffed by two gender officers 
as well as by two seconded consultants, one of which served as a protection officer 
and the other as an international humanitarian law and human rights expert.
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The Civil Affairs Unit works at the social, administrative and local political levels to 
facilitate the implementation of AMISOM’s mandate and to support efforts at ensuring 
sustainable peace in Somalia. The unit conducts activities aimed at confidence-
building, effective governance management, and support to reconciliation. The unit 
also assists the state in restoring and extending its authority. As of March 2017 the 
unit was staffed by one senior and two civil affairs officers.
The Safety and Security Unit is charged with undertaking safety and security 
programmes and activities in AMISOM to protect civilian staff and property. The 
unit comprises three sub units: Security Information and Operation Unit (SIOU), 
Personal Protection Unit (PPU) and Investigation Unit (IU). This unit is tasked with 
the management of mission security and it also manages the security for high-level 
events, conferences and meetings in which the mission is involved. As of March 2017 
the unit was staffed by three security officers. 
The Public Information Unit is responsible for sharing information on AMISOM’s 
activities and ensuring accurate reporting through regular interaction with local 
Somali and international journalists. By so doing, the unit helps to display the 
credibility and accountability stance of AMISOM to Somali community and the 
international community. As of March 2017 the unit was staffed by one officer and 
one assistant. The work of the unit is complemented by a private sector company 
hired through a contract with the UN.
The Mission Support Unit encompasses the Logistics, Transport, Supply, Engineering, 
Information and Communications, Technology, Finance, Personnel, Procurement, 
General Services, Medical, Travel and Protocol, Asset Management and Verification, 
and Contingent Owned Equipment functions of the mission, among others. As of 
March 2017, this unit had approximately 19 staff members and 7 consultants, as well 
as approximately 25 national staff, most of whom are language assistants.
The Medical Unit is responsible for the management, oversight, provision, and 
reporting on all clinical activities that may incur costs to the mission. The Senior 
Medical Officer serves as the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of the Mission, under 
the delegated authority of the Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS), and is 
responsible for the provision and maintenance of all clinical services in the mission 
area, except for services offered by contingent-owned level one medical facilities. 
As of March 2017, this unit had one staff member, a medical doctor, in a seconded 
consultant position.
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Other elements of the civilian component include, amongst others, legal affairs (the 
three positions are vacant), conduct & discipline (one consultant), a civilian casualty 
tracking and reporting cell (one consultant), a Mission Analysis cell (two positions 
are vacant, one consultant), and Security Sector Reform (SSR) unit, (the two positions 
are vacant).
Through some of these civilian components, AMISOM is meant to support the 
efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen the capacity of various 
government departments to provide public services and to extend state authority, 
especially in newly liberated cities and territories, and with a special focus on the 
security and judicial sector. The civilian component of AMISOM is also meant to train, 
mentor and advise state administrators on how to attain efficient local governance.10 
Although AMISOM has conducted various training exercises for Somalia’s civil 
servants as well as military and police officers over the years, due to the size of the 
civilian component, these efforts have not had much effect in the larger context.
Other civilian components are more inward looking in that they generate advise to 
the mission leadership and mission planning processes, they provide analysis, they 
provide internal training and guidance, and they investigate, track and report civilian 
casualties and conduct and discipline cases.
The security situation necessitates that all staff who leave the protected airport area 
require an armed escort. There is limited escort capacity and escort needs are thus 
prioritised. Routine liaison with civilian counterparts is low on the priority rankings. 
Visiting civilian counterparts, other than those in the government’s Villa Somalia 
compound, with an armed escort can have negative consequences, including putting 
those counterparts at risk. The end-result of these constraints is that most civilian 
staff rarely leave the airport compound. Instead of visiting their counterparts they 
have to invite their counterparts to visit them in the airport compound.
The civilian component suffered from significant understaffing. Of approximately 
240 approved posts, approximately 100 were vacant as of March 2017. This seriously 
undermined overall mission capacity to perform effectively and efficiently. It takes 
the AUC more than a year to recruit personnel for an AMISOM civilian position. 
Often the candidates are no longer available once this process reach the contracting 
stage. As a result, several key positions have been supplemented with staff hired on 
a consulting basis, including, for instance, the acting head of mission support. The 
recruitment challenge does not only impact on the effectiveness of the mission, but 
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is also demoralising for all involved, including the mission leadership, who feels their 
needs and concerns are not prioritised at the AUC.
The AMISOM Head Quarters (HQ) and United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Somalia (UNSOM) HQ compounds are neighbours, and the differences in the 
way the two missions are resourced is obvious, although they are both supported 
by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). These differences are 
demoralising and a source of tension and resentment for AMISOM staff. AMISOM 
staff are not allowed into the UN compound except on official business, for example, 
and thus do not have access to the restaurant located inside the UN compound. There 
are no recreation facilities or other forms of after-hours relief for AU mission staff. 
This situation impacts negatively on the effectiveness and efficiency of the mission 
and results in a high rate of absenteeism and frequent travel.
Realising a multidimensional approach
AMISOM’s three components – military, police and civilian – seem to operate as 
three separate pillars. Collective briefing for the components is not a norm and there 
are inadequate mechanisms and processes for the sharing of information. At the time 
of the research there was limited integrated analysis, co-ordination, training and 
mission planning. Interaction among the components is by need and not by form 
or structure, and this exacerbates the negative misconceptions about the relevance, 
roles and functions of the civilian components because the mission does not have a 
platform for integrated interaction, co-ordination and co-operation.
In January 2015 during its Mission Implementation Plan meeting, AMISOM 
leadership decided to adopt a cluster based approach aimed at integrating the civilian, 
police and military components of the Mission. This approach was also geared 
towards promoting greater effectiveness with the limited staff capacity within the 
Mission. Six thematic clusters were identified namely: inclusive politics, stabilisation, 
protection (including the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP)), Security 
Sector Reform, main supply routes and humanitarian. Some of these clusters have 
been relatively functional but the time-bound rotations of uniformed personnel as 
well as the overstretched capacity of AMISOM personnel in general have hampered 
the consistency of meetings and overall performance of these cluster-based working 
groups.
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Relations with the UN and other partners
AMISOM has established co-ordination mechanisms to avoid duplication or overlap 
with its UN counterparts and other international partners and NGOs. These include 
working groups on specific topics, task teams to support specific initiatives, and co-
operation with AMISOM’s Civil–Military Coordination (CIMIC) cell, as well as the 
Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), in those cases where there are specific 
requests for military or mission support. During the assessment sessions of areas 
liberated by the mission, the team undertaking the assessment is comprised of the 
military, police and civilians as well as external stakeholders, thus encouraging 
co-ordination and effective use of resources, where initially each partner would 
undertake separate assessments.
CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE AFRICAN-LED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
MISSION TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MISCA)
The AU mission in CAR was established following the civil war that broke out in 
CAR on 10 December 2012, when the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebels battled 
against President Francois Bozize’s government, which was accused of failing to 
honour the peace agreements of 2007 and 2011. The Séléka rebels seized the capital 
on 24 March 2013 and installed the rebel leader Michel Djotodia as president. The 
National Transitional Council (CNT) and the Constitutional Council, which were 
respectively established on 15 April and 16 August 2013, remained incapable of 
resolving the crisis in CAR. The conflict rather took on a much more sectarian 
overtone as the predominantly Christian anti-balaka movement attacked Séléka 
rebels and communities associated with them.
On 5 December 2013 the AU, in accord with UN resolution 2127, established the 
AU mission in CAR, known as MISCA, an acronym for its name in French: Mission 
Internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine. MISCA was 
established to replace the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR (MICOPAX) 
that was led by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). As 
authorised by the AU PSC during its 385th meeting on 19 July 2013, MISCA was 
mandated to consist of a total force strength of 3 652, including 3 500 uniformed 
personnel (2 475 for the military component and 1 025 for the police component) 
and 152 civilians.11 During the 408th meeting of the PSC on 13 December 2013, 
the mission was increased to a force strength of 6 000. Nine-months later, on 15 
September 2014, upon successful completion of MISCA’s mandate and in accordance 
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with UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), MISCA was transferred to a new 
UN Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).
Mission management
MISCA was headed by an appointed civilian Head of Mission (HoM), the SRCC, 
who was responsible for the overall management of the mission and the attainment 
of the mission mandate. A deputy SRCC (DSRCC) was appointed to support the 
SRCC in the execution of his duties and serve as the Acting SRCC whenever the 
SRCC is out of the mission area. In addition to the management of the mission, the 
SRCC was responsible for leading the implementation of the AU’s strategy in CAR, 
for managing relations with the government of CAR, and for soliciting international 
support for MISCA and for CAR. The DSRCC was further responsible for the 
management of the substantive civilian component of the mission. Apart from the 
SRCC, the DSRCC, the Police Commissioner, the Force Commander and the Head 
of Mission Support constituted the Senior Mission Leadership Team (SMLT).
Substantive components
MISCA’s civilian substantive components, headed by the DSRCC, consisted of the 
Political Affairs, Humanitarian Liaison, Protection, Human Rights and Gender, 
DDR/SSR and Public Information sections.
The Political Affairs Unit was mandated to monitor and analyse the political 
environment and work towards the realisation of the political agenda of the AU in 
CAR. The role of the political affairs office was to analyse the situation in the country, 
advise the SRCC and suggest solutions for the gaps identified. The unit was also 
responsible for supporting the electoral process. One challenge that was noted was 
that there were no resources to travel to the provinces to assess the situation on the 
ground. This section interacted with the different government agencies responsible 
for issues of peace and security in the country.
The HLU was responsible for liaising with the government of CAR and other 
humanitarian actors in the country, monitoring the humanitarian situation in the 
country, identifying the gaps in the field and making recommendations on what the 
mission could do to bridge the gaps identified. The unit also performed a liaison role 
between the military components and humanitarian workers. Quick Impact Projects 
(QIPs) comprised a further task, for instance the rehabilitation of infrastructure and 
building of roads. Some of the humanitarian actors have criticised the mission for 
74
the african standby force
infringements on humanitarian space, for instance when the mission responded to 
requests from Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by providing relief items.
The Protection, Human Rights and Gender Unit was charged with monitoring, 
observing, reporting and responding to human rights violations across the state and 
ensuring protection of civilians. The section was also charged with ensuring that 
gender issues within the mission were addressed. This section was the largest civilian 
section in the mission, with eighteen civilian human rights observers and human 
rights officers. The role of the human rights officers involved monitoring human 
rights violations as well as responding to human rights issues.
The Public Information Unit was responsible for the implementation of MISCA’s 
public information strategy in support of the mission mandate. Its roles involved 
communicating all public information to the citizenry and other external actors.
The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) Unit were responsible for co-ordinating the provision of all support 
by MISCA to the development of the CAR security sector and for serving as the 
interface between the mission and the CAR authorities, the UN and other actors on 
support to the security sector and the DDR process.
The Mission Support Component was the responsibility of the Head of Mission 
Support (HMS) and the unit was comprised of Logistics, Transport, Supply, 
Engineering, Information and Communications Technology, Finance, Personnel, 
Procurement, General Services, Medical, Travel and Protocol, Asset Management 
and Verification, Boards of Inquiry, and Contingent Owned Equipment functions. 
The Mission Support Component was responsible for the overall management of all 
support functions for the mission and its responsibilities included co-ordinating all 
the logistical activities, finance and management, human resources, and procurement 
activities of the mission, including contract management. The unit had forty staff, of 
which twenty-two were civilians.
Realising a multidimensional approach
The co-ordination between the military, police and civilians was relatively well 
established. For instance, the humanitarian section worked with the military 
component in responding to the humanitarian crisis and supplying the relief items 
in IDP camps. The strategic directive provided for a general benchmarking of the 
success of the mission, but there were no specific benchmarks for measuring the 
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impact and contribution of the civilian component in the overall implementation of 
the mission mandate.
Relations with the UN and other partners
In light of the growing presence of other actors in the mission area, in particular 
the UN, ECCAS, EU, other foreign international militaries, and humanitarian and 
development partners, co-ordination strategies and mechanisms were developed by 
the HoM to ensure unity of effort, coherence and co-ordination in the implementation 
of the MISCA’s mandate. The mission operated with limited resources and duplication 
or overlap of effort and resources were minimised by such co-ordination efforts. All 
civilian sections highlighted that, owing to limited resources at their disposal, they 
forged partnerships to help them in the implementation of the mission mandate. 
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
Significant challenges persist in developing and clarifying the role of the civilian 
component of AU PSOs. The following are some issues that were observed during 
the course of the study of the civilian components in AMISOM and MISCA.
ASF doctrine
The primary challenge deterring the development of the civilian dimension is 
inadequate understanding of the role of civilians in PSOs within the AU PSOs 
community. Closely linked is the view among the AU’s partners, and some within the 
AUC, that the AU should primarily or exclusively perform military PSOs functions 
and leave the civilian functions to either partners or other parts of the AUC that are 
not deployed as part of the PSO.
The AU’s PSC Protocol, and subsequent policies, are clear that the AU’s PSO was 
always intended to be a multidimensional instrument. The AU’s own experiences in 
especially Burundi, CAR and Somalia has also taught it the necessity of a politically-
led comprehensive approach. In Somalia, for instance, the AU came to understood 
that it can temporarily stabilize a situation by winning selected battles and by 
controlling territory, but that it cannot ultimately defeat Al Shabaab militarily. They 
can only be defeated in the long-term if the Government of Somalia can provide 
better security, governance and social-economic opportunities than what Al Shabaab 
can offer.12 The AU has learned that when AMISOM lacks the political and civilian 
expertise necessary to ensure that their military operations are directed towards 
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enabling and supporting political and governance objectives, any gains achieved are 
likely to be short-lived. 
For instance, the AU was able to help Somali national forces to liberate cities 
and towns from Al Shabaab, but the AU and its partners, including the UN and 
EU, lacked the ability to follow-up with the civilian expertise necessary to help the 
federal government and local authorities to re-establish basic governance structures 
and services.13 AMISOM has thus learned that it needs a comprehensive approach to 
help the mission ensure that its stabilization efforts are directed towards achieving 
sustainable political and governance objectives.14 The AU in Somalia thus learned 
that they cannot rely on partners who have their own administrative, logistical 
and security constrains, and who as a result, we’re not able to provide the political 
and governance expertise that was needed to consolidate the AU security gains. 
However, AMISOM has not yet been able to translate this lesson identified into 
concrete strategies and action plans that have convinced the AUC, or their partners, 
to strengthen and focus the civilian component of AMISOM into a significant 
enabler for the mission’s stabilisation task. This would require a strengthening of 
especially the mission’s political and civil affairs capacities. The former should see 
a political affairs capacity at the sector levels that can provide sector commanders 
with political analysis and advise, and that can help to broaden the missions political 
situational awareness across the country. The latter should ensure that the mission is 
able to provide basic local governance support to newly liberated town and regional 
administrations.
The lack of a clearly articulated role for the civilian dimension has its origins in the 
limited space afforded the multidimensional nature of AU PSOs, and specifically 
the civilian dimension in ASF doctrine and related core PSO policy documents. An 
attempt was made to address this shortcoming by adopting an ASF Civilian Dimension 
Framework in 2006. However, this 2006 policy document is not widely known beyond 
those working on the civilian dimension. This challenge will not be overcome until 
the ASF doctrine and related core policy documents are updated to reflect the role of 
the civilian-led senior leadership team and the civilian component in AU PSOs, and 
such new doctrine and related policies have been socialised throughout the AU PSO 
civilian, police and military communities. The operational realities of the missions in 
Somalia and CAR helped to highlight the need for a multidimensional PSO doctrine. 
Unfortunately, the mission in CAR, like the AU mission in Mali, was of such a short 
duration that there was little time for in-mission adaptation and evolution.
77
The Role of the Civilian Component in African Union Peace Support Operations
Lastly, an important structural constraint is the fact that the ASF is overseen, at the 
senior officials and political level, by the Chiefs of Defence and Security and the 
Ministers of Defence and Security. For the civilian component this means that 
there is no natural departmental or political constituency that owns the civilian 
component, and there is thus no bureaucratic and political momentum behind the 
civilian dimension of PSOs. However, on the basis of the recommendations of the 
Gambari Report, a meeting was hosted by the Government of Zambia in 2015 that 
focused on the civilian component, and there it was decided to establish a Civilian 
Strategic Policy Support Group (CSSG). The CSSG will facilitate Member State and 
technical support for the development of the civilian dimension of African PSOs and 
provide technical advisory support on civilian-related issues in AU PSOs.
The comparative size of the civilian component
Another factor is that the civilian component in AU PSOs is small, compared to its 
military and police counterparts. Although the civilian component performs functions 
that are critical and important for pursuing mission mandates, its comparative size 
does have practical implications for its relative impact and importance in the mission. 
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had about 50 civilian staff compared 
to over 7 000 troops. As of March 2017 AMISOM had approximately 114 civilian 
staff, of which 50 were national staff, compared to approximately 450 police and 
approximately 21 000 troops.15 As of September 2014 MISCA had 5 079 troops and 
882 police, totalling 5 961,16 compared to forty-one civilian staff.17
A comparison with the numbers of civilians in UN missions highlights how small 
the civilian components are in AU PSOs. For instance, at the end of 2015 the civilian 
components of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had about 1 000 international civilian staff and a total 
force strength of 10 264 personnel. The United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) had approximately 
4 000 international civilian staff and a total force strength of approximately 20 000. 
UNMISS has approximately 2 200 international civilian staff and approximately 
14 000 military personnel.18 These numbers point to the level of multidimensionality 
that has been achieved in UN peace operations and the degree to which civilian 
expertise is regarded as critical for achieving mission mandates in UN PSOs. 
While missions differ based on context and mandate, it should be noted that both 
MINUSMA and MINUSCA, the UN follow-on missions to the AU’s African-led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and MISCA, are stabilisation 
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missions, as is MONUSCO; so the difference in numbers are not due to these UN 
missions being post-conflict peace-building missions. The small number of civilians 
in AU missions, compared to UN missions, is rather due to funding constraints and 
the policy choices of the AU and its partners.
The point is not that the AU should strive to have civilian components numbering in 
the thousands like the UN, but rather that the small size of the civilian component 
in AU missions to date is a factor of the political choices made by the AU’s policy 
organs and the advice provided to them by the AUC. However, as in the UN, the 
most important factor is not the relative size of the components but the roles they 
perform in contributing to achieving their given mandates. The civilian components 
of AU PSOs can make a critical contribution to mission success, despite relative size, 
depending on how we utilise these capacities.
Substantive functions
The 2006 ASF civilian dimension policy framework envisages that AU PSOs could 
include the following substantive functions: Political Affairs; Legal Advice; Public 
Information; Planning & Co-ordination; Human Rights; Humanitarian Liaison; 
Conduct and Discipline; Child Protection and Gender; Rule of Law; Electoral Affairs; 
DDR; Civil Affairs and SSR, as well as mission support functions. This list was meant 
to be somewhat similar to the UN’s civilian structure given that AU and UN missions 
work in close co-operation and anticipating that AU missions will, in many cases, be 
replaced by UN missions, as was the case thus far with the AU missions in Burundi, 
CAR, Darfur and Mali.
However, as was also envisaged in the ASF Policy Framework, AU missions, owing to 
funding constraints, have to do with considerably smaller civilian components than 
their UN counterparts, and this means that the AU civilian staff have to perform 
several interrelated functions, and that there is thus less room for specialisation in 
AU missions. AMISOM consists of units such as Political, Humanitarian Liaison, 
Gender, Civil Affairs, Public Information, Security and Safety, and Support. The 
civilian component of MISCA consisted of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Liaison, 
Human Rights, DDR, SSR and Mission Support.19 The AU mission in Mali (AFISMA) 
had a civilian component that was made up of Political Affairs, Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Affairs, Gender and Public Information.20 From these experiences we 
can deduce that the civilian components most commonly found in AU PSOs are 
Political Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information, Humanitarian Liaison, Gender 
and Mission Support.
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In comparison, UN missions have a much larger and more specialised civilian 
structure. The UN missions in the DRC, South Sudan, Mali and Liberia have 
additional civilian specialisations such as Child Protection; HIV/AIDS; Rule of Law; 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual and Gender-based Violence; Electoral 
Affairs; SSR and DDR; and Conduct and Discipline. This means that in AU missions 
the civilian component has to combine functions such as sexual exploitation, sexual 
and gender-based violence and gender in one unit, usually with one single officer. 
In comparison, the UN civilian structure, for instance the civilian component of 
MONUSCO, separates these three functions and has one unit each for Gender, Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) that is focused on the behaviour of the peacekeepers 
and another for Sexual and Gender-based Violence that is focused on the behaviour 
of the belligerent parties. In addition, in the field there are also teams of Women 
Protection Advisors.
Lastly, as reported earlier, the Political Affairs section of AMISOM is, in addition to 
political analysis and advice, involved in governance capacity-building. In most UN 
missions this is the responsibility of Civil Affairs and of UN development agencies. 
AMISOM’s Political Affairs unit also oversees efforts that are aimed at strengthening 
the Rule of Law in Somalia. In comparison, most UN missions have dedicated Rule 
of Law units.
The smaller number of civilian staff in AU missions, which is due to policy choices 
and resource constraints, thus have to combine a comparatively wider number of 
functions compared to their UN counterparts. This does not necessarily have negative 
consequences. If the function of the unit is essentially advice and co-ordination, 
having oversight over a larger set of interrelated issues can enhance co-ordination. 
It would only be negative if lack of staff, resources and specialised knowledge meant 
that crucial mandated tasks are not being performed.
Gender
One of the most devastating forms of violence against civilians is conflict-related sexual 
violence. Poverty, conflict, lack of education and unemployment can all contribute 
to vulnerability and sexual exploitation. The lack of economic opportunities for 
displaced populations may result in commercial and exploitative sex as a means to 
meeting basic needs. The support system for children in the two countries studied has 
been weakened by conflict, which makes them vulnerable to sexual predation. Some 
peacekeepers, including civilian peacekeepers, have exploited these situations and 
have committed sexual exploitation and abuse. Despite the existence of a normative 
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framework and robust gender policies and strategies, the UN and AU have not been 
able to eradicate sexual exploitation and abuse.
There are also a number of issues related to gender that are relevant to the civilian 
component in African PSOs. A UN mission such as MONUSCO, which has similar 
strength to AMISOM, has sixteen gender officers. UNAMID has fifteen gender 
experts, while UNMISS has ten. Their staffs are not focal points but skilled personnel 
and field practitioners. This is different in the AU missions, where there is one gender 
officer per mission, and a few gender focal points, who are often under-resourced.
Recruitment
Military and police peacekeeping personnel are seconded by their countries to AU 
PSOs. Civilians who serve in AU PSOs can be either seconded by AU Member States 
or recruited by the AU. To date the majority of civilian personnel in AU missions 
have been recruited in their professional capacity. The UN also hires the majority of 
its civilian personnel directly, but some categories of staff, such as corrections officers 
and judges, are usually hired via secondments in a category referred to as “government 
provided personnel”. In contrast, the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) make use mostly of secondments from member states. 
One of the challenges with reliance on secondment, especially where the costs are 
born by the sending state, is that those countries that are wealthier tend to have the 
most staff. Another is that the pool of available staff is limited and this could lead to 
a shortage of civilian experts, particularly in specialised fields.21
The UN and the AU have faced challenges when it comes to the speed of recruitment.22 
The process involved in identifying, selecting, recruiting and deploying civilian 
personnel can take too long, and this has led to a high vacancy rate of civilians in UN 
and AU peace operations. UN peacekeeping missions recorded a 33% vacancy rate 
between 2005 and 2008.23 However, this is not only due to recruitment shortcomings. 
Other considerations that can impact the vacancy rate in a PSO include budgetary 
considerations, security, logistics, etc. Overall, the recruitment process seems to be 
improving. In 2000 and 2001 the process of recruitment for UN missions took about 
275 days, and in 2004 the process was brought down to 174 days, according to a 
UN report in 2005.24 In all the AU missions to date the AU has recruited individual 
civilian staff through public advertisements. Civilians respond to the applications, 
they apply, are shortlisted, interviewed and, if selected, are offered a position. In 
missions like AFISMA and MISCA that process lasted between six and twelve months, 
and in AMISOM most recruitments appear to take more than a year. As a result, the 
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AU civilian recruiting process generates staff that only come on board towards the 
end of the mission’s lifespan. The slow rate of recruitment and hire rate of vacancies, 
especially in a mission like AMISOM, have had a significant impact on the missions’ 
ability to achieve its mandate effectively and efficiently. This is an area that requires 
urgent remedial action. The AU would have to significantly improve the processes it 
follows to recruit civilian personnel for its PSOs, special political missions and other 
field presences.
Training
Most of the civilian peacekeepers did not undergo some form of pre-deployment 
training before joining the mission, and only a few underwent induction training. 
This is the same for senior mission management, where only a few had undergone a 
one-week induction orientation. Whilst each section had its own training needs, the 
need for induction on AU functionalities and specialised thematic areas came to the 
fore. This need included training on the roles and functions of the military and police 
components as well as on civil–military coordination. As the AU does not have a long 
PSO tradition, most civilian staff, including senior mission leaders, are deployed with 
limited prior knowledge of how PSOs function, and the processes and mechanisms 
available to them to enhance integration, coordination and accountability. In-mission 
training can thus be an important tool to enhance mission effectiveness.
INTEGRATION AND CO-ORDINATION
Both missions suffered from lack of coordination between the civilian, police 
and military components. There were insufficient opportunities, processes and 
mechanisms for sharing information, joint analysis or joint planning. This indicates 
that there is a lack of guidance from AU HQ on doctrine and Standing Operations 
Procedures for how the mission leadership should function, and on the mechanisms 
and processes that should be put in place to generate joint analysis and planning and 
integrated decision-making. Lack of coordination is also a reflection of inexperience, 
and of a deficiency in training and preparation for senior staff and mission leadership 
that would prepare them further for a mission culture that promotes integration and 
co-ordination. Unless the AU is able to address these integration and co-ordination 
shortcomings, little that is done on improving the capacity of individual civilian 
officers, or the functioning of civilian components, will have much effect. There can 
be no military solution to stability or protection, nor can one find a political solution 
or achieve effective governance in an unstable and insecure environment. The civilian, 
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police and military roles and functions can only be meaningfully performed if they 
complement each other and are part of a larger integrated mission strategy.
A well-developed civilian Concept of Operations (CONOPs), which is integrated 
with those of the other components and the strategic vision of the mission, is key 
to ensuring that the role of the civilians in any given AU PSO is clearly articulated. 
This will enable the mission leadership to explain the contribution of the civilian 
component to the police, military and mission support components, as well as their 
hosts and partners. It will also contribute to greater effectiveness because the civilian 
component will be better understood, and thus be better supported, led and co-
ordinated with the other mission components, host authorities and partners.
CONCLUSION
The ASF Civilian Policy Framework of 2006 was based on international best practice 
because the AU had only limited civilian peace operation experience at the time. 
However, since then the AU has by now deployed approximately 400 civilians across 
a range of missions, it can now look to its own empirical experience to inform lessons 
learned and future policy development.
This study set out to analyse the different civilian roles in the AU missions in CAR 
and Somalia, with a view to assess the overall contribution the civilian components 
are making towards the achievement of mission mandates.
The study found that although the AU missions in CAR and Somalia have deployed 
civilian staff, and although the AU Commission and the missions in question have 
gained experience over the years with the selection, recruitment, deployment and 
utilisation of its civilian staff, this experience, and the knowledge generated in 
the process, have not been systematically captured and fed back into AU policies, 
doctrine or standard operating procedures. As a result, it is difficult to identify any 
improvement in the way the civilian component functions.
The study found that there was a low level of awareness and understanding of the role 
and contribution of the civilian component in PSOs, especially among senior AUC 
personnel, senior mission leadership, military and police components, and even 
within the civilian components themselves.
This challenge has come about in part because the AU has not been able to clearly 
articulate why it needs a multidimensional approach and what the function and 
contribution of the civilian component is, or how it contributes to achieving the 
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mandate of a particular mission. We conclude by suggesting a number of ways in 
which these shortcomings can be addressed.
 ◆ Update and revise the ASF concept and the related doctrine and SOPs to reflect 
the multidimensional nature of PSOs, and specifically the role and functions of 
the civilian component.
 ◆ Strengthen the Civilian Strategic Support Group (CSSG), which was recently 
established to provide strategic advice to the AUC on the role of the civilian 
component. This could be done through the appointment of a steering committee 
to provide periodic guidance to ASF continental and regional planning elements.
 ◆ Enhance civil–military coordination and mission integration by incorporating the 
comprehensive approach into the overall AU PSO concept, doctrine and SOPs.
 ◆ Implement the revised ASF concept, doctrine and SOPs, socialise it through 
training and reflect it in planning and budgeting, for instance in the HQ and 
mission structure and staffing tables.
 ◆ Improve the training and quality of the senior mission leadership team and the 
expectations placed on them to enhance and facilitate mission co-ordination 
and integration. These expectations need to be reflected in their contracts and 
compacts and they must have the staff, resources and tools necessary to achieve 
these functions.
 ◆ Standardise the need to develop a civilian CONOPs for each mission and each 
planning cycle.
 ◆ Establish a table of equipment for civilian personnel so that mission planners 
know what equipment needs to be procured for the civilian component.
 ◆ Planning and budgeting of new AU PSOs must reflect the minimum civilian 
component foreseen in the AU Civilian Policy Framework for the ASF.
 ◆ Strengthen gender dimension in implementing the mission’s mandate through 
increase in the number of female peacekeepers, increase in resources, both 
human and financial to address the gender issues in the missions.
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A Need for Military Psychology 
in Africa: The African Standby 
Force as an Example
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INTRODUCTION
Africa has been characterised by several wars with very destructive effects on 
infrastructure and the population. In the 1990s there were wars in Angola, Burundi, 
DR Congo (DRC), Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, 
among others.2 Murithi wrote, “African leaders have to take responsibility for the lack 
of peace and security on the continent.”3 He mentioned political misrule, economic 
mismanagement, kleptocracy, theft of state resources, crime, fraud and lack of human 
rights as some of the conditions that contribute to conflict and war on the continent.
The “Industrial Colonisation” process, where foreign countries such as Great Britain, 
the USA, France, Germany, Russia and China competed for the soil/land of Africa, 
has changed – now mineral resources under the soil and fish resources in the oceans 
of African states are targeted. These international actors are fuelling the conflicts and 
wars in Africa by seeking to exploit resources such as oil in South Sudan, DRC, Nigeria 
and Congo-Brazzaville, diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, timber in Liberia and 
Guinea, and copper, chromium and coltan from Central Africa.4 The characteristics 
of the circumstances and the nature of the wars in some countries such as Nigeria, 
Somalia, Mali and DRC are complex, politically loaded and financially complicated.
Nigeria, for example, is the most populous country in Africa, with a population split 
between Muslims and Christians being a key determinant of civil war susceptibility. 
A substantial proportion of its export earnings is from crude oil and the inequitable 
distribution of oil-derived incomes is a further driver of conflict.5 Poverty existing 
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cheek by jowl with wealth from oil exporting is “double trouble” in making the 
country susceptible to civil war.
The Somali conflict is one of the most terrible civil wars in Africa. From 1991 Somalia 
has been without a functioning central government for years. Obstacles include 
competition for resources, repression by the military regime, widespread availability 
of weapons, large numbers of unemployed youth and warlords showing a lack of 
interest in peace.6
The armed Tuareg rebellion once again triggered Mali’s political and territorial crisis 
in January 2012 with far-reaching consequences for security in the region. After the 
fall of Gaddafi in Libya in October 2011, heavily armed, military-trained Tuareg 
fighters returned to Mali to fight for their independence.7 Challenges in the Mali 
conflict are to find a solution to the Tuareg conflict, improve relations between ethnic 
groups and combat high levels of organised crime.
Lastly, the recent wars in DRC are a reincarnation of past conflicts based on economic, 
institutional, regional and global geopolitical factors. These factors are influenced by 
mismanagement of the public sector, deterioration of social conditions, a resource war 
fuelled by poor management of the natural resource sector and unequal distribution 
of benefits arising from the exploitation of natural resources.8
In most of these countries rebels are generally not satisfied with how governments 
rule, which results in potential scenarios for more wars in Africa.
Against this background it is evident that there is a viable need for an African Standby 
Force (ASF) to respond to conflict, crises and war situations in Africa timeously 
and efficiently.9 The ASF should consist of five brigades, one from each of Africa’s 
subregions: the Southern, Western, Central, Eastern and Northern brigades. These 
include brigade formations drawn from:
 ◆ Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
 ◆ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
 ◆ Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
 ◆ Two regional mechanisms in East Africa (EASBRIG COM)
 ◆ North Africa Response Capability (NARC).10
These brigades must be well trained and well equipped – in essence, to be combat ready 
for complex operations in Africa.11 Combat readiness has become so imperative that 
De Coning proposed adapting the ASF to a just-in-time readiness force, by putting in 
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place the necessary policy frameworks, doctrine, standing operating procedures, and 
a legal and logistic framework.12
The aim and scope of this chapter is to conceptualise and theoretically discuss combat 
readiness, outline challenges facing the ASF and its combat readiness, and argue the 
need for military psychology to promote combat readiness of ASF forces through 
support to soldiers and their families.
WHAT IS COMBAT READINESS?
A number of researchers have explored the concept of combat readiness (CR), focusing 
on different concepts to develop a definition.13 Kruys states that terms such as 
“readiness”, “combat efficiency”, “combat proficiency” and “combat power” are similar 
and can be used interchangeably.14 Van Vuuren is of the opinion that these terms are 
closely interconnected.15 Gal focuses on CR as a psychological attribute influencing a 
soldier’s choices in a specific action in an operation.16 Kirkland and Katz refer to CR 
as a soldier’s degree of commitment.17 Shinga and Van Dyk view CR as a soldier’s level 
of preparedness psychologically and physically through training and psychological 
interventions (on morale, leadership, cohesion, hardiness, team functioning, daring) 
aimed at developing soldiers’ capability to perform a given military task successfully. 
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Figure 1 CR: A State of Mind for a Soldier
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ASF soldiers are expected to deal with conflict, disasters and war that collectively or 
individually represent dangerous and traumatic environments.18 Shinga and Van Dyk 
view CR also as a state of mind influenced by personal, material and unit readiness 
within which soldiers have to operate (see Figue 1).19
 ◆ Personal readiness requires good intrapsychic ability, with high levels of ego 
power, self-confidence, self-efficacy (to deal with complex military operations 
as ASF members), high levels of daring, tough-mindedness and hardiness to 
fight dangerous and hardened rebels like Al-Shabaab, M23, Boko Haram and, if 
necessary, the dangerous terrorist group known as the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS).20
 ◆ Material readiness speaks to the fact that militaries in Africa don’t always have 
the best, latest and serviceable military equipment. The Battle of Bangui in CAR 
in March 2013 is a good example where South African National Defence Force 
soldiers did not have enough equipment, vehicles, helicopters and medical 
support on the ground to fight the Séléka rebels.21 Glad is of the opinion that 
serviceable vehicles, military equipment, medical support care and equipment 
have a direct influence on the motivation, morale, will to fight and state of mind 
of the soldiers involved, which is their level of CR.22 Financial and logistic support 
for the ASF will therefore be crucial to sustain the level of CR of soldiers in battle.
 ◆ Unit readiness is an indication of the collective state of mind of the soldiers. 
Nkewu found in his research on soldiers in Africa that training, vertical and 
horizontal cohesion, esprit de corps, high morale and teamwork contribute 
positively to CR.23 Horizontal cohesion is the trust shared between soldiers,24 the 
bonds of confidence between men within a single unit (section, platoon, company, 
brigade). Vertical cohesion is the trust between soldiers and their leaders on 
different levels, the degree to which soldiers trust their leaders, believe in them 
under fire, obey their decisions and commands, and require their willpower 
to do the task or fight the war. Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment 
among members to achieve a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group 
involved. Effective and competent leaders who care about their soldiers will 
strengthen vertical cohesion to sustain CR in ASF contingents.
Achieving these different levels of cohesion in the ASF to promote high levels of unit 
readiness and CR will be a challenge for brigades. Soldiers originating from different 
countries, speaking different languages, having different organisational/unit cultures, 
doctrines and (possibly) values must be integrated to promote unit cohesion and 
CR. Interventions by military psychologists to contribute to higher levels of unit 
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readiness include team-building sessions, psycho-education sessions to establish a 
new identity and managing cultural diversity.
THE IMPACT OF SOLDIERS’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNIT AND THEIR 
FAMILIES ON CR
Shinga and Van Dyk, in a research project on soldiers in Africa, also found factors 
which contribute to CR, a soldier’s relationship to his/her unit, a soldier’s relationship 
to family/spouse, hardiness and leadership.25 The military unit and the family of the 
soldier are described as “greedy institutions”, both seeking the undivided attention, 
loyalty, commitment, time and energy of the soldier.26 A well-integrated unit and a 
stable family life will be a win–win situation for soldiers – and equally so for the ASF 
– in sustaining their CR. Military leaders also need to be sensitised about the needs 
of the family and the responsibilities of the soldier to his family before, during and 
after deployment. Military psychologists can contribute in this situation to develop a 
well-integrated unit before deployment.
The approach of the unit influences the attitude of the family and vice versa, both 
with substantial effect on the state of mind of the soldier. A positive, supportive 
family and spouse will positively contribute to the morale, motivation and CR of 
each soldier. Military psychologists can present programmes to soldiers and their 
families to address domestic issues (communication before and during operations, 
financial arrangements, etc) that may arise during the absence of the soldier on 
operations. This will enable the family to function independently, giving the soldier 
the opportunity to focus on the operational task.27 Uncertainty about his family will 
break down the soldier’s focus for the deployment, negatively influence his morale 
and motivation and make him more vulnerable to accidents and even substance 
abuse (such as alcohol abuse) to cope with the stress.
HARDINESS
Hardiness is a well-known concept and theoretically grounded in existential 
psychology.28 Hardiness is a pattern of personality characteristics encompassing 
three mutually related dispositions, namely commitment, control and challenge.29 
Commitment is an attitude to involve oneself in (rather than experience alienation 
from) whatever one is doing, while control is to feel and act as if one is influential 
(rather than helpless) in activities such as operations or war, and challenge is the 
belief that changes in life are opportunities for personal growth.30 The results from the 
research of Shinga and Van Dyk in Africa on soldiers show a meaningful influence of 
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hardiness as a mediator in the soldier’s relationships to the unit and family to protect 
their CR while absent from home and during operations.31
MILITARY LEADERSHIP
Dunn describes military leadership as the catalyst for the personnel dimension 
of combat readiness – it is an irreplaceable force multiplier.32 Military leaders 
(commanders) play a significant role in soldiers’ CR and overall state of mind, serving 
as a buffer between the soldier and unwanted mental health conditions such as post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).33 Successful military leaders contribute to feelings 
of high morale, motivation, self-efficacy and self-confidence in their soldiers, as well 
as to safeguard them from psychological conditions such as anxiety, adjustment 
disorders, depression and PTSD.
Combat readiness, as a state of mind, is grounded in a multifactorial theory. 
Intrapsychic strength, the inner self and ego power of the soldier characterised by 
high self-confidence, self-efficacy and hardiness, will empower the soldier with the 
necessary motivation to fight and sacrifice for his country and the continent. To 
attain this requires unit readiness as well as military leaders that can manage a well-
integrated unit and family system, making informed and proper decisions for ASF 
brigades to become a just-in-time combat ready to fight high risk and complex wars 
in countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Somalia and DRC in the future.
CHALLENGES TO THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
Circumstances in some Africa countries include realities such as old outdated military 
equipment, inadequate medical equipment, support and military hospitals, and the 
absence in most countries of military psychologists as well. There is no need indicated 
for military psychology and services in policy documents of the ASF and AU.
ABSENCE OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGISTS IN THE PLANNING PHASE
Murithi mentioned the importance of operational readiness of the ASF, but the how 
and what on CR is vague.34 The complexity of future operations requires ASF soldiers 
with high levels of CR and a focused state of mind. It is now the time to include this 
dimension in selection and planning, during and after operations, and in doctrine 
to support the soldiers on a psychological level. This implies that ASF brigades will 
need well-trained and well-equipped soldiers, but in the available literature the 
psychological dimension in preparation of brigades is unclear, if not absent. The void 
became abundantly clear at the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) 
93
A Need for Military Psychology in Africa: The African Standby Force as an Example
conference held on 5–7 September 2016 in Cairo, Egypt. From the discussions it was 
clear that military psychological services, sources and an overall plan are currently 
not part of ASF doctrine and AU policy for the ASF.
In discussing proper military psychological services in Africa, Kasujja stated that 
some countries, such as South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda, are possibly in a better 
position, while several countries have no capability.35 As a consequence, for several 
ASF brigades military psychologists will possibly be absent during the planning 
phase of operations and thus no psychological services at the level of operations. 
Delivering the necessary military psychological services before, during and after 
operations to those who are under pressure is lacking. This absence could well lead 
to the failure to protect the mental health of military members of the ASF and their 
families. Circumstances such as the absence of the necessary psychological services 
predict conflict in soldiers’ family life and psychological disorders such as depression, 
anxiety and PTSD. As a result, drug and alcohol misuse/abuse as surviving and coping 
measures are bound to increase, with negative consequences for armed services.
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
African military forces are often poorly funded, which implies that they have very 
old and inferior military equipment, ammunition, communication equipment and 
medical support equipment such as field hospitals.36 By way of illustration, Heitman 
attributes some vulnerabilities to the South African National Defence Force during 
the Battle of Bangui against the Séléka rebels. He points out the absence of light 
armoured equipment and vehicles, assault helicopters, Cessna Caravan utility 
aircraft and adequate medical services.37 In Mali and Nigeria soldiers rebelled as a 
result of having to fight insurgents with inferior or outdated military equipment. It 
is also the reality that most East and West African countries have armies that are 
poorly armed. The kinds of firearms they possess are only adequate when dealing 
with civilians, but inadequate to deal with heavily armed rebel groups operating in 
East and West Africa.38 For example, this is what was said about the African Union 
Mission in Sudan:39
“At times the AU’s equipment is woefully inadequate for the task at hand. 
Soldiers of the AU Darfur Mission (AMIS) are armed with pistols for 
officers, AK-47s for the majority of the troops, and one rocket-propelled 
grenade launcher (RPG-7) for every ten soldiers. When opposing 
unarmed civilians these weapons are quite adequate. However, against 
the factions armed by the government they are poorly equipped and 
little more than a ‘nuisance’.”
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This is a clear indication, for example, that in order for African Standby Forces to 
maintain peace and pose a military threat anywhere within the region, they need to 
catch up with the rest of the world in terms of weapons. In fact, this might imply that 
by deploying for ASF missions various African governments are putting the lives 
of their soldiers at risk unnecessarily. Unrealistic mandates, unsustainable numbers 
of personnel, hostile host governments and mission creep have undermined peace 
operations.40 Such lack of equipment and fire-power in particular put the CR levels 
of ASF members under pressure.
Some rebel/terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, supported on occasion 
by ISIS, share in money gained from selling oil from captured oil industries.41 In 
Africa, in particular, the money they spend on military equipment might well be 
turned to fighting ASF brigades in the future. This will have a negative effect on the 
morale, motivation, CR and state of mind of ASF soldiers. Employing superior fire 
power was demonstrated during 2013 in the CAR, when the newly equipped Séléka 
fighters returning from fighting in Lybia marched on Bangui and outfought the forces 
of the CAR government.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be described as the “sleeping enemy” in 
the psyches and minds in most of the soldiers of the ASF brigades. Hoge et al found 
in a meta-analysis that the average post-deployment prevalence of PTSD was 13,2% 
for the personnel involved in the sample, while 21% of soldiers reported receiving 
mental health services for stress, emotional, alcohol, drugs or family problems. 
Studies have shown that 13–53% of US and Canadian veterans meet the criteria for a 
mental health problem.42 In the case of ASF soldiers, most of them might have been 
previously deployed or were even involved in grim war circumstances. It is unknown 
whether the necessary military support on PTSD screenings, trauma management 
and other psychological services have been available to these soldiers. Data on PTSD 
for soldiers in Africa and the ASF brigades is either unknown or absent.
Untreated/undiagnosed PTSD is a safety and operational risk for the ASF and it will 
influence the general mental health of the force, their level of CR and their state 
of mind to deal with a competent and violent enemy. Soldiers with high PTSD 
levels are vulnerable to aggressive outbursts, shooting at colleagues or civilians 
during peacekeeping operations, depression, bad decision-making, low levels of 
concentration, and drug and alcohol misuse.43
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SELECTION OF SOLDIERS
The “job–demands–resource” (JDR) model of Bakker and Demerouti, where selection 
will contribute to make a proper job fit between the resources of a soldier and the 
demands of a job, can be helpful in doing job-fit profiles of soldiers in the ASF.44 Van 
Dyk and Ditsela developed a job-fit model for the military with general profiles for 
posts such infantry, logistics and artillery, and more specialised profiles for jobs such 
divers, pilots and special forces.45
Dimensions noted in the Description column of Figure 2 are proposed for a selection 
process of soldiers to do a proper job-fit assessment, including soldiers of the ASF, 
with the possible use of psychometric tests or questionnaires by military psychologists 
(Figure 2):46
Tests/questionnaires Description
Potential evaluation (Differential Aptitude 
Test (DAT))
To assess vocabulary, verbal reasoning, abstract 
ability, decision-making.
Management profile (Myers Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI))
To assess different dimensions of personality 
such as people- or task-orientated, emotional 
or cognitive functioning, and sensing- or 
judging-orientated.
Hardiness (Dolan and Adler Hardiness Test)
To evaluate the soldier’s ability to commit, 
control and deal with change.
Absence of psychopathology (Millon Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory-III (Millon-III))
To prevent psychopathology such as depression, 
anxiety, PTSD and personality disorders such as 
borderline, narcissistic and anti-social behaviour 
in soldiers.
PTSD (PTSD-checklist-clinical version, PCL-C)
To assess PTSD levels of soldiers for screening, 
prevention or for clinical treatment.
Personality (16 personality factor questionnaire)
To assess the personality profile of a soldier to 
do proper job-fit to the challenges related to a 
specific job.
Figure 2 Psychometric tests and questionnaires
The dimensions outlined in Figure 2 together with tests or questionnaires can be 
useful for a basic evaluation and proper job-fit placement in the general job profiles, 
while more specialised careers such as pilots, divers, paratroopers and special force 
operators may require an alternative specialised job-fit process with the use of 
specialised psychometric evaluations. Normally, military psychologists compile the 
psychometric battery of tests if the specific group is identified or their job descriptions 
are available.
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FAMILY INVOLVEMENT
Results from research in Africa have shown a strong positive connection between 
the soldier’s healthy relationship with a spouse or family and level of CR.47 
Kalamdien and Van Dyk developed a model to support soldiers and their families 
psychologically during operations.48 The model is based on an approach where the 
Military Psychological Team (MPT) supporting soldiers during operations interacts 
with the MPT supporting the family at home to develop a co-ordinated approach in 
dealing with possible challenges during operations.
Soldiers and their families need support during the different phases of a deployment 




Starts with the warning order for deployment; soldier’s routine normally 
starts to change, longer hours busy with preparation for operation, and the 
family goes through the different emotions around separation. The military 
psychologist can work with groups of family members and soldiers to 
facilitate the challenges that are part of this phase.
Deployment 
phase
A phase characterised by adjustments for the soldiers and his family. It is 
important that the military psychologists get involved to settle all groups 




MPTs needs to give support to soldiers and the families, do assessments 
during operations on CR, motivation and morale levels of soldiers and 
families, to advise commanders and make proposals to sustain CR levels.
Redeployment 
phase
Sometimes the last month of deployment is difficult for soldiers, possibly 
resulting in a decrease in focus and motivation, a higher number of vehicle 
and shooting accidents, and incidents of misconduct occurring at the front 
during operations. Soldiers start to focus on family and home, and family 
members become excited, on the one hand, and also anxious about giving 
up roles and positions which they had during the operation. In this phase 




It is necessary to keep the unit–soldier–family well integrated for proper 
functioning and future deployment. MPTs need to plan and advise 
commanders properly for the success of activities during this phase, to 
protect unit and family cohesion for the sake of a “healthy military family”.
Figure 3 Phases of deployment
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NEED FOR MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY IN AFRICA: ASF AS AN EXAMPLE
This part of the chapter outlines the need for military psychologists and services in 
Africa to support brigades of the ASF in future by sustaining mental health and CR 
of members. This need results from a survey done with the attendees from African 
countries at the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) conference 
5–7 September 2016 in Cairo, Egypt. The survey followed a presentation to sensitise 
the audience on the need for military psychological services in Africa. These services 
include the following:
 ◆ Military psychologists and services. An imperative is to develop pockets of 
knowledge, skills and expertise with military psychologists, theory on military 
psychology and skills for relevant services. Pockets exist at, for example, 
Makerere University, Uganda for East Africa, Annambra University, Nigeria for 
West Africa, at military academies in Namibia and South Africa, and training 
institutions for peacekeeping operations in Kenya (International Peace Support 
Training Centre), Zimbabwe (Southern African Development Community’s 
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre), Tanzania (Institute of Peace and 
Conflict studies) and Ghana (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (KAIPKTC)).50 These pockets of knowledge can spread to support the 
different ASF brigades within the respective regions.
 ◆ Mental health management. The use of MPTs is required to keep the force 
mentally stable, for good motivation, decision-making, team cohesion and high 
morale.51 It is important before, during and after an operation to utilise a MPT 
(registered nurse, doctor, military psychologist, social worker and chaplain, for 
example); this is already being practised in many units in the South African 
National Defence Force and can make a meaningful contribution in the different 
ASF brigades that stand to face the brunt of future armed conflicts.
 ◆ Trauma and PTSD management. Combat trauma influences soldiers on a 
conscious and subconscious emotional level and on a physical level.52 At the 
conscious level a soldier is informed through his/her senses by what is heard, 
seen, smelled, felt and experienced at a specific time during a specific incident 
in war. To sustain CR, Psychological Debriefing (PD) must be done during or 
after operations to debrief traumatic experiences on a conscious level to prevent 
such trauma filtering through from the conscious mind and becoming stored at 
the subconscious level as “unfinished business”. Such “unfinished business” can 
influence the soldier’s daily conscious behaviour. Seemingly irrational avoiding 
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of places or hyper arousal after hearing a noise are symptoms of PTSD and 
evidence that everyday incidents can trigger unfinished business of previous 
experiences. Soldiers can overreact with high-risk behaviour during operations 
such as impulsive shooting, running away from noise, reacting to the smell of 
diesel, dust or blood. Unmanaged PTSD can influence soldiers’ CR and state of 
mind and require urgent treatment by a military psychologist to control the risks 
and CR during battle.
The physical dimension refers to the neurological process that occurs in the brain 
of the soldier when his/her senses observe or experience danger as in war. During 
this process the brain releases hormones adrenalin, nor-adrenalin and cortisol, and 
opioids. These substances cause anatomical and muscular changes in the body, the 
body reacts by preparing for flight (worry, concern, anxiety during war) or fight 
(frustrations, anger, rage, hate) or to freeze (helplessness, hopelessness, numbness, 
dissociation). These chemicals remain in the body as muscle contraction and some 
researchers have found that PTSD symptoms arise when residual energy from a 
traumatic experience is not discharged from the body. Military psychologists need to 
be involved during and after operations to keep the soldiers physically fit, free from 
trauma and PTSD, with a high level of CR.
PD can be helpful in the prevention of psychological conditions like PTSD to keep 
soldiers mentally fit and combat ready. PD can be used by military psychologists as a 
first-line treatment to prevent psychopathology and as a psychological triage to screen 
soldiers to determine who are mentally fit to stay in the operation and who are unfit 
so that they can be referred to the MPT for clinical treatment. Proper management 
of PTSD is important for prevention as well as to protect soldiers against its effects 
when involved in incidents such as vehicle and shooting accidents.
Dhladhla and Van Dyk proposed the following model to manage PTSD during 
operations in Africa and it can be suitable for soldiers of the emergent ASF brigades 
within the respective regions:53
 ◆ Pre-deployment screening, normally by a MPT, and will include PTSD assessment 
and screening by military psychologists of all the soldiers.
 ◆ Pre-deployment awareness training, where military psychologists educate 
soldiers on trauma, the effects of trauma, dealing with trauma and symptoms of 
PTSD in members for early identification.
 ◆ Post-incident counselling, where PD can be a very useful tool during an operation 
to debrief trauma in time to prevent PTSD.
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 ◆ Post-deployment PTSD screening, assessment and PD if necessary, when soldiers 
are back home to “cleanse” them of symptoms or experiences of traumatic events.
 ◆ Follow-up PD sessions on soldiers who need more than one session.
This model wants to prevent PTSD and sustain CR and a positive state of mind in the 
soldiers of the ASF brigades by offering the following three advantages and progress 
in three selected domains:
 ◆ Psychological plan. For ASF operations it can be a tool, a process that the military 
psychologist can use before, during and after operations to assess factors such as 
morale, CR and motivation, with feedback as management information to the 
force commander and planned activities to support or correct it.54 Even more 
relevant is if the psychological plan can become part of the “appreciation and 
planning cycle” just like the intelligence, operational and logistical plan, to 
support the commander and the CR level of ASF soldiers.
 ◆ Selection and proper job-fit of soldiers. Psychological assessment (aptitude, 
personality, levels of hardiness, resilience, grit), training and field exercises 
are imperative. Delahaij, Kamphuis and Van den Berg55 aver that “military 
organisations are moving from a curative to a preventative approach in 
supporting mental health, well-being and job performance”. The authors found 
that threat exposure is both a stressor for soldiers with low self-efficacy and also 
a crucial part of the deployment experience for soldiers with high self-efficacy, 
such as paratroopers and special forces operators. The ASF brigades have to 
optimise selection and job-fit to support CR and prevent psychological burn-out 
in soldiers.
 ◆ Leadership development. Research shows that leaders can have a strong influence 
as a buffer to protect soldiers from the effects of trauma. If leaders of the ASF 
develop the potential of their soldiers to become self-leaders, to develop self-
confidence, be more independent, with high levels of competency and self-
efficacy, and as a platoon to experience collective efficacy, they will be better 
protected against PTSD. Leaders who create unit cohesion convey the necessary 
information, develop a feeling of emotional safety, build their relationships on 
trust with their soldiers, care for their needs and families, and eventually create an 
atmosphere that will serve as a safety net for soldiers under fire while protecting 
CR and preventing PTSD.56
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CONCLUSION
Current developments in Africa bring security challenges to the fore, specific for the 
type of scenarios the ASF is destined to encounter. Future complex situations will 
challenge the CR levels and the state of mind of soldiers employed within the ASF 
brigades. The need in Africa is to develop a sustainable military psychological service 
to support soldiers of the ASF brigades and their families during these operations. 
The chapter conceptualises CR, discusses the military psychology challenges for 
the ASF and proposes realistic needs for future military psychological services for 
soldiers of the ASF brigades and their families.
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The African Standby Force: A Reactive 
Paper Tiger or a Pre-Emptive Lion?
Eeben Barlow1
INTRODUCTION
As Africa transitions through numerous cold, simmering and hot conflicts and wars, 
the eruption of violence across the continent shows no sign of abating. Armed violence 
will continue and will, in all probability, escalate. Many of the simmering conflicts and 
wars will reignite as populations become more demanding, desperate, impoverished 
and restive. Not only is the continent faced with non-violent and violent conflicts 
and limited wars between governments, a disgruntled and agitated populace, armed 
anti-government forces (AGFs) and proxy forces, it is also increasingly becoming an 
assembly area for foreign military forces operating under numerous guises. Typical 
of the latter are “military partnerships”, “Foreign Internal Defence”2 (FID),“Global 
War on Terror”3 (GWOT) as well as “free foreign Private Military Company (PMC) 
training” and several intelligence agencies masquerading as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Added to this melting pot of potential conflict is the fact that 
African countries do not, despite claims to the contrary, share common values or a 
collective vision of a common future whereby all of its people will benefit.
In principle, the African Stand-by Force (ASF) ought to provide African security 
solutions to African security problems, but its establishment requires a detailed 
assessment and investigation with numerous searching questions requiring answers. 
Failure to address and answer the questions honestly and without bias will result in 
the ASF being out of step with its envisaged role. The continent cannot afford this. 
Currently, an apparent weakness is the AU’s unwillingness to engage in preventive 
and coercive diplomacy when a conflict or war is in its embryonic phase. However, 
even if the political will exists to provide security solutions to a conflict, the AU still 
seeks funding beyond Africa’s shores.
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Driven by political and military will and guided by actionable and predicted 
intelligence, the ASF could present Africa with an asset that can be deployed to deter, 
discourage, intervene, contain and/or neutralise the threats that drive the numerous 
conflicts and wars in Africa. However, to establish the ASF as an effective deterrent 
force operating in tandem with the AU member states’ diplomatic efforts, the ASF 
must be African-owned and never allow itself to be exploited as a proxy force acting 
to secure the foreign interests of a foreign donor or power.
As the continental fall-out of both FID and GWOT continues, radical religious 
groups will further pursue their quest to enforce religion-based politics through 
extreme violence. These groupings have already gained footholds in north, west, east 
and central Africa and are moving southwards. They show no sign of slowing down. 
Their loose affiliation to Daesh in primarily West and North Africa – also known as 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL and currently IS) – has bolstered their cause and 
motivation, and added further momentum to their quest for power through religion-
driven violence. A similar linkage has occurred with radical groupings in East Africa 
(Al-Shabaab) and Al-Qaeda. Currently, the Islamist group in CAR, Séléka, and the 
Allied Defence Force (ADF) in eastern DRC are being courted by both Daesh and 
Al-Qaeda. Similarly, ethnic, tribal and/or politically motivated Anti-Government 
Forces (AGFs) will continue their violent quests to achieve their political aspirations 
– with or without covert and clandestine foreign economic, moral and military aid 
and support.
The inability of the continent’s intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and 
national armed forces to fulfil their mandates to identify, prevent and neutralise this 
wave of destruction has prompted the rise of the African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crises4 (ACIRC) alongside, and possibly in co-operation with, the ASF.
ESTABLISHING THE ASF
The establishment of an ASF presents the continent with a potentially powerful asset 
that can be deployed to deter, discourage, intervene, contain and/or neutralise the 
threats that drive the numerous conflicts and wars in Africa.
Conceptualised in 2003 and planned to consist of five regional brigades, the 25 
000-strong ASF is intended to form the backbone of the continent’s peace and 
security architecture. This asset will – if correctly organised, trained, equipped and 
led – be able to provide the favoured African security solutions to African security 
problems. However, the large manpower base for the ASF holds the risk to foster 
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a cost-intensive, unsustainable, lumbering, unwieldy giant that is unable to rapidly 
react and deploy.
An ASF much reduced in size will be better able to provide the continent with a 
measure of added independence and the opportunity to assume responsibility for its 
own defence and security, without being forced to rely on the two-edged sword of 
“free” foreign aid. The acceptance of this so-called “free aid” is partly responsible for 
the continued instability and violence pervading Africa. The misguided acceptance 
of “free aid”, furthermore, lays the foundation for the economic and political 
manipulation of governments and nations, in the interests of the donor countries, 
and usually to the distinct disadvantage of the recipient country. In spite of the latter 
risk, and to be an effective deterrent to any hostile threat force the ASF must pose a 
credible and sustainable deterrent force. It must be able to rapidly transition from a 
mere standby posture to a rapidly deployable, highly mobile and agile intervention 
force, able and willing to neutralise and/or overcome pending or real armed hostile 
situations. Overcoming hostile armed situations requires more than creating new 
terms to discuss old problems in the erroneous belief that new answers and solutions 
will be forthcoming. It requires the ability to rapidly and relentlessly employ both 
sustainable horizontal and vertical manoeuvre along with firepower to deadly effect.
But have the common political aspirations driving the establishment of the ASF 
truly been attained – and does the collective continental will exist to deploy such a 
force? And has consensus been reached on the strategic and operational deployment 
policies and principles of the ASF?
THE FACE OF CONFLICT AND WAR
The face of conflict and war in Africa undoubtedly differs from that beyond the 
continent’s shores. These differences are evident in terrain, technology, infrastructure, 
climatic variations, insufficient airpower, conflict-drivers and budgetary constraints, 
social issues, demographics, population manipulation, to name but a few.
Calls for “negotiations” by failing anti-government and proxy forces will – once 
they face destruction – continue with the aim of gaining time to re-arm and 
continue the conflict or war. The false negotiations will inevitably be accompanied 
by a dishonouring of the ceasefires and a return to conflict and war. This cycle of 
negotiated deception has been successfully applied on several occasions by AGFs 
and proxy forces faced with defeat and will continue – often with the support of 
international bodies and governments.
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International “diplomacy” and UN intervention, combined with the ever-present 
threat of the International Criminal Court, are used very effectively in preventing 
African governments under siege from ever achieving absolute victory in conflicts 
and wars and destroying the threat(s) to their independence and sovereignty. Africa 
also remains a perfect example that half-won conflicts and wars are never truly 
won. Conflict and war in Africa is – and will remain – complex, dynamic, and 
multidimensional. It will continue to engage the populace at various levels and, as a 
result, expose them to the mercy of the opposing forces.
Ill-prepared, under-equipped and poorly disciplined government forces will 
continue to view civilian casualties as mere “collateral damage” and, in some 
instances, will target the population through frustration. The number of refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are bound to escalate and place additional 
strain on underperforming government agencies and services. In addition domestic 
and regional tensions, conflict and war will linger and be fuelled and triggered by, 
inter alia:
 ◆ intoxication of power by heads of state
 ◆ ever-demanding and restive populace who demand greater support from 
government
 ◆ foreign interests of major powers colliding with national and vital interests of 
African states
 ◆ resource greed and control
 ◆ neighbourly suspicion (historical suspicion) – often encouraged by foreign 
advisors
 ◆ tribal loyalties and religious differences
 ◆ bad political and military advice at the strategic and operational levels
 ◆ perceived weak or ill-prepared armed forces and their inability to project decisive 
force rapidly, ruthlessly and efficiently
 ◆ lack of actionable and predictive intelligence, continually rendering the armed 
forces reactive as opposed to proactive
 ◆ failure to assess the implications of “unintended consequences”
 ◆ regional spill-over of conflicts and wars into neighbouring states
 ◆ government corruption
 ◆ development and encouragement of militant and divisive politics
 ◆ political marginalisation 5
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By identifying and countering potential conflicts and wars, the ASF will signal the 
desire and willingness of the AU’s member states to take responsibility for securing 
peace on the continent. In so doing, it can play a major role and become an asset 
that serves all of Africa. To the contrary, if the ASF is to simply become another 
peacekeeping force – as opposed to a true African deterrent and intervention force 
acting in the interests of Africa – it will be restricting its options. Such an outcome 
will simply add to the many costly and failed peacekeeping missions instead of 
providing viable options for peace in Africa.
To launch and conduct successful containment and intervention operations the ASF 
will require strong and determined AU guidance along with the requisite political and 
military deployment and operating parameters. Failure to do so will result in mission 
creep as well as tarnish the image, effectiveness, and reputation of the fledgling ASF.
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence is the fuel that drives strategy and subsequently the force design. But 
what has intelligence thus far “told” the strategists and planners in terms of the 
current and predicted threats and how has this intelligence been used to design the 
ASF? The ASF’s force design and policy framework must be dictated and guided by 
the current and predicted conflict trends, along with the realities facing Africa. It is, 
after all, the current and predicted conflicts and wars that will establish and confirm 
the force design, deployment policy and protocols of the ASF.
Will the ASF for example be required to intervene in state-on-state aggression and, 
if so, under what circumstances and on which warring side? What if a conflict 
arises between a government and its populace – what decision will be taken to 
intervene and how will such intervention manifest itself? What action can be taken 
if the government facing domestic unrest and uprisings refuses the ASF entry into 
the country? Will the threat be a hostile neighbour, a proxy force, an armed anti-
government force, and what foreign support will the threat have? Or will the threat 
be a foreign expeditionary force aimed at “regime change” somewhere in Africa? 
Furthermore, in what shape will the threat appear in – a limited conventional force 
or an unconventional force? These are potential and real scenarios facing the ASF.
Will the AU have the collective ability to recognise foreign/non-African instigated 
conflicts, the necessary courage to expose such operations for what they are – and the 
collective political and military will to stand up to and resist such interference? Will 
the ASF be focused solely on Military Operations Related to War (MORW) or must it 
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also engage in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)? Ultimately current 
and predicted intelligence will determine if the ASF must be an expeditionary force 
or an intervention force – or both. Intelligence will, additionally, determine the ASF’s 
design, doctrine, equipment requirements and posture.
At present, numerous intelligence gaps exist – gaps that need to be rapidly investigated 
and rectified. To be of any value, intelligence must be actionable, pre-emptive, 
predictive, directed and focused and must never be shaped to match existing agendas 
and/or perceptions. Utilising an array of clandestine, covert and overt sources, the 
necessary intelligence must direct and guide strategists and planners in force design, 
doctrine, equipment, training, logistics, communications, cyber threats and so forth.
Sound intelligence is furthermore required to enable the development of realistic 
campaign strategies and operational designs that fall within the means of the ASF. 
It is through a lack of coherent, credible and confirmed intelligence that the term 
“unintended consequences” was born, a euphemism for “we forgot to consider the 
implications of our actions…”.
A lack of sound intelligence will prevent the development of predictive intelligence, 
thus rendering the ASF a reactive force and largely unable to fulfil its missions. It will, 
as currently witnessed, prevent government forces from regaining and maintaining 
operational initiative or result in intervening merely to establish a stalemate. Africa 
cannot afford one more conflict or war that has reached stalemate and is likely 
to reignite.
AFRICA’S ARMED FORCES
The majority of, if not all, African government forces are clones of their former colonial 
rulers and later of their East Bloc and other allies. Such types of force structures along 
with their accompanying doctrines seldom – if ever – work in Africa. Not only are 
the current force structures cumbersome and in many instances incorrectly advised 
– they lack flexibility, adaptability and rely primarily on mass – and recent history in 
Africa and beyond has shown that large armies fight small conflicts and wars very, 
very badly. This is not to say that African national armies are unable to fight. They 
can – but they do so in an uneconomic, unsustainable manner and, in the process, 
cede initiative and manoeuvre to opposing forces, thus prolonging conflicts and wars.
That being said, a conflict or war must be decisively won by the national armed forces 
and not by an intervention force. Any military victory by an intervention force will 
remain a hollow victory and result in a flare-up of hostilities once the intervention 
109
The African Standby Force: A Reactive Paper Tiger or a Pre-Emptive Lion?
force withdraws. Therefore, national armed forces must overcome hurdles and 
challenges to increase their deterrence level and combat effectiveness. These 
challenges relate primarily to force design, manpower, training, doctrine, command 
and control, equipment and force projection.
History often shows that much of the agenda-based “free” foreign training given 
to African armed forces sets those forces up for failure to ensure control over their 
capabilities and effectiveness. On these incorrectly organised and poorly trained 
forces, obsolete equipment is dumped, further hampering the forces on numerous 
levels and essentially weakening them to a point where they become easy prey to 
AGFs and proxy forces. As a rising threat domain, a “silent front” called Directed 
Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks faces most, if not all, African national armed forces 
and their governments. Not only can these cyber-attacks cripple critical technology-
based infrastructure – they can also shut down or intercept communications and 
cyber-reliant technology within the armed forces. This critical aspect of cyber warfare 
appears to have been neglected by most African armed forces.
National armed forces are constituted to protect and defend the constitution, the 
state, its people, and its territorial integrity from hostile domestic and foreign armed 
threats and incursions. To fulfil this role, armed forces must synchronise their sources 
of power to ensure unity of effort and strategic, operational and tactical focus.
The sources of power include inter alia:
 ◆ intelligence
 ◆ organisational structure
 ◆ strategic vision and intent
 ◆ leadership and doctrine
 ◆ equipment and training
 ◆ human resources
The perceived disconnect and distrust between the political level and the military 
level has, in many instances, prevented the strengthening of the sources of power. 
The result has been national armies that are better prepared to conduct Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) than Military Operations Related to War 
(MORW). This unhealthy approach to national defence has given encouragement 
and impetus to hostile forces aimed at disrupting and/or dislodging governments.
National armies are often used to bridge the gap created by law enforcement agencies 
that are lacking in training and means, making them quasi-policemen as opposed to 
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soldiers. In turn, this has resulted in a mismatch between training and deployments 
in the law enforcement environment. It has also created a degree of antagonism and 
distrust between the armed forces and the law enforcement agencies. The populace 
have, as a result, lost much faith in the law enforcement agencies and developed a fear 
of their own armed forces. These incompatibilities and their unwanted consequences 
are carried over to any ASF structure they have to serve.
Regardless of the ultimate mission definition(s) of the ASF, it will draw its manpower 
and equipment from the national armies of its member states. The composition of 
many African armed forces precludes the advancement of manpower from different 
ethnic, religious and/or tribal groups. This divide within the armed forces generates 
its own dissatisfaction within the populace, creating a perception that only members 
of a certain ethnic, religious or tribal group are destined for command positions. 
Such divides ultimately find their way into ASF contingents and adds a further red 
flag to what the ASF must contend with.
FORCE DESIGN AND PREPARATION
Currently, many African armed forces follow an Order of Battle (ORBAT) based on 
that of their former colonial rulers and later East Bloc allies. This has resulted in 
adaptions and changes to force a composition that, in many instances, make little to 
no sense. These ORBATs are rigid force structures that hamper the decentralisation 
of command and control, utilise outdated doctrines, are inflexible, expensive to 
maintain and unwieldly to deploy, and logistically and economically taxing to sustain.
Not only are these inherited structures and doctrines cumbersome but they are also 
in many instances bloated, inefficient, ill-trained, badly advised and poorly equipped. 
This hampers the much-talked about African requirement for rapid deployment 
and combat effectiveness. Africa therefore needs to reassess its current armed forces’ 
structures. For the ASF to be a truly adaptable, agile, flexible, sustainable and credible 
deterrent force, the ASF must be planned and structured following a “bottom-up” 
approach instead of “top-down”. This will enable the brigades and/or elements 
thereof to be correctly structured, trained and equipped for immediate and rapid 
deployment. It will furthermore be more cost effective and enhance decentralised 
command and control.
Force design must, however, be dictated by the current and predicted threats the ASF 
will be required to deal with. To simply assume that the current threats will remain 
unchanged or that the pending threats will manifest themselves as similar to the 
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current dangers will be a folly. Intelligence must, therefore, play a fundamental role 
in the design of the ASF and its elements.
Threats in Africa have demonstrated an ability to adapt to combat operations intent on 
destroying them. To prevent the adaption of threats, national armed forces will need 
to be flexible in their application of doctrine and force preparation. The doctrines 
followed by most African armies are unworkable as they are outdated, lack agility and 
flexibility, and fail to recognise the complexity of missions. Many African military 
doctrines consist of a mishmash of different doctrines cobbled together and hold 
little if any relevance to the prevailing situations. Deployment drills and operational 
sustainment are attributed the importance they deserve. Command and control is 
centralised, thus negating initiative on the battlefield. To achieve mission success, the 
current amalgamation of doctrines requires rectification. Incorrectly organised and 
poorly prepared government forces, utilising unworkable doctrines, cannot achieve 
the operational successes they need to accomplish. In turn, this weakens them in the 
eyes of the populace and adds impetus to anti-government forces and other hostile 
armed forces.
It will do the planners engaged in the force architecture well to dissect the past and 
analyse the present in order to predict the future. This requires historical, current and 
predicted intelligence.
STRATEGIC VISION OR STRATEGIC DREAM?
Strategy, expressed as “Ends, Ways and Means”, provides numerous questions that 
require answering. Currently, there appears to be a disconnect between the Ends, Ways 
and Means at both the political and military levels within – and between – numerous 
African governments. This is, despite statements to the contrary, partly due to the 
lack of a common, shared future vision for Africa and how Africa wishes to present 
and position itself on the international political, security and economic stages.
This apparent disconnect provides opportunities for opposing forces to act against 
governments. But to what extent is this apparent disconnect carried over into the 
AU and how does this impact on the ASF’s force design and its intended deployment, 
missions and operations?
The Ends, Ways and Means at the strategic levels need to be aligned to ensure joint co-
operation, along with a synchronised and unified effort. To achieve this, consensus 
surrounding the strategic intent of the ASF must be determined and whether its 
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role is to be peacekeeping or peace enforcement through determined intervention. 
Typical guiding concepts and questions are as follows.
 ◆ What means are available to equip the brigades?
 ◆ Where will the brigades be based?
 ◆ What strategic, operational and tactical airlift assets are available to enable a rapid 
deployment and sustainment of forces?
 ◆ What deployment protocols and policies are in place?
 ◆ What common doctrine will be agreed on?
 ◆ What training will be given to the brigades and by whom?
 ◆ What if member states disagree on the desired Ends?
 ◆ What if member states disagree on an intended deployment?
 ◆ What if a member state refuses an ASF deployment in its territory?
 ◆ Will the ASF be a well-balanced, self-sustaining expeditionary force or will it be a 
force that will merely be used to act as a buffer between conflicting parties?
If the ASF is required to choose a side, it must be remembered that half-won wars are 
never won and any ASF intervention to end a conflict or war must achieve a decisive 
result. However, any decisive result achieved by the ASF will be a hollow victory as it 
will signal the inability of the host government’s armed forces to fulfil their mandate. 
This brings into play a longer-term view and settings to counterbalance the weakness 
of the host government. Military operations are by their very nature characterised 
by extreme violence. The mechanisms required when the violence ceases and the 
threat has been neutralised need to be timeously identified and deployed to ensure 
that all successes are exploited. Handing back control to an AU peacekeeping force, 
the law enforcement agencies and/or other government agencies and departments to 
institute governance to the advantage of the populace needs to be carefully considered 
once the ASF has achieved mission success.
WHO WILL OWN THE ASF?
Conflict and war in Africa remain ever present and are, in many instances, 
unavoidable. As many African national armies are unable to rapidly transition 
from a peacetime posture to a fully offensive posture, the door has been opened to 
foreign forces offering “help” that in many instances simply aggravates and prolongs 
a conflict situation and increases domestic and regional tensions. This has created the 
perception that African armies are unable or unwilling to fulfil their mandates – a 
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perception that holds some validity. It has, however, allowed foreign forces to capture 
numerous African armed forces as in Uganda, South Sudan, Nigeria and Mali, to 
name but a few, to act on their behalf, and thus making these African armed forces 
nothing less than proxy forces of foreign powers.
As recent history has shown, when the foreign interests of a major power collide 
with the national and vital interests of an African state, conflict and war become 
unavoidable – usually in the form of foreign-supported proxy forces or covertly 
foreign-sponsored and -supported “popular uprisings” masquerading as “fighting 
for democracy”. In the most extreme case it may involve a foreign-planned and 
-supported military action to achieve a so-called “regime change” with the intent of 
installing a puppet government. Libya, South Sudan, Central African Republic, DR 
Congo, Ivory Coast and Mali serve as such examples.
The ability of the ASF to act in the interests of Africa will be determined by its 
ownership. Ownership will become a crucial point of contention that in itself will 
present numerous challenges. The ASF will require strong, robust political and 
military will of its principles if it is to effectively intervene in African conflicts and 
wars. Funding will become a prime driving force for the successful establishment, 
equipping and training of the ASF. Unless the ASF is wholly funded by African states, 
it will be unable to fully act in the interests of Africa. An independent sustainable 
funding model to finance ASF operations, even when these operations become 
unpalatable to some AU member states, will be essential to its success.
Unless it is financed by Africa, the ASF will not be owned by Africa and will therefore 
risk being viewed as a foreign-owned, African-staffed intervention force, acting on 
behalf of its donors to achieve donor ends. Unfortunately, present strategic thinking 
holds that “the force will depend almost totally on ‘development partners’ for funding 
for logistical support, equipment, rations and other essentials for its upkeep while 
on deployment as African countries are unable to fund the force”.6 This strategic 
view has already consigned the ASF to becoming a powerful, foreign-owned armed 
instrument to enforce the will of the “development partners” on African nations. 
Such economic hijacking of a strategic African security initiative will haunt Africa 
for decades to come.
History has also shown that foreign funding comes with its own challenges and 
demands as the donor dictates the agenda. This fact alone positions the AU where 
it cannot negotiate from a position of strength but instead has to negotiate from a 
position of weakness and use its forces to also attain goals other than its own. Unless 
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Africa pays for the establishment, training and equipping of the ASF, it will never 
truly be an African force but in part a proxy instrument acting on behalf of foreign 
donors as well. This will erode the credibility of the ASF and subsequently the AU.
A CENTRE OF GRAVITY OR A TRINITY OF GRAVITY?
The Clausewitzean view of a single centre of gravity (CoG) does not retain the same 
relevance it did at the time of its writing as Africa will seldom, if ever, see two massed 
national armies facing one another on a field of battle. Instead, the current and 
pending conflicts and wars Africa faces – and is likely to face – involve more than 
just massed armies. The threats facing Africa are – and will be – diverse, complex and 
multidimensional, and characterised by AGFs and proxy forces with regional and/
or foreign government support. The battlefields will be complicated by the presence 
of the populace, who will find themselves having to choose sides. Their decision will 
primarily be based on self-preservation.
The current and pending conflicts have transitioned from a single CoG to a trinity of 
gravity7 (ToG) that involves not only the threat forces, but also the populace, foreign 
and other support. This fact complicates the counter-actions of a government under 
attack and requires an all-inclusive, unified governmental effort along with a multi-
dimensional approach to counter and neutralise the threat or enemy. Similarly, the 
AU and its ASF will need to follow a multi-dimensional approach to achieve mission 
success that focuses on:
 ◆ support-centric operations
 ◆ population-centric operations
 ◆ enemy-centric operations
Support-centric operations
Identifying the financial and other support given to threat forces is a function that 
ought to engage the law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the under-threat 
government and the AU. The channelling of donor funds through banking and other 
financial institutions and systems and the movement of weapons and ammunition 
ought to be priority target areas for the AU or any government facing an armed 
threat. Disrupting the financial and other support structures will result in the enemy 
being financially and materially bankrupted on the battlefield.
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Population-centric operations
Commonly referred to as “Winning the hearts and minds (WHAM)”, these operations 
must counter the impact of conflict or war on the populace. It is a government or 
AU function that is achieved through the application of good governance, positive 
perception creation and the provision of basic essential services. Poverty, a perceived 
belief that government or AU doesn’t care about the citizenry, a lack of income, a lack 
of opportunity and so forth are all aspects the enemy can exploit to their own ends. 
Developing an anti-government sentiment that promises the populace a better life if 
the ruling government is removed will result in the populace supporting the enemy – 
if not with manpower and logistics, then at least with tacit support and intelligence. 
AU intelligence operations must seek to identify and respond to such perceptions in 
a timeous manner.
Enemy-centric operations
The ASF must be able to strike and annihilate the enemy and exploit any and all 
battlefield successes. Utilising horizontal and vertical manoeuvre along with focused 
firepower, the ASF must conduct relentless offensive operations. But to do so it must 
address and rectify the numerous deficiencies many Africa armed forces that face 
and ultimately bring into the ASF.
By neutralising the enemy or threat’s ToG, offers a better platform for the AU to 
commence with negotiations to resolve situations of which military success or 
progress by the ASF is but one building block.
CURRENT DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS
Most, if not all, African armies are plagued by numerous deficiencies and problems. 
These military short-comings disrupt, hamper and restrict the development of 
campaign strategies, thereby impacting on sound operational designs and the 
deployment of forces, combat effectiveness – including sustainability – and combat 
readiness. Grouping together elements from different African armed forces that in 
themselves harbour some, if not major deficiencies, to staff the ASF circulate existing 
deficiencies and problems and hinder any idea of a combat ready ASF.
Some current deficiencies and problems facing African armed forces include, 
inter alia:
 ◆ budgetary constraints
 ◆ lack of actionable and predictive intelligence
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 ◆ weak command, control, communications, cyber and intelligence (C4I) structures
 ◆ lack of airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and 
capabilities
 ◆ inflexible and cumbersome organisational structures
 ◆ lack of coherent strategic vision and intent
 ◆ unworkable or incoherent doctrines that are antiquated, complex and inconsistent
 ◆ shortage of true command leadership as opposed to management techniques
 ◆ no selection or vetting process for troops followed by substandard training 
programmes
 ◆ lack of mission-specific equipment; instead, many African armed forces have 
become the recipients of dumped, obsolete equipment
 ◆ lack of tactical air support assets such as attack and utility helicopters, operational 
and strategic airlift, and strike aircraft.
 ◆ weak logistical systems that impact negatively on operational sustainability
 ◆ inability to project credible and sustainable force
 ◆ Inadequate and poor tactics, techniques and procedures
The ASF will need to address the above, along with the other current deficiencies 
and problems that are inherent to numerous African armed forces to ensure that it 
becomes a more credible, threat-deterrent force.
ALIGNING AND SYNCHRONISING COMBAT POWER
Aligning and synchronising the ASF’s combat power will be determined by the 
type(s) of mission(s) it will be expected to engage in, as well as the available means 
at its disposal. If the ASF’s regional brigades are mobilised for deployment within 
a regional conflict zone, their combat power must be aligned and synchronised 
with that of the local military forces, especially if they are to operate alongside local 
armed forces – or if they are to be integrated into local military contingents. This 
may create numerous challenges to the AFS brigade commanders, especially if there 
is a doctrinal mismatch or if the local military forces suffer operational deficiencies. 
Doctrinal mismatches can have disastrous effects and become multiplied alongside 
operational deficiencies.
Sustaining such operations will also present difficulties to the ASF, especially if 
the resident military forces are poorly organised, trained and sustained. It may be 
necessary to withdraw the local military forces and deploy the ASF brigades as stand-
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alone forces, conducting independent operations within a certain area of operations. 
This too may present challenges as the under-threat or host government may then 
purposely neglect its own armed forces as it will expect the ASF to come to its aid in 
a conflict or war.
If the ASF’s brigades are to be mobilised for deployment as “peacekeeping” forces – 
in effect to conduct MOOTW – the ASF’s combat power will be of little importance 
or relevance. Such deployments will, additionally, merely weigh down the ASF with 
the baggage of ongoing peacekeeping operations and complicate the conflict area. 
As the driving political logic behind an ASF is the desire to play a more prominent 
and deterrent role in securing peace in Africa, it must be more than just another 
foreign-owned peacekeeping force. By creating a new force to merely act as another 
peacekeeping force defeats the Ends of any strategy aimed at securing a lasting and 
permanent peace on the continent.
FINALLY, WHO WILL PULL THE TRIGGER?
Who will “pull the trigger” to deploy the ASF – and at what stage of a conflict or war? 
The decision to deploy ASF brigades is a one that must be taken by Africa and not 
by a donor country or a foreign power. To act in the interests of Africa, the ASF’s 
deployment protocols and policies must be guided and directed by the AU itself and 
supported with strong political will.
Assuming the AU fully owns the ASF and is able to master its economic and logistic 
sustainability, it must remain a coercive political instrument of the AU. This will, 
however, require consensus of the member states on its strategic and operational 
deployment along with its strategic and operational objectives. This in itself creates 
several concerns if the prescribed consensus patterns amongst member states 
remain absent.
“Pulling the trigger” will also have repercussions if the conflict or war is between 
member states of the AU. On which side will the ASF intervene or will it only be used 
to identify, locate and destroy armed anti-government forces (AGFs) that threaten 
the government of a member state? If the ASF is intended for use against an AGF, 
who will decide on the palatability of the government that is faced with an armed anti-
government movement – especially if the AGF has mass popular support? Although 
a recognised government may accept or reject the intervention, certain rules and 
guidelines may override such government objections. If within a regional conflict 
area, which state will be prioritised for ASF intervention should there be a shortfall 
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in capacity to attend to multiple conflict zones? Who will make this decision if each 
state has contributed financially to the creation and support of the ASF? Answers to 
these difficult questions are not clear as the probably stem from wicked problems that 
often defy easy or even any answer.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The economic implications of the proposed ASF, given the aim of a 25 000-man 
strong force with its requisite equipment, is not sustainable. Although Africa can 
afford to establish and sustain an ASF, the current vision of five brigades is excessive 
and overly costly, positioning the ASF as a cost-excessive force unable to act with 
speed and agility.
The following recommendations are put forward:
 ◆ To be a true African Standby Force, Africa must own the ASF and resist temptation 
to seek funding beyond Africa.
 ◆ Intelligence must be given the prominence it deserves and all available overt, 
clandestine and covert collection assets must be exploited to provide actionable 
and predictive intelligence. This is a general obstacle in multinational missions and 
one exacerbated when such missions comprise of multiple African contingents. 
To be the fuel that powers the strategy and determines the force design of the ASF 
it must be driven with a common African goal, energy, focus and determination. 
Breaking down the barriers of distrust will enhance intelligence liaison between 
member-state governments, allowing the AU to play a crucial role in developing 
current and predictive threat trends.
 ◆ The ASF’s force design must be guided and developed by current and predicted 
intelligence and must follow a bottom-up approach. The design must make 
provision for agility, flexibility, rapid deployment, horizontal and vertical 
manoeuvre, fire support, and so forth. It must be staffed by volunteers from 
member states’ armed forces that have undergone a rigorous selection prior to 
being accepted into the ASF brigades. The ASF cannot become the dumping 
ground for non-essential personnel that a government no longer has a need for, 
or wishes to pay for. The current envisaged force level of five brigades (25 000 
men) should be reduced to three composite battle groups, correctly staffed, led, 
trained, equipped and postured.
 ◆ ASF strategies must be aligned with the AU’s continental security strategy as 
well as that of the under-siege government. Mismatched strategies will scupper 
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any operational deployment of the ASF and result in counter-productive 
operational plans and actions. ASF campaign strategies must be pre-emptive, 
realistic and sustainable, and be aligned with the available means at the disposal 
of the ASF brigades. Deployment protocols and policies must match reality and 
consider the available means the ASF will have at its disposal. The member states 
must agree to – and conclude – regional trans-border military deployment and 
operational parameters, allowing for rapid deployments without waiting for 
time-consuming negotiations before being able to commit their forces to the 
field. Deployment scenarios must be regularly conducted and make allowances 
for shortcomings in the means.
 ◆ The ASF’s proposed doctrine requires urgent investigation and adjustment. 
The proposed regional units must share a common doctrine to enable them to 
conduct independent and/or combined and joint operations. The doctrine must 
be matched with African conditions and combat operations, and allow for rapid 
deployment of manpower and equipment into various scenarios relating to 
MORW and MOOTW.
 ◆ Training and equipping the proposed regional units will require urgent and 
priority attention. The founding of a single, centrally located, AU-endorsed ASF 
training institution must be established. All volunteer officers, NCOs and other 
ranks must receive joint training in a common ASF doctrine in order to establish 
a universal standard throughout the ASF. This will assist in the development of 
a common ASF identity and esprit de corps, enabling joint ASF operations with 
commonality in doctrine, training and equipment. Equipment requirements 
and upgrades must be matched with the terrain, the threat and the deployment 
constraints of the AU.
 ◆ Force projection must be a guiding principle in the ASF. Coercive diplomacy and 
the threat of armed force may achieve only a limited goal. When diplomacy and 
the threat of force fail, the ASF will require the ability to project force rapidly and 
sustain it over a long distance for an indefinite period. Strategic airlift capabilities 
along with operational and tactical airlift and support – controlled by the AU and 
ASF respectively – will be critical to any ASF deployments. Currently, such assets 
are lacking in most African armed forces.
 ◆ Command and control mechanisms must be agreed upon at the highest level 
and allow decentralised command and control within the requisite guidelines 
and Rules of Engagement (RoE). Very clear policy guidelines must be agreed 
to and established within the AU to ensure the ASF command mandate is clear, 
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unambiguous and unbiased. Unity of command and a politically agreed mission 
intent will be crucial.
 ◆ Sustainability of operations requires deeper investigation. Distant ASF operations 
will require a large strategic airlift capability, be more costly and require a lengthy 
logistical tailback. Troop rotations, casualty and medical evacuations, and 
resupply of essential combat equipment, including ammunition and rations, will 
require a strong and robust logistical system(s).
 ◆ A cyber operations unit must be established to give the ASF access to cyber 
intelligence as well as conduct cyber counter-actions. Cyber threats facing the 
continent are ever-increasing and as national armed forces and the AU itself 
become more technology dependent, the greater the cyber threat will become.
CONCLUSION
To successfully develop and deploy an ASF, the Africa Union and its member states 
need to find common ground on a common future along with shared values that 
benefit all of its people. Despite this view being propagated, its fragile declaratory 
foundations become clear when member states disagree on whether or how to respond 
to a crisis. The greater African interest has not yet replaced the narrow personal and 
national interest of many African governments. The lack of a common interest will 
render African unity an illusion and African security an unobtainable goal.
With the establishment of the ASF, the continent’s desire to implement African 
security solutions to address African security problems has taken an important leap 
forward. As Africa’s turmoil continues and increases, the ASF can become an asset 
that serves Africa to ensure peace and stability.
Ownership of the ASF by Africa will determine what this envisaged force can and 
cannot do. To ensure mission success, the ASF must have the political and military 
will to rapidly, forcefully and decisively respond to conflict-driven crises on the 
continent. If the ASF is unable to do this, it will flounder and lose the confidence of 
the people it must serve whilst threats and enemies alike will view it as a weak force 
incapable of executing its role.
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From Idea to Practice to Failure? 
Evaluating Rapid Response 
Mechanisms for African Crises
Malte Brosig1 & Norman Sempijja1
INTRODUCTION
Since African nations became independent sovereignty and non-interference 
achieved a status as near sacrosanct concepts and this despite mass atrocities, war 
crimes and even genocides occurring. However in the post-Cold War era especially 
after the debacle in Rwanda and Srebrenica the need to make states more accountable 
for internal matters became compelling. One instrument of stopping gross human 
rights abuse like war crimes or genocide has been to set up rapid intervention 
tools within international organisations. Indeed traditional peacekeeping has 
often been slow and insufficient in halting these crimes as deployment times are 
long (around six months for the UN). A number of efforts to institutionalise rapid 
intervention have been put in place like the EU battlegroups, the UN Standby High 
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) and most 
recently African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). All of these 
instruments have been problematic to some extent. A range of issues like internal 
discord, operational and mandate problems, and self-interests of state actors have 
blighted these efforts and most initiatives have had a stillbirth.2, 3 This article reviews 
some of the challenges rapid response is encountering with a special but not exclusive 
emphasis on the ACIRC. 
WHY RAPID INTERVENTION?
Hause Charles argues that military intervention and conflict resolution in the 1990s 
could not be uttered in the same breath.4 Yet in this current era we find military 
124
the african standby force
force being used for humanitarian purposes especially in intractable conflicts also 
termed “complex emergencies”. Rapid intervention in conflicts around the world has 
been slow in taking root yet it has been accepted as forming an important structural 
element can ameliorate the suffering of millions threatened by violent conflict. All 
major international organisations involved in deploying peacekeeping missions have 
also been involved in efforts to shorten their response times in the belief that timely 
reaction to immediate crisis and severe threats to human life begins with a timely and 
robust response. Stopping mass atrocities at an early stage is seen as vital in order to 
prevent a widening of conflicts and escalation of violence. For Langille the reasoning 
behind improving rapid deployment capabilities are straightforward because “delays, 
vast human suffering and death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost, escalating 
costs” were some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate responses.5 
On the African continent the most drastic example of a preventable genocide 
remains Rwanda, where close to 1 million Tutsis were killed while the international 
community proved to be incapable of intervening on time and with adequate 
force. In sum, the basic rationale for rapid response is widely shared and seen as 
unproblematic in principle but much more challenging in practice. 
On the normative side, the emergence of the concept of the responsibility to protect 
(R2P), which enjoys increasing levels of institutionalisation within major international 
organisations (UN, AU), has further contributed to the debate on rapid response. It 
should be noted that, while the concept has been institutionalised in the Constitutive 
Act of the AU, its use as an instrument for regime change has been criticised by many 
African states and BRICS countries in the aftermath of its application in Libya.6 
Nevertheless in cases of severe human rights violations there is now an accepted 
responsibility to react. This can be seen for instance in the debate around protection 
of civilians and the principle of non-indifference that the AU is endorsing.7 What 
exactly this reaction has to look like is contested, but rapid reaction – including 
military means – does play a role. In the end, the existing demand for prompt reaction 
has highlighted the insufficiencies of prevailing measures in place and demonstrated 
that we are still some way off responding quickly and with adequate instruments. 
It is not only institutional shortcomings at international level that complicate 
the aspiration for rapid responses. The character of post-Cold War conflicts is 
challenging and requires substantial changes in the field of peacekeeping.8 These wars, 
according to Melander, Öberg & Hall, are characterised by “a blur in the distinction 
between internal and external, public and private, political and economic, civilian 
and military and even war and peace itself… [O]ccurring in failing or failed states, 
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these are understood to be essentially non-political, identity-based, organisationally 
deconstructed wars of aggrandisement waged among a myriad of actors unified only 
in their disregard for legitimacy, ideological goals and military restraint.’9 Any debate 
about the effects of rapid response has to take into account these complex conditions. 
The solution to conflicts can certainly not be reduced to the question of timely 
reaction – it has to be set in context with conflict dynamics on the ground and needs 
to be thoroughly embedded in follow-up responses such as peacekeeping and peace-
building measures. Rapid intervention should be considered as only one instrument 
in a larger toolbox. Much of the long-term success of intervention is likely to depend 
on its thorough co-ordination with other instruments across different institutions 
involving a variety of actors.
RAPID INTERVENTIONS INITIATIVES
As mentioned in the introduction, rapid response structures have been developed by 
a number of IOs. Here to mention are the UN, AU, EU and NATO. We focus only on 
the first three as they have been the most active deployers on the African continent. 
While all of these organisations have made serious efforts to set up reliable rapid 
reaction mechanisms, they have all been unassuming in practice. There is certainly 
a significant rift between institutional design driven by secretariats and experts and 
member states’ willingness to actually use these instruments. After all, decision-
making within these organisations remains inter-governmental and thus secretariats 
have limited independence. However, this cannot be surprising because questions 
of military intervention are usually associated with infringements on sovereignty. In 
the following sections we will explore the rapid response efforts undertaken by the 
UN, AU and EU.
The United Nations
The reality of complex conflicts with a fragmented scene of warring parties such 
as government forces, rebel groups, insurgents or Islamist terrorists that pose an 
existential threat to the civilian population has brought enormous challenges for UN 
peacekeeping. In many situations the UN has been accused of reacting too slowly and 
not decisively enough. Although the UN was aware of the intractable nature of these 
post-Cold War conflicts, it was not ready to overstep the issue of sovereignty when it 
came to gross human rights abuses, for example in Rwanda but also the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and other countries. Yet the UN still seems involved in 
a prolonged transformation process away from traditional peacekeeping, when it 
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was initially tasked with separation of combatants after a conflict ceased and using 
force only in self-defence.10 Hardly any conflicts today fit into this pattern of classical 
inter-state border dispute. Over the four generations of peacekeeping the roles 
have changed to robust peacekeeping and the protection of civilians have become 
standardised in mandates. Still a robust and pro-active intervention remains difficult 
for the UN. It is better perceived as a fairly heavy bureaucratic machinery engaging in 
comprehensive peacekeeping, then deploying rapidly and proactively engaging peace 
spoilers. The problem is that many of today’s conflicts, such as those in Mali, CAR, 
Somalia or South Sudan, require engaging in a mix of counter-insurgency operations, 
robust defence of civilians and rapid response. In all these cases the UN has struggled 
to come up with an adequate response.
The issue of rapid response is not confined to newly emerging conflicts, but might 
be most pressing in these situations. There are ample examples that response times 
within already deployed missions are insufficient. One of the most criticised missions 
is the one in the DRC. Here for example Uruguayan peacekeepers in Ituri in 2003 
were overwhelmed by the violence between the Hema and Lendu and could only 
guard their compound and the people who managed to seek refuge there. Most of 
these troops had been accustomed to guarding UN buildings and were brought in 
for protection duties; they were not physically equipped or psychologically prepared 
for combat.11 Accusations of no or slow reaction to severe threats to the population 
continue until today. However, in 2013 a robust force, the Force Intervention Brigade 
(FIB), has been set up as part of the UN’s mission and is operational in eastern 
DRC. It proved to be an important tool to defeat the M23 rebels. Although the FIB 
is, strictly speaking, not a UN rapid response tool, it is important for rapid reaction 
because its design as a military and primarily African intervention tool engaging in 
peace enforcement alongside an existing UN peacekeeping mission was seen as a test 
case.12 Furthermore rapid response is in principle not limited to the deployment of 
new missions but can also be used to complement existing ones.
Yet the need for rapid response has been recognised for some time and thus there is 
no shortage on initiatives to boost the UN’s capacity to react swiftly and decisively. 
The most prominent example was the establishment of the Stand-by High Readiness 
Brigade (SHIRBRIG). In 1994, Denmark spearheaded the initiative which formed 
part of the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). 
Countries like Canada, Austria, Poland, Norway and the Netherlands, among others, 
committed to supporting the initiative. Until 1999 it was in an institutional building-
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up phase gathering operational capability. In January 2000 it reached operational 
capability for deployment.13
The conceptual framework for SHIRBRIG stipulated that the UN Security Council 
was to sanction the deployment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and member 
states’ decision to participate in missions was to be made independently on a case-
by-case basis. At the request of the UN, SHIRBRIG missions could be deployed 
between fifteen and thirty days and would last six months in the field of operation. 
The availability of forces was dependent on a brigade pool of resources that included 
capabilities to carry out a peace support operation.14
SHIRBRIG registered successes in Ethiopia and Eritrea, where it deployed along 
the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, concluding the mission in May 2001 after 
six months. Later in 2003 SHIRBRIG assisted the UN and ECOWAS in planning of 
the peace mission in Ivory Coast and supplied twenty personnel to form the core 
of the UN mission in Liberia.15 However, in the end there was not enough support 
from a large enough number of UN member states to keep SHIRBRIG afloat and 
permanently institutionalise it as a rapid response instrument. It died a silent death. 
Although perhaps the leading example of a rapid intervention framework and force 
of its kind, it faded away not because it was inappropriate, but merely as a result 
of waning collective commitment and support. So it was not due to SHIRBRIG 
being ineffective, but rather to a shift in priorities of leading states, which in turn left 
SHIRBRIG as a practical blueprint, but one without capacity, and it was closed down 
by 2009.
In 2000 the Brahimi Report16 noted the need to enhance rapid and effective 
deployment capacities of the UN so that it could from an operational perspective 
deploy within thirty days after the passing of a UN Security Council resolution. This 
could extend to ninety days in complex peacekeeping operations.17 However, in 
the report rapid deployment was envisioned deployment in terms of post-conflict 
rebuilding. For instance, it was noted that a six- to twelve-week window existed 
for mission deployment following a ceasefire or peace accord. Thus in order not to 
lose this momentum the report called for rapid deployment.18 Today the UN often 
deploys in situations of continued violence and unclear prospects for peace.
Although the UN’s mission to the DRC received much criticism, especially regarding 
inadequate and delayed responses, it also is an example for institutional innovation. 
For instance, as shown earlier the UN has embraced robust response to crisis 
authorising of the launch of the FIB in March 2013. FIB was integrated within the 
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existing mission MONUSCO and following multilateral co-ordination between the 
AU, SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). It 
is mandated to neutralise all rebel groups and proved to be an effective tool against 
the M23 rebels.19 However, other rebel groups remain active in the DRC and the 
government continues to struggle controlling its territory. Most troops under the 
FIB are provided by South Africa, which later spearheaded the initiative for the 
establishment of the ACIRC. Although it is not the first authorisation of lethal 
force by the UN Security Council, the FIB represents a shift from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement in the Great Lakes Region. Nevertheless, the deployment of FIB 
integrated within an existing UN mission was seen by the UN as an exceptional 
measure that will not become standardised practice or replicated for other missions.20 
More acceptable for the UN is a model that completely outsources peace enforcement 
and counter-terrorism, as can be seen by the French operations in the Sahel region 
(Serval and Barkhane). In the case of Mali the UN Secretary-General made it clear 
that peace enforcement or counter-insurgency “falls well outside the scope of the 
United Nations peacekeeping doctrine.”21
The UN sticks to the principles of impartiality, limited use of force and avoidance 
of counter-insurgency measures.22 The deployment of FIB is therefore challenging 
for the UN. It makes the UN a party to the conflict, which has a dual impact. First, 
the UN’s neutrality is feared to have been compromised and may have negative 
consequences for future peacekeeping operations worldwide. Secondly, there are 
risks to the UN civilian personnel and unarmed humanitarian workers, who might 
become targets for reprisal attacks from rebels.23
The UN has found itself caught between a rock and hard place. The increasing human 
rights abuses, especially by M23 rebels, have prompted the UN to act especially in 
light of the R2P doctrine. The DRC is not the only country in which swift and robust 
action is required to protect civilians. More recently UN missions in Mali, CAR 
or South Sudan are facing the same problems. Rebel violence, terrorist activities 
and incomplete peace agreements keep these countries unstable. We can observe 
both a continuance of and a relapse into conflict. While conflict resolution is a 
complex task providing basic security by neutralising peace spoilers, using military 
means if necessary is an important contribution to preparing the ground for more 
comprehensive peace-building later on. The use of rapid response instruments ideally 
shortens the time until comprehensive peacekeeping missions can be deployed and 
take effect, which they cannot do while conflict continues.
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In 2014 and 2015 the UN underwent a major review of its peacekeeping missions. 
Under the guidance of the UN’s José Ramos-Horta, the so far most comprehensive 
and reflective document on modern UN peacekeeping was published in June 2015. 
While it touches upon many of the current challenges, it also explicitly addresses 
the issue of rapid deployment, recognising that, “Slow deployment is one of the 
greatest impediments to more effective peace operations.”24 The document does not 
recommend revolutionary changes to the system but makes convincing arguments 
for smaller steps accelerating the heavy and slow UN machinery. Among the 
recommendations are: the establishment of “(i) a small UN rapid reinforcement/rapid 
deployment capability; (ii) arrangements for the transfer of personnel and assets in 
a crisis; (iii) a rapidly deployable integrated UN headquarters; and (iv) national and 
regional standby arrangements.”25
Instead of aiming to set up a large new mechanism akin to the SHIRBRIG the Horta 
report opted for the establishment of a vanguard force that is rather small in size. 
It aims at either propping up existing missions by adding a rapid reaction tool or 
functioning as spearhead to accelerate the deployment of a new mission. Additionally, 
a more effective use of resources and thus a more rapid response is envisioned by 
making capabilities available through inter-mission exchange of staff and troops. 
While the full deployment of a comprehensive mission still takes up to six months, 
the report suggests that a much quicker deployment can be achieved with sending out 
an integrated civilian–military and police headquarters within eight to twelve weeks. 
Lastly, the report is realistic about the UN’s slow reaction times and recognises the 
important role regional organisations can play. Accordingly, regional organisations 
such as the AU should be encouraged to function as first deployers, preparing the 
ground for a later UN take-over. In principle these suggestions have also been 
endorsed by the UN Secretary-General.26 However, it remains to be seen how much 
of the 111 pages of the Horta report will actually be implemented. Experiences of 
the past have been rather disappointing. In any case the recommendations made do 
not call for a major overhaul of the system, but more realistically follow the idea of 
gradually customising peacekeeping missions to real-life needs.
The European Union
Although the EU does not belong to the group of classical peacekeepers, it has been 
involved in dozens of missions in Africa since 2003. Most of them are small in 
scale and ambition and are filling in functional gaps the UN is not covering.27 The 
small size of its contribution makes it potentially more suitable for rapid response. 
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However, in practice the EU has struggled to deploy its missions quickly.28 Lack of 
political momentum and bureaucratic layers have slowed down rapid deployment. 
Still, with the EU transforming from a purely economic community to a political 
union, its foreign policy aspirations have grown and the EU has invested visibly in 
peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty directly refers to peacekeeping 
in Article 42 paragraph one.
In the early 2000s the EU instituted the European rapid reaction force with a number 
of aims, such as availing assistance to civilians threatened by a crisis outside the EU, 
responding to UN calls for peacekeeping forces and intervening to separate warring 
factions. In all three scenarios the EU would deploy its forces only if NATO decides 
not to get involved.29 This was in line with the Petersberg tasks in the Western 
European Union declaration of 199230 and the Helsinki Headline goals.31
The idea was further that rapid reaction forces could be deployed to fill a gap before a 
UN peacekeeping mission is deployed. A case in point was Operation Artemis in the 
Bunia region of eastern DRC.32 However, this did not materialise, as there were many 
operational problems. Major and Mölling identified “significant qualitative shortfalls 
in key capabilities such as transport, force protection, or operational mobility”.33 
They further noted that although member states were willing to contribute troops, 
questions lingered as to whether the deployed troops would receive proper equipment 
and logistical supplies as intended.34
With the failure of the European rapid reaction force, member states at the behest of 
France and United Kingdom set up the concept of EU battlegroups35 with the aim of 
dealing with a range of peace support operations and humanitarian tasks providing 
the EU with a rapid intervention tool.
This involved a creation of 1 500-troop-strong battlegroups formed either by a single 
nations or up to four states. These would be highly flexible forces to be utilised in 
support of the UN with capability to be deployed within fifteen days and sustainable 
up to ninety days.36
However, although the battlegroups have been operational for some years, they have 
never been deployed in the field. The EU has been hesitant to respond to UN requests 
for deployment. There is thus little interest and political support for either getting 
consumed by the UN, simply becoming a sub-contractor of the UN or engaging in 
risky missions involving peace enforcement measures.
In the end, the EU selects which missions it aims at supporting. Thus rapid response is 
a reaction of choice and not necessarily a response of necessity.37 Consequently, these 
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operations are normally “short-lived (following the quick in, quick out principle) 
and/or relatively light in nature and scope”.38 This contradicts the very essence of EU 
battlegroups, which. according to Ortega, were designed essentially to respond to 
UN requests.39
Another factor affecting EU decisions on intervention is rooted in public opinion. 
While the EU public is usually supportive of humanitarian-motivated operations, in 
fact it tends to be much more in doubt when such operations become high-end, risky 
and costly. The “body bag test remains a difficult one for many EU governments 
and publics, let alone the soaring financial costs of protracted military missions 
in countries far and away from the European continent”.40 Therefore, EU decision-
making has to accommodate risk assessment and this limits high-risk operations and 
the use of existing rapid response instruments.
Koops finds that the EU battlegroups, although set up to bolster the UN system by 
providing a rapid response tool that is missing at the UN, were in essence weakening 
it. For instance, by retaining the right to decide when and where to avail troops the 
EU was creating a high level of uncertainty as to when it could be relied on by the UN, 
the same dilemma the latter was facing with other organisations such as NATO.41
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a niche approach of deploying small operations 
is actually contributing to more rapid and effective deployments. The impact of 
EU missions remains low and rapid response a more distant target than actual 
achievement. Most EU missions come with only minimal operational engagement 
on the ground, but are on average more oriented towards training local security 
forces. Response times of the EU varied between missions, while the first mission to 
Africa – Operation Artemis to the DRC – was also one of the fastest deployments of 
the EU, the joint action adopted by the Council on 5 June 2003 and within seven days, 
on 12 June 2003, the Council had decided to launch the operation. The operation was 
deployed on the ground within three weeks.42 However, this speed was not replicated 
in other missions. On average, EU deployment times for all its missions between 
1991 and 2009 have been 6,2 months.43 Part of the problem is not missing policy 
instruments but political disagreement over the use of those instruments that have 
been developed.44 The moribund battlegroup concept is one striking example.
The African Union 
As the leading theatre of operations for peacekeeping missions45 and the highest 
number of conflicts, Africa as a continent has aspired to have a more relevant role 
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in resolving its conflicts. Although under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
African states tended to guard their sovereignty46 and champion non-interference, 
the successor organisation, the African Union (AU), has departed from that notion 
especially in face of the new wars and humanitarian crises that have developed 
since the end of the Cold War.47 Its principle of non-indifference48 transformed the 
organisation into an active intervener ranging from the application of sanctions on 
member states with unconstitutional changes in government49 to sponsoring peace 
talks, sending election observers and deploying peacekeeping operations.50
So far the AU has deployed peacekeeping missions to half a dozen countries, 
including Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. 
In the majority of cases the AU functioned as first deployer and later handed over 
its mission to the UN. In other cases it deployed alone. A division of labour between 
the AU and UN is developing in which the AU takes the role of a first responder 
preparing the ground for a UN mission to be deployed later.51 Such operations have 
been called “bridging operations” or “sequential deployment”. The AU became a first 
responder for a number of reasons. First, its response time is indeed much faster than 
that of the UN.52 Secondly, it does not deploy troops with a comprehensive mandate, 
unlike the UN, and can thus gather resources more quickly. Thirdly, violent conflict 
on the continent creates a much stronger political momentum for action in Africa 
than in faraway New York.
With the building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)53 the AU 
received an elaborate security structure, including a Continental Early Warning 
System (CEWS)54 and the African Standby Force (ASF), which includes a Rapid 
Deployment Capability.55 The operationalisation of the ASF, which is based on 
sub-regional contributions by five Regional Economic Communities and Regional 
Mechanisms (RECs and RMs), proved to be troublesome and stretching over more 
than a decade. Although significant progress has been made, operational capabilities 
remain unevenly developed across the continent and not all the envisaged standby 
brigades of the ASF are operational. However, in principle the early warning 
mechanism and the RDC, when fully operation and synchronised adequately, provide 
the AU with a robust institutional framework developed for rapid response.
The ASF was based on the notion that the AU would have at its disposal 
“multidimensional capabilities, including military, police and civilian, on standby in 
their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment”.56 It was envisioned that 
the ASF would enable the AU to respond quickly with little or no impediments of a 
political or instrumental nature.57 In the six deployment scenarios the AU adopted, 
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the ASF officially operates with very short deployment targets, which vary between 
fourteen and thirty days.58 However, it must be asked whether these ambitious 
targets are realistic. De facto the ASF has not directly been deployed. While AU 
peacekeeping missions surely profited from increasing inter-operability resulting 
from the establishment of the ASF, rapid response as originally planned remains 
difficult. Plans for a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) within the structure 
of the ASF emerged only years after the ASF concept was adopted and thus its 
operationalisation is lagging behind an already delayed implementation of the ASF 
concept. Deadlines for achieving full operational capability have been moved from 
2010 to 2015. It foresaw that every regional standby force would provide 2 500 troops 
for rapid response within fourteen days. However, these plans never materialised 
to the full. While, for example, the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) has 
operationalised an extended battalion-sized force, other regional standby forces are 
still lagging behind. The northern African component especially is inactive. The 
RDC was planned to be a catalyst instrument that would be deployed in advance of a 
larger ASF or UN operation.59
The crisis in Mali in 2012–13 exposed the structural weaknesses of the ASF set-up. 
While the Malian government was threatened severely by a Tuareg and Islamist 
insurgency, neither the AU nor ECOWAS had the financial structures in place to 
deploy troops quickly enough to prevent a total military defeat. 60 In the end, France 
intervened at the last minute, which was followed by a peacekeeping operation.61 
ECOWAS was politically incapacitated due to internal divisions62 and the AU simply 
does not have its own continental standby arrangement. The ASF is in the end a 
mostly subregional building to which the RDC is attached and cannot be separated 
from. De facto there is no AU-only rapid deployment instrument available.
The initiative for the formation of a continental rapid response instrument known 
as the African Capacity for Immediate Crisis Response (ACIRC) came from South 
Africa.63 A series of South African foreign policy events can be linked to the initiative. 
Here can be mentioned the deployment of the FIB with a large South African 
component in the DRC under the umbrella of the UN mission and the unilateral 
military support for President Bozizé in CAR outside the framework of a regional 
peacekeeping force deployed by ECCAS. The South African engagement in the CAR 
ended abruptly in March 2013 when South African forces suffered heavy casualties by 
the Séléka rebel group.64 Establishing an AU intervention force would multilateralise 
and integrate South African foreign policy interventions into African structures and 
counter arguments of unilateralism. While ACIRC is initially linked to South African 
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foreign policy interests, it also addresses institutional shortfalls at the level of the AU. 
First, the inability of the RDC to fully operationalise and deploy in the case of need, 
such as in Mali in 2012/13, has given space for the ACIRC at least as an interim stop-
gap instrument until the ASF and RDC are fully operational. Secondly, the RDC is 
linked to RECs, but is mission a cross-REC dimension. This is an inhibiting factor in 
all those cases in which conflict is inter-regional or regional actors are incapable to act 
because of political divisions or otherwise. In the end, the emergence of the ACIRC 
is equally linked to South African foreign policy experience and is a consequence of 
the incomplete institutional security architecture in Africa.
The ACIRC was formally established by the AU Assembly in May 2012.65 The ACIRC 
is built on cross-continental voluntary contributions of individual AU member states. 
It was envisioned “to provide the AU with a flexible and robust force, made up of 
military/police capabilities”.66 Although it is designed to work within AU structures, 
ACIRC is self-funded and deployment comes at the behest of a lead nation.67 Thus 
it is structurally and institutionally rather different from the peacekeeping approach 
the APSA has developed, which rests exclusively on the support of regional standby 
brigades provided by REC/RMs. In contrast to the ASF, the ACIRC was supposed 
to be a purely military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency 
situation” within a maximum of ten days after a mandate has been issued.68 A 
forty-eight-hour timeline applies to missions deployed under article 4h of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act which refers to the right to intervention in cases “of war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity”.69 As such the ACIRC was only a stop-gap 
instrument until the ASF and its RDC becomes fully operational. So far thirteen 
countries, which include Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Niger, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda,70 have pledged troops 
under this framework.
At a preparatory meeting for African Chiefs of Staff April 2013 the doctrinal concept 
was elaborated.71 Accordingly, the ACIRC had the following aims:
“… establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be 
deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration 
and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the 
deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations.”72
The role of the ACIRC was defined as follows:
 (i) stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention missions;
 (ii) neutralisation of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed
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 rebellions; and
 (iii) emergency assistance to Member States within the framework of the principle 
of non-indifference for protection of civilians.73
The ACIRC was planned to consist of around 5 000 troops subdivided into 
battlegroups of 1 500 soldiers.74 Each battlegroup can either be pledged by a single 
lead nation or a group of countries. The activation of the ACIRC was proposed to 
fall within the competence of the Commission Chair as well as the establishment of a 
field headquarters. Plans have also been made for a sea and air component at a lower 
level (battalion).
Although it has been declared operational, ACIRC has faced opposition from key 
peacekeeping countries among which are Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya. Concerns 
have been raised over the ACIRC as it is seen by some as a rival in competition with 
the ASF. 75 Consequently, the further operationalisation of the ACIRC was mostly 
delegated to lower level such as the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, 
Safety and Security (STCDSS). Within the Peace Support Operations Division of the 
AU a planning element (PLANELM) was established and individual Member State 
pledges were verified. In November 2014 a Command Post Exercise was conducted 
in Tanzania in which nine countries contributed.76 In 2015 the STCDSS made clear 
that the ACIRC should be terminated by the end of the year. The expectation was 
that ACIRC is fully integrated into the ASF/RDC at the moment the ASF is declared 
operational following a major military exercise under the AMANI framework.77 The 
lack of pan-African political support for the project became even more apparent 
during the AU summit taking place in South Africa, which took place in Johannesburg 
in June 2015.78 Reference to ACIRC in AU Assembly declarations practically 
disappeared after 2014. Many unaddressed questions remained at the conceptual 
and practical level. 79 For example, the specific mandate, the organisation of supply 
across the continent, funding, logistics and decision-making procedures all remain 
largely unclear. The future of the ACIRC is uncertain. At the same time it is unlikely 
that the RDC within the ASF will be developed into a viable rapid intervention tool 
any time soon.
In late 2015 South Africa hosted the EU sponsored AMANI II military exercise, 
testing the readiness of the ASF, RDC and ACIRC. Some 2 116 staff were participating 
from ACIRC contributing countries.80 Despite this, the initiative was phased out soon 
thereafter. Following the exercise, the STCDSS met in early 2016 and declared full 
operational capability for four out of five RECs/RMs. De facto this means the ACIRC 
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became obsolete as an interim instrument. Consequently the STCDSS recommended 
that the ACIRC be dissolved.81 
CONCLUSION
On several occasions the international community has made efforts to institutionalise 
rapid response instruments. The best-known examples can be found within the UN 
(SHIRBRIG), the EU (battlegroups) and AU (ASF-RDC, ACIRC). While there is 
general agreement that rapid response constitutes an important instrument to stop 
conflicts from escalation at the earliest possible moment and prepare the ground 
for more comprehensive peacekeeping and peace-building, all three examples of 
institutional building for rapid response turned out to be problematic, if not failures.
The rather poor performance of rapid response instruments does not result from 
the impossibility of the task as such. Although building multilateral structures for 
quick response is ambitious, demanding and resource intensive, it can be done if the 
political environment is conducive. For states, providing military resources beyond 
the narrow scope of their national interests remains problematic. In the vast majority 
of cases peacekeeping deployments are politically built on coalitions of willing and 
interested countries. These coalitions are flexible but non-permanent institutions. 
They offer a flexibility that permanent structures cannot provide. Necessarily setting 
up multilateral institutions and grouping countries together will increase mutual 
dependencies. The problem is that there is little predictability how, where and when 
rapid response instruments will be used. As questions of military intervention 
usually remain highly politicised, if not contested, states are reluctant to sign up to 
institutional structures with unclear strategic value. Consequently, SHIRBRIG, EU 
battlegroups or the ASF and ACIRC are far better developed on paper than used 
in practice.
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A Toothless Lion? The Role of the 
Southern African Development 
Community in Conflict Management
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk1
INTRODUCTION
Historically Africa has suffered and continues to suffer egregious violence. Africa 
has been the site of one-third of all the armed inter- and intra-state conflicts that 
have taken place since 1946.2 Since 1989, Africa has experienced 75% of the world’s 
conflicts between non-state groups.3 Analysts have identified four regional complex 
emergencies or ‘conflict zones’: the Mano River region, the Great Lakes region, the 
Horn of Africa, and the Sahel/Maghreb region.4 Violent conflicts are driven by 
greed, grievance and exploitation, and exacerbated by weak states, poor or corrupt 
governance and unwelcome outside interference. It is often unclear to what extent 
the United States, French, British and now Chineses military presence in Africa are 
primarily in the continent’s peace and security interest.
Given this state of affairs, coupled to the complexities of international (in)
security, few outsiders – except for the United Nations – feel compelled to offer 
comprehensive assistance. Consequently, the making and keeping of the peace – and 
rebuilding broken states and communities – is a task for Africa in the first place. 
Crisis management approaches, structures, procedures and behaviour has received 
attention from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the 
African Union (AU). Whereas the OAU was seen as largely ineffectual in crisis 
prevention, management and recovery, the AU introduced a new approach and 
energy to challenge its predecessor’s lethargy. It established the African Standby Force 
(ASF) as part of a comprehensive approach entitled the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA). Following the principle of subsidiarity, Africa’s various regions 
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and regional bodies (known as Regional Economic Communities or RECs) were 
given complementary tasks in conflict management. In the case of Southern Africa, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2008 established a SADC 
Standby Force (SADC SF or SSF).5 Leaving aside the question of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the APSA and ASF, this chapter will examine the state of readiness of 
SADC to address conflict, in the context of the broader regional challenges of poverty 
alleviation and development.
At first blush SADC appears to make steady progress with establishing the approaches 
and instruments needed to tackle its peace and security, and development challenges. 
In preparation for the Summit meeting of the leaders of SADC in August 2015, its 
senior officials adopted a set of progress reports and policy documents that suggests 
a deepening of regional integration and, in particular, development and security co-
operation. Among these were the revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISDP) for 2015–2020 and an accompanying industrialisation strategy.6
Africans also witnessed the launch of an ambitious Free Trade Area (FTA) involving 
SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the 
East African Community (EAC), entitled the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA.
Regarding peace and security, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Co-operation (OPDSC) reported that it remained engaged with stabilisation and 
democratisation processes in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Madagascar. A SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy was also adopted. The regional block’s five-year old peace and security 
strategy – the revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-operation or SIPO II – was renewed for another year, given that 
SADC was not ready to assess its implementation in time for the development of a 
replacement. The official explanation was that:
The future arrangement is that the RISDP and the SIPO will culminate 
into one strategy, which will provide a holistic approach to issues of 
sustainable economic development and peace and security in the 
SADC region.7
These dynamics – including the selection of King Mswati III of Swaziland as the 
incoming Chair of SADC in 2016 – raise a number of questions regarding the nature 
of the integration project. This chapter will attempt to address these, including:
 ◆ Do SADC member states share norms and values (a shared strategic culture) to 
the extent that ceding of sovereignty becomes possible – or even desirable?
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 ◆ Can the SADC Secretariat be regarded as a decision-maker and rule enforcer – 
now or in the future?
 ◆ Which form of integration is most compatible with the emerging African 
Governance Architecture (AGA) and evolving African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) – two prime policy frameworks of the African Union (AU)?
 ◆ And, ultimately, is SADC well placed to act as a reliable and capable peacemaking 
and peacekeeping partner for the AU? In practical terms, what is the state of 
readiness of the SSF and its associated instruments, such as an early warning 
system or mediation capacity?
In this regard, note the research findings of Ndlovu, who wrote that although the 
protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU spells out 
how it is meant to interact with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), there is 
no reciprocity in the REC peace and security protocols, at least not on the part of 
SADC.8 He asks whether the PSC or the AU as a whole would be prepared to observe 
the principles of subsidiarity and variable geometry, and give REC policy organs a 
formal role in peace and security issues as well as other developmental activities. 
He concludes:
Given the asymmetries and complex sets of interests at play on the 
continent, member states are more comfortable with integration 
spillover at the subregional level than at the continental level.9
This statement will be examined as well as the general approach of SADC towards 
peace and security in the sections that follow.
The statement also needs to be examined against another set of research findings on 
the question of the future of African peace operations.10 According to the authors 
of this report there is a gap between the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) model 
(inclusive of the six deployment scenarios) and realities on the ground. In particular, 
they point out that the AU simultaneously pursues stabilisation missions and 
mediation; UN/EU/AU missions overlap; African peace operations depend on foreign 
funding; and select African countries dominate peace enforcement operations, with 
implications for host populations. Key issues to be resolved include: how to adjust the 
ASF to remain relevant; how to harmonise the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) 
of the AU and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC); and 
what mission scenarios are most likely and how to prepare for them.
Many analysts mention, in addition, the question of subsidiarity; the role of strategic 
partners; and the roles of civilians in African peace operations.
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SADC’S PURPOSE
SADC is an expression by fifteen nations of the Southern African region to collaborate 
in the interests of peace, security, democracy and development. SADC is first and 
foremost an arrangement facilitating economic integration in order to “improve the 
quality of life of the peoples of the region”. SADC’s genesis reflects this priority. When 
the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) was formed 
in 1980 it adopted the slogan “Southern Africa – towards economic liberation”.
The SADC vision is one of
a common future, a future within a regional community that will ensure 
economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and 
quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security for the 
peoples of Southern Africa.11
In 2015, this formulation was refined as follows: “The SADC vision is to build a 
region in which there will be a high degree of harmonisation and rationalisation, to 
enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance [my emphasis] in 
order to improve the living standards of the people of the region”.12
According to SADC, the main objectives of economic development and peace 
and security are to be achieved through increased regional integration, built on 
democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development.13
INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION14
Regional co-operation in the 1980s, even if informal and limited, succeeded in 
realising a number of regional development projects, mainly in the infrastructure 
and food security sectors. The activities of the Frontline States (FLS) alliance, in 
its quest to eradicate colonial rule and apartheid in Southern Africa, additionally 
brought about a sense of regional identity and briefly promoted a shared political 
vision. The FLS established SADCC in 1980 and it was transformed into SADC 
in 1992, reflecting the changing regional – and external – environments. Most 
importantly, South Africa joined SADC in 1994, as did the DRC in 1997. However, 
a year later a major regional war erupted, involving the DRC and a number of other 
SADC (and non-SADC) states. At the same time an attempted coup destabilised the 
small country of Lesotho. SADC’s unresolved security structures played a role in the 
attempt to resolve these crises.15
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In following the logic of ‘no development without stability’, broad institutional 
refinement was therefore called for.
In 2001 an extraordinary SADC Summit approved the proposed recommendations 
for far-reaching changes in SADC’s institutional framework and the structure for 
executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in SADC’s governing structures 
at the regional and national level, but most importantly a plan for the centralisation 
of the twenty-one sector co-ordinating units and commissions located in twelve 
of its member countries. These units were brought together in four clusters in a 
strengthened SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.
At the Council of Ministers Meeting and Summit in Blantyre in August 2001 these 
changes in SADC structures were further consolidated. The SADC Treaty was 
amended to take into account these institutional changes. In addition the Summit 
signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation that provided for an 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation under the SADC Summit. The 
Organ has its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for policy formulation 
and implementation.
The Organ is supported by a Directorate for Politics, Defence and Security Affairs 
based at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. It functions under the overall supervision 
of the SADC Executive Secretary and is headed by a Director for Politics, Defence 
and Security Affairs. The Directorate’s tasks relate to politics, defence and security 
issues as defined in the Treaty, Protocol and SIPO (focusing primarily on strategic 
planning and policy analysis and development); the monitoring and evaluation of 
the implementation of Organ decisions; and the provision of administrative backup 
to the Organ. It also supervises the activities of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (RPTC) based in Harare.
The SADC Organ and its Directorate have overseen the creation and implementation 
of two successive peace and security strategic plans: SIPO (established 2004) and a 
revised version, also known as SIPO II, established in 2010. SADC has been criticised 
for its unwillingness or inability to fully implement these plans. It remains unclear 
to what extent the plans themselves were designed to be implementable. Factors 
impacting on such plans include not only poor programme design and management 
but also institutional politics and political control, donor policies and politics, and 
contextual factors especially fragile or conflict-prone environments. A limited review 
process led to the establishment of SIPO II in 2010 (and a delayed launch in 2012) 
and a comprehensive review of SIPO II was undertaken in 2016 to assess these issues. 
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Based on the review and faced with the difficulties of conceptualising the integration 
of the revised SIPO with the revised RISDP, the SADC Summit has decided to extend 
the life of SIPO until 2020.16
It is clear that any attempt to design a future peace and security strategic plan must 
include the ‘lessons learnt’ of SIPO’s successes, achievements, failures and challenges. 
It must also spell out the rapidly evolving strategic context and institutional setting 
as these are factors that will impact directly on the architecture and content of a new 
peace and security plan for Southern Africa.
REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ACTORS: SADC AND ITS MEMBER STATES
To what extent then can we view SADC (and in particular its OPDSC or ‘Organ’) 
as an influential peace and security actor? Is it a decision-maker in its own right or 
merely an administrative instrument in the hands of the region’s ruling elites – does 
it make and implement rules, or follow rules? If it is a follower, who instructs?
We suggest that amongst the fifteen SADC members a hierarchy of power and 
influence exists: on most issues South Africa (with its advanced economy) dominates, 
with Zimbabwe in ideological opposition. Tanzania is an independent, influential 
actor with East African interests. Oil-dependent Angola was until recently an 
influential actor with Central African interests. Mozambique used to play the role 
of trusted intermediary, but this will decline as it obsesses over its new-found oil 
and gas riches. The DRC is influential in a negative sense – many of its ruling elites 
draw on (and some would say, drain) the region’s creative energies with its relentless 
demands for victim compensation. Other member states behave as dependencies – 
satellites circling these influential actors.
Figure 1 below suggests that the SADC Secretariat’s ability to exercise power and 
influence (its ‘actor-ness’) is shaped by the reality of power relations amongst the 
members of the organization. Three SADC members compete as agenda-setters 
(South Africa, Angola and Tanzania) whilst the rest display short-term ad hoc ‘follow 
the leader’ alliance politics.
In previous research, an analysis of SADC political co-operation suggested a 
developmental path from informal, ad hoc to formal, rules-based governance.18
This is in line with Oosthuizen, who noted that SADC provided an “evolving, 
institutionalised, rules-based forum within which the members meet regularly to 
discuss and argue about political and security issues”.19 It appears that this level of 
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institutional evolution is necessary before common foreign policy approaches or 
positions can be formulated and implemented.
It was concluded then, as it can be now, that the SADC leadership was rhetorically 
committed to full integration in both the socio-economic and security arenas (and 
to the eventual merging of the two into one, human security, agenda). The practice 
reveals the maintenance of a stable (but not always efficient) institution, used by 
members to behave in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of 
national interest and sovereignty.
This seems to resonate with a recent interesting contribution, by Malte Brosig and 
colleagues, to theory development relating to regime complexes.20 They explored 
the notion of convergence in the context of African security actors and processes. 
The aim was to explore different convergence types and their depth as well as their 






























Economic power (GDP in USDbn)
ZIM 
Figure 1 The SADC hierarchy of power and influence17
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often conceptual, technical, and formal than political or behavioural. It is also more 
often cosmetic or partial rather than extensive or full, and in most cases impacts 
on efficacy only moderately. These mediocre results might best be explained by a 
combination of rational and social purpose prediction. While actors are aiming to 
extend their co-operation among one another, they at the same time aim retaining 
their institutional autonomy, leading to processes of mediocre convergence.
Another theoretical approach might be able to cast light on the nature of SADC as 
a peace and security actor. I recently explored and applied the notion of “strategic 
culture” to a regional setting. 21 By strategic culture I refer to Snyder’s 1977 argument 
that elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to security–military affairs 
that is a wider manifestation of public opinion socialised into a distinctive mode of 
thinking. As a result of this socialisation process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviour patterns with regard to strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence 
that places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy. The applied research 
offers the following insights.
First, a range of factors severely constrains the freedom of choice of Southern Africa 
decision-makers; these include the urge to consolidate power and meet socioe-
conomic demands at home and the reality of being confronted with the influence 
of external actors. These factors continue to shape African foreign and security 
policy behaviour. Put differently: the requirements of state survival force elites to 
use foreign policy to extract political and economic resources from the external 
environment. Closely related to this point is the fact that the role of personality is key. 
African foreign and security policy decision-making has always been the province 
of leading personalities. Contemporary African elites remain preoccupied with 
political stability, legitimacy and economic security, issues whose importance seems 
to increase rather than diminish.
Secondly, new decision-making institutions (an evolving APSA and the fledgling 
AGA) combined with the so-called “flattening” of decision-making relating to 
foreign and security policy (meaning incorporating the influences of new actors such 
as parliament, media, civil society and interest groups) is testing traditional decision-
makers’ roles and ability to control the agenda and implementation of decisions 
regarding peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. Interestingly, SADC’s 
revised SIPO, a forward-looking policy template that promotes the democratic 
management and enhanced efficiency of the region’s security sectors, was launched at 
a high-level event in Arusha in 2012, accompanied by a wide stakeholder engagement 
regarding the question of its implementation across the fifteen member states.22
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However, despite the acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors in shaping 
peace and security agendas, this chapter’s institutional analysis of SADC suggests 
that it is a stable but not always efficient institution, used by members to behave 
in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of national interest 
and sovereignty. The SADC leadership is rhetorically committed to full integration 
in both the socio-economic and security arenas, but still fails to integrate SADC’s 
own business plans in these two areas into one coherent SADC agenda. This is 
demonstrated by its inability to finalise and implement its peace and security agenda, 
as represented by the five-year SIPO. As noted, a revised version of this policy 
framework was completed in 2010, formally launched by SADC in 2012, but yet to 
be fully disseminated or implemented.23 This suggests SADC security actors behave 
in a manner described by Brosig as “mediocre convergence”.24
Thirdly, a fast-evolving international context is challenging the perceptual and 
analytical lenses of decision-makers as never before. Key trends include the prolonged 
economic downturn in the West, a rising and assertive East, ongoing Western 
concern over terror, and a renewed global interest in Africa’s mineral riches. In South 
Africa, for example, policy elites have uneven understandings of key global trends. 
The National Planning Commission’s ambitious development plan neglects to take 
account of these global trends (or more accurately has adopted a narrow economic 
understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy) – to the extent that senior decision-
makers requested a re-think.25
Furthermore, limited resources restrict African foreign and security policy largely to 
regional and at most continental contexts, and as argued by Khadiagala, when elites 
articulate national interests beyond the continent they do so to win prestige, establish 
a presence in the proliferating international organisations, and forge strategic 
alliances with other global underdogs in an effort to extract resources from dominant 
power blocks.26 Again, this resonates with the concept of mediocre convergence 
whereby security actors co-govern a policy area or conflict without entering into 
open competition, but leave room for dissonance.
The fourth insight is the character of African countries’ national interest. Research 
on the state of national security policies and practices in Southern Africa suggests 
that security thinking was, and in many cases continues to be, shaped by the 
experience of liberation movements of the decolonisation project.27 Despite limited 
progress, acceptance of a contemporary template for security sector governance 
across the SADC region remains a challenge. The extent to which the revised SIPO 
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policy framework will receive domestic acceptance in the fifteen member states will 
demonstrate the status of SADC’s strategic culture.
Against this background, this chapter suggests there are dissonant strategic cultures 
at play. On the one hand, scholars question the SADC commitment to a strategic 
culture of peace. Consider, for example, the content of the SIPO: it is a policy approach 
that tries hard to combine diplomatic and military approaches to peacemaking. The 
awkward SADC response to the crisis in Madagascar (when its senior decision-
makers at one point called for a military intervention, only to discover UN and AU 
mediators already at work in Antananarivo) as well as the more recent decision by the 
Summit to deploy a SADC-based military intervention force to deal with the crisis 
in the Eastern DRC (overtaken by a decision of the UN Security Council to deploy a 
UN force) are examples of the uncomfortable fit. Nathan has consistently argued that 
SADC does not have a shared political value system to enable it to act coherently, and 
Cawthra believes that while there has been considerable convergence around certain 
principles within SADC, they remain rather shallow. From this perspective SADC 
will remain an intergovernmental (with a weak peace and security secretariat) rather 
than a supranational organisation.28
On the other hand, there is a school of thought that views SADC as an emerging security 
community, whereby it moved from a “regional security complex” characterised by 
conflict to a display of commitments for peaceful change. In addition, Khadiagala 
concludes that SADC has benefited from valuable lessons in policy co-ordination 
relating to the crises in Lesotho, DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar.29 He underlines 
the ability of SADC, through trial and error, to promote mediation and democracy. 
I have argued elsewhere that SADC Summits consistently pursue three aspects of 
the organisation’s contemporary foreign relations: conflict mediation and resolution, 
election management, and economic and trade integration. But to what effect? 
Consider the trade integration objective: recent negotiations between SADC member 
states and the EU on establishing EPAs have revealed a number of problems with 
collective decision-making: the weak foundations of the region’s integration agenda, 
the widely disparate nature of the region’s economies, and long-simmering regional 
tensions and mistrust, partly related to perceptions of South Africa’s regional 
hegemony. To what extent these experiences will prepare officials to manage the 
decision by the political elite to merge SADC with the EAC and Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa remains to be seen.
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THE SADC STANDBY FORCE (SSF): STATE OF READINESS
According to SADC, the SSF supports regional peace operations under the African 
Standby Force Policy Framework.30 The SSF (called a ‘Brigade’ on its website), 
launched in August 2008, is made up of military, police and civilian members from 
SADC Member States.
The function of the SSF is to participate in missions as envisaged in Article 13 of the 
“mandate” of the Peace and Security Protocol relating to the Establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU), which includes:
 ◆ observation and monitoring missions;
 ◆ peace support missions;
 ◆ interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a Member State; 
and
 ◆ actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence 
of violence after agreements have been reached.
According to SADC, the SSF “serves in peace-building efforts including post-conflict 
disarmament and demobilisation and humanitarian assistance in conflict areas and 
areas impacted by major natural disasters”.31 The SSF operates as a tool of the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and receives its guidance 
from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence staff and the Committee of SADC 
Police Chiefs.
According to SADC, training of the SSF at all levels is a key priority. The Regional 
Peacekeeping Training Centre located in Zimbabwe and other national peace 
support training institutions play a pivotal role in training military commanders, 
police officers and civilian officials at various levels. SSF achievements, according 
to the SADC officials and planners, include the development of common policy 
documents for its operationalisation; the conduct of regional training programmes 
and participation in continental exercises; maintenance of a register of capabilities 
pledged by member states; and the development of a Civilian Component Policy 
Framework.32
SADC recently demonstrated its will by deploying 500 individual police officers for 
seven months as part of the SADC Observer Mission in Lesotho (SOMILES). However, 
it begs the broader question of SADC’s effective peace-making role in Lesotho.33 
Arguably, the SSF should have deployed to stabilise the eastern DRC – instead, the 
UN established and deployed the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to great effect.34 
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By some accounts FIB was the inspiration for the establishment of the African 
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) – an idea discussed further 
below. Admittedly, the troop contributions were made by three SADC member states, 
but command and control remain with the UN.
So despite ambitious and optimistic statements and claims, it remains unclear to what 
extent the SSF is ready to be deployed at short notice to address and resolve a crisis 
(either in preventive mode or responsive mode). Regarding this question, a small 
literature exists, mostly coming to similar conclusions relating to SADC’s capacity 
challenges to implement ambitious structures or plans.35
SADC officials themselves are reluctant to overstate the ability of the organisa tion to 
deploy at short notice to address violent conflict. Several issues continue to bedevil 
the full operationalisation of the SSF, including appropriate staffing of planners at 
headquarters, the absence of a regional logistics depot, and the ability of SADC 
to move beyond endless training exercises to action in the field. In addition, and 
seldom voiced, is the question of the integrated nature of conflict management 
policies, procedures and culture of behaviour. To what extent are the component 
parts of the SSF (military, police, civilians) harmonised? How do the early warning 
system, panel of elders, mediation support structures, disaster risk reduction 
approaches, and relations with the non-state sector contribute to “unity of purpose” 
in addressing conflict or crisis? It appears more work needs to be done to enable 
SADC to benefit from the existence of a multitude of design features relating to its 
peace and security architecture.
There is a further relationship in need of careful management: the simultaneous 
existence of the ASF, SSF and the recently created (and seemingly short-lived) 
ACIRC. The latter, struggling with capacity and doctrinal issues, is viewed by some 
as an “elite club within the AU”.36 At the time of writing it appeared the status of 
ACIRC (which was called fully operational by the AU in 2016, but has yet to deploy 
to intervene in a crisis) remains in doubt, although there seems to be widespread 
agreement amongst security sector actors that this rapid response instrument will 
have to be (re)integrated into the overall ASF architecture.
In particular, South Africa, as a leading founding member of this voluntary association, 
needs to balance its regional and continental commitments and leadership roles lest 
it suffers from the “big hat, no cattle” syndrome. Not only does it have to harmonise 
and capacitate its foreign, security and defence policies (and postures) – it needs 
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to overcome some of its internal contradictions before it can (re)claim African 
leadership with confidence.
And, to be more precise, there is a contradiction at play with the thinking around 
South Africa’s “deployable assets”. When the South African National Defence Force 
was required to respond to the (political) call for the establishment of ACIRC, it 
did so in good time and designed the South African role in this instrument in great 
detail.37 Yet the country’s recently adopted defence policy (Defence Review) has not 
been supported financially by government and so South Africa has a limited ability 
to rise to the challenge of deploying as part of a rapid response tool of diplomacy.38
CONCLUSION
The chapter suggests that the strategic culture of the region’s decision-makers – the 
set of values and norms that shape their understanding of the world and determine 
their menu of choices – is not unified but fractured. On the one hand, ruling elites 
in several of the region’s weak states are unable to utilise the tools of statecraft to 
effectively manage critical issues, from regional integration to democracy promotion 
to conflict resolution. On the other hand, the region displays signs of “partial 
convergence” relating to core values and interests.
Encouragingly, a generation of younger, well-educated decision-makers (politicians 
and officials) as well as public intellectuals increasingly understand the nature of the 
development and security challenges at hand. Left to them, the regional organisation 
and its culture of behaviour will hopefully undergo a process of modernisation – 
resulting in more credible institutional behaviour – in addressing the region’s 
prospects for the future.
In the absence of such a generational change, SADC’s long-term survival is not a 
given and its ability to act as a unified, reliable partner for AU-driven peace support 
operations will remain in doubt. This is assuming the AU itself is able to act as a 
unified, reliable partner! Adding to SADC’s fragility is the inability of South Africa’s 
current political leadership to come to terms with the kind of investment it has 
to make if South Africa is to maintain its lead in anticipating and responding to 
crises in Southern and Central Africa. Even though South Africa appears dominant 
relative to its fellow SADC members states, in terms of power and influence, time will 
tell whether its ruling African National Congress will be able to arrest its electoral 
decline and rediscover its moral compass – necessary ingredients for the country to 
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play a progressive role, at least in the short to medium term, on the continent and 
further afield.
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Evolving Security Threats in West 
Africa: Interrogating ECOWAS’ 
Response Mechanism
Mustapha Abdallah,1 Kwesi Aning1 & Joana Osei-Tutu1
INTRODUCTION
Consisting of fifteen Member States, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) is one of the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that 
contribute to the promotion of continental peace and security. Its Peace and Security 
Architecture, established under the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999 
(hereafter “Mechanism”), is probably one of the most developed and robust of the 
five regional African security architectures.2 A critical component of this Mechanism 
is the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) – the West African regional brigade of the 
African Standby Force (ASF) crafted under the AU Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) to respond to crises.
Although the ESF is comparatively well developed, with the possible exception of 
its civilian component, a matter discussed elsewhere in this publication, it is yet to 
be described as fully operationalised. Similar to the other four regional brigades 
or standby forces,3 the ESF lacks the necessary financial wherewithal, well-trained 
personnel to respond to emerging threats and the logistical equipment needed 
to deploy.4 In some instances, some Member States have demonstrated a lack of 
readiness and willingness to contribute troops when there is imminent danger that 
can potentially threaten regional stability. More often than not, the process of seeking 
authorisation for the release of troops in Member States is at best bureaucratic and at 
worst often tainted with domestic politics. For instance, in 2011 Ghana’s late President 
John Evans Atta-Mills argued that the country’s military was overstretched and thus 
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would not be in a position to contribute troops should the ECOWAS Commission 
decide to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire to oust former President Laurent Gbagbo.5 In 
addition to the lack of political will and commitment of some Member States, co-
ordination between the AU and ECOWAS constitutes a significant challenge to the 
deployment of the ESF.
This chapter focuses on the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and discusses how 
adaptable it is to the double evolving threats of violent extremism and terrorism in 
mission environments in the region. The chapter posits that while these regional 
security challenges are potential catalysts underlining the need for the ESF, they 
currently pose a veritable “set of litmus tests” to ECOWAS security architecture, 
slows the operationalisation process of the ESF and particularly weakens its capacity 
to respond to crises urgently. This has implications for the full operationalisation 
of the ASF and can potentially weaken the AU and ECOWAS peace and security 
architectures. As a result of the potential wider ramifications of these evolving threats, 
especially within peace operation theatres, it is significant to adopt a more nuanced 
approaches to discussing the ESF and how it contributes to the effectiveness of 
the ASF.
This chapter comprises four sections. The first section discusses the context of 
developing the ESF by highlighting the antecedents from the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia. Such 
historical contextualisation is significant as it lays the initial foundation that led to 
the adaption of the 1999 Mechanism. Consequently, the second section examines 
the status and operational readiness of the ESF against the background of its 
2012 intervention in Mali and how the lessons learned there can enhance better 
restructuring towards the full operationalisation of the ASF beyond 2015. An 
important aspect of this latter section will be the strategic and operational challenges 
that impeded the early intervention by ECOWAS in Mali and what new strategies 
ought to be designed for future operations. Having presented the ESF structure, the 
chapter specifically discusses the double threats of violent extremism and terrorism 
as potential major impediments to ESF in the third section. Although ECOWAS has 
developed institutional frameworks and complex mechanisms over the years, it is 
argued that the constantly evolving nature of the threats pose particular types of 
operational challenges and extensive response difficulties that can potentially hinder 
the effectiveness of the ESF without alterations.6 The final section discusses how 
existing approaches can be improved upon by ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU 
towards addressing what has been characterised as an African security predicament.7
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FROM ECOMOG TO ESF
Following the outbreak of the Liberian civil war in 1989, ECOWAS established 
the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) aimed at finding a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict. However, after weeks of unsuccessful efforts at brokering 
peace between the various rebel factions, the SMC decided to establish – and 
subsequently deployed – the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
amidst bitter opposition from the rebel leader Charles Taylor and some West 
African leaders.8 Other regional interventions by ECOMOG have been in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire as an ad hoc subregional peacekeeping 
force.9 ECOMOG engaged in diverse activities, including: disarming rebel factions, 
protection of humanitarian aid, mediation and peace enforcement.10 However, partly 
because disciplinary and complaint mechanisms were weak or almost non-existent, 
and training and understanding of the mission was lacking, ECOMOG was accused 
of committing human rights violations in contravention of IHL and HL.11
Resulting from ECOWAS experiences in Liberia, the need to develop better conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping structures became imperative. Stemming from Article 
58 of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the 1999 Mechanism was established. The 
Mechanism created the structures for conflict resolution and mediation in the 
subregion, thus representing the first documented attempt at restructuring the 
ECOWAS conflict prevention and management scheme. Prior to the ASF’s adoption 
in 2003, ECOWAS had an already estabilished security mechanism. But as one of the 
regional building blocks of the ASF, ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission had 
to conform by renaming ECOMOG the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in June 2004.
Under the operational structure the force will be made up of 6 500 highly trained 
soldiers to be drawn from national units. It will include a rapid reaction task force 
of 1 500 troops that will have the capability to be deployed within fourteen days 
(instead of the thirty days previously planned in line with AU Standard), whilst 
the entire brigade could be deployed within ninety days. The ESF will form one of 
the components of the ASF and will be under the operational control of the AU to 
respond to crises situations on the continent.12 It is made up of military, police and 
civilian components consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which makes 
provision for regional arrangements.
In the West African context the ESF is covered by Article 21 of the ECOWAS 
Mechanism.13 In furtherance to that, Article 22 of the Mechanism expands the the 
ESF’s mandate to include: observation and monitoring; peacekeeping and peace 
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restoration; humanitarian intervention; enforcement of sanctions; preventive 
deployment; peace-building, disarmament and demobilisation; control of organised 
crime; policing activities.14
To achieve these expanded goals of the ESF at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels, ECOWAS, in a memorandum of understanding in 2007, designated Centres 
of Excellence, namely: National Defence College (NDC) in Abuja, the Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Centre based at KAIPKTC in Accra, Ghana, and the 
Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye (EMPABB) in Mali to deliver multi-
dimensional training and exercises for the military, police and civilian components 
of the ESF.15 Significant strides have been made since then in the conducting of 
exercises, including: the Command Post Exercise in Dakar and Accra in June 2006 
and December 2007 respectively; the West Battalion Exercise in Thies, Senegal, 
December 2007; the Command Post Exercise in Bamako, Mali, June 2008; “Operation 
Cohesion” in Benin in April 2010; the Command Post Exercise (EXERCISE JIGUI 3) 
in Accra, Ghana.16
These exercises were aimed at testing the operational readiness of the ESF for effective 
peace support operations and to evaluate the ESF Main Force (MF), which is an 
important milestone in the operationalisation of the ESF. Similar efforts have been 
made to address the recurrent logistical challenges. ECOWAS has designated two 
logistics depots – a coastal base just outside Freetown, Sierra Leone, and an inland 
base in Mali. In July 2010 the Government of Sierra Leone donated eighteen acres 
of land to ECOWAS for the building of the logistics base and ECOWAS has already 
disbursed $10 million for the first phase of the project.17 These demonstrate the effort 
of ECOWAS in the operationalisation process. Being the country where ECOWAS 
demonstrated political willingness and flexed its muscles, Mali provides the classical 
basis to ascertain the ESF’s future operational readiness and its contribution to the 
attainment of ASF’s full operational capability beyond 2015.
ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN MALI: ASSESSING THE FUTURE OPERATIONAL 
READINESS OF ESF
The ECOWAS intervention in Mali occurred in a context of great uncertainty and 
deterioration of governance structures. By the end of 2011 Tuareg rebels had attacked 
the Malian army in several locations and cities in the north (Tinzawaten, Tessalit).18 
Worse still, some Malian soldiers were kidnapped or killed in Aguel’hoc, prompting 
their mothers and wives to stage a protest march to the presidential palace on 
2 February 2012.19 The objective of the march was to demand additional resources 
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and support from the Government of Amadou Toumani Touré to strengthen the 
capacity of the military. Before the Ministry of Defence could make progress to 
address the concerns of the military, Amadou Toumani Toure was removed from 
power in April 2012. Subsequent to that, Mali was taken over by a military junta and 
became a theatre of instability characterised by growing extremism and terrorism. 
Particularly the northernmost administrative zones – Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, 
home to about 1,3 million people – became notorious nodal towns for the Islamist 
insurgency.20 Initially confined in the northern part of the country, the insurgency 
began to assume serious dimensions, spreading to the southern part of the country. 
With imminent subregional ramifications, neighbouring countries began to galvanise 
support in the form of diplomatic interventions by ECOWAS and subsequently the 
AU, pushing for a UN-authorised military intervention.21
Although ECOWAS took a lead role, focusing on political negotiations to remove the 
military junta, the organisation was criticised for not being effective and subsequently 
came under mounting pressure as extremists in northern Mali took advantage of the 
seeming lack of political leadership in Bamako to extend their control. Consequently, 
ECOWAS demonstrated political willingness to establish an ECOWAS Mission in 
Mali (MICEMA), a military approach that could dismantle the rebels insurgency. 
However, there were a number of challenges. First, while the ECOWAS military chiefs 
proposed a total of 5 500 troops to be deployed, 3 200 would come from the ESF and 
the rest from other regions. Secondly, ECOWAS lacked the needed political clout 
and financial resources to pursue the military intervention agenda and, lastly, donors 
who could assist were also not willing to back the ECOWAS proposal, ostensibly 
because of lack of capacity to deal with the difficult threat of terrorists and their 
affiliate transnational networks in northern Mali.22
MICEMA was subsequently transformed into the African-led International Support 
Mission in Mali (AFISMA), thereby making it an African, rather than a West 
African, initiative.23 However, before AFISMA could be deployed a significant force, 
numbering 1 200 extremist militants primarily from Ansar Dine and Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), launched an attack towards the south and 
threatened an advance on the capital, prompting Dioncounda Traoré,24 the interim 
president, to call on France to intervene to save civilians and Mali’s territorial integrity. 
Oluwale, however, argues that, even before the militants’ push into Bamako, French 
special forces reportedly had been fighting alongside the Malian army.25 Thus, the 
call of Traore became the basis for France to co-ordinate the launch of Operation 
Serval, with the aim of ousting the Islamic militants from the northern region. While 
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some criticised France that its early intervention was purely interest-driven, it must 
be credited for reclaiming major northern towns like Gao, Konna, and Timbuktu by 
the end of January 2013, as the militants withdrew farther north into the desert and 
the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains.26
Subsequently, the long-delayed AFISMA was deployed into Mali by February 
2013. However, this was dependent upon assurances of the logistical and financial 
support that had previously been withheld. By March 2013, a 6 288-member strong 
AFISMA force – smaller than anticipated – began to expand its presence in parts 
of north and central Mali under the leadership of Nigeria’s General Shehu Abdul 
Kadir. Other ECOWAS troop-contributing countries included Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Unsurprisingly, the troops faced logistical 
challenges including the securing of food, fuel and water, requiring bilateral donor 
support to overcome these deficiencies.27 In response a hastily created UN Trust 
Fund provided AFISMA with $26,7 million by March 2013.28 This was subsequently 
followed by the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilisation Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelleintégrée des Nations unies 
pour la stabilisation au Mali), MINUSMA.
What has become clear from the above is that there was a quick transition from 
AFISMA to MINUSMA. While this is commendable, as UN has the primary 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, it also further 
demonstrated the enormous financial and logistical challenges that ECOWAS and, 
by extension, the AU continually faces. Their personnel could not easily adapt to the 
evolving threats as noted by French President Francois Hollande in January 2013 that 
“Mali would have been entirely conquered and the terrorists would be in a position to 
force … the Malian population to [surrender to] a regime it did not want but [also] 
to put on pressure on all countries of West Africa”.29 Surprisingly though, similar 
sentiments were expressed by Africans. For instance, Nigeria’s Foreign Minister 
Olugbenga Ashiru noted in April 2013 that, “If the French had not intervened at the 
time they did, the situation in Mali would have been different today.” Jacob Zuma of 
South Africa also supported French intervention in Mali, although he had previously 
opposed interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011.30 Consequently, South 
Africa, Nigeria and indeed all members of the AU and ECOWAS expressed gratitude 
for French intervention.31
Indeed, the delayed intervention by AFISMA and the acknowledgement of the 
challenges it faced indicates that the ESF – and, by extension, the ASF – is not fully 
developed to intervene independent of the external support. This, according to 
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Oluwale, exposed the weakness of ECOWAS and the AU in bridging the gaps between 
early warning and early response. Early response implies being able to deploy within 
stipulated times according to the ESF’s mandate. This, coupled with the sluggish 
political decision-making and deployment capacity, leaves many to wonder if the 
ESF and the ASF will ever be ready for deployment. While this question remains 
nagging, it is fair to argue that, compared to other regional brigades, ESF has made 
purposeful strides, making it unquestionably one of the most prepared to respond to 
crises owing to the support of Nigeria as a regional hegemon, but more importantly 
because of better developed structures.32 However, with regard to its mandate as 
defined under Article 22 of the Mechanism vis-à-vis the evolving nature of security 
threats, it can be argued that ECOWAS will continue to grapple with some challenges 
in its operationalisation efforts. The following section discusses the evolving threats 
of violent extremism and terrorism that present response difficulties to the military 
component of the ESF.
EVOLVING THREATS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA
Increasing radicalisation in West Africa, especially in the Sahel countries, including 
Nigeria and Mali, has resulted in the emergence of violent extremist and terrorist 
groups. Notable among them include ‘Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Li dda’Awatiwal Jihad’ 
also known popularly as ‘Boko Haram’, the Movement for Unity/Oneness and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); Ansar Dine, National Movement for the Liberation 
of Azawad (MNLA), Al Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and 
Al-Ansaru.
These groups pose particular response difficulties to the miltary component of the 
ESF as they defy and resist conventional unilateral approaches, counter-measures 
and classical tactics of warfare. In other words, the military is not traditionally 
trained to respond to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. For instance, 
since the establishment of Boko Haram it has transmuted from opposing Western 
education into a violent extremist organisation, with expansionist bases in Nigeria 
and neighbouring states such as Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. There is no 
doubt that, over the years, its operational focus has changed from attacks on churches 
and mosques to detonating bombs indiscriminately, kidnapping civilians for ransom, 
with improved usage of improvised explosive devices. At the same time, it has 
metamorphosed both into Islamic State in the Levant’s franchised representative 
currently known as Islamic State in West Africa and also into a regional terrorist group.
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Consequently, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups such as Ansar Dine and 
MUJAO continue to operate both independently and as a network, posing enormous 
challenges to regional peace and security architecture. For example, despite the 
restoration of relative peace in Mali following the 2013 general elections, lack of 
resilience in state institutions has created conditions in which militant and terrorist 
groups continue to perpetrate crime and undermine state security.33 Indeed, since the 
establishment of MINUSMA, terrorist attacks have remained a daunting challenge 
to the UN as well as the peacekeepers. In June 2016 two separate terrorist attacks 
occurred in Gao in northern part of Mali. A preliminary report indicated that, in 
the first incident, one peacekeeper from China was killed and a dozen UN personnel 
were injured when a vehicle with an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated at 
the MINUSMA camp. In the second episode one civilian contractor from France and 
two security guards from Mali were killed by unknown assailants. Reacting to the 
June incidents, Ban Ki-Moon, then Secretary-General of the UN, recalled the past 
attacks to MINUSMA “that have killed twelve peacekeepers and injured many more 
in May [2016] alone”.34
The difficulties of the ESF and the ASF in responding to the threat of terrorism stem 
from the fact that their modus operandi keeps changing. Undoubtedly, terrorism 
and terrorist networks have transformed, with multiple and diverse manifestations, 
including suicide bombing, car bombing, kidnapping of humanitarian aid and 
foreign workers and school children, and attacks on mosques, churches, transport 
terminals and shopping malls. While in the past terrorists would engage in bombing 
and kidnapping for ransom, increasingly today captives are being maltreated, 
severely beaten and forcibly made to have sex. Terrorist networks also engage in the 
recruitment of innocent young men into their fold.35
These dynamics present a particular type of response difficulties not only to ECOWAS 
Member States but also to ECOWAS as an organisation and the AU largely because 
its multi-dimensional response structures are not designed to adapt and respond 
effectively to the constantly evolving threats. However, unlike the ECOWAS and 
the AU, the French led Operation Serval made significant progress in combating the 
threat of terrorists due to the combined effect of land and air forces, with military 
logistic support from other EU Member States (including Belgium, Denmark and 
the UK).36
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RESPONDING TO THE GROWING THREATS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND 
TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA
The changing dynamics of security challenges in West Africa mean that innovative and 
multi-dimensional approaches need to be developed in order to adapt to the evolving 
nature of the threats. But as ECOWAS remains a regional building block of the AU, 
there is also the need for coherence and synergy between the two organisations.
Co-ordination of efforts beteewn ECOWAS and AU
The growing threat of violent extremism and terrorism means the AU and ECOWAS 
need to constantly co-ordinate in the spirit of complimentarily and subsidiarity. Co-
ordination of efforts, especially in the area of intelligence-gathering and information-
sharing is critical between the AU and ECOWAS. In October 2015 the AU and Lake 
Chad Basin Commission (this Commission is comprised of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon) signed a Memoradium of Understanding (MoU) on the operationalisation 
and sustenance of the Multi-National Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) to counter the Boko 
Haram Terrorist Group.37 This taskforce opens up the troop-contributing countries 
to share intelligence and other information to curtail the threat of the terrorist groups. 
Among others, the operations of the MNJTF have contributed to blocking most of 
the escape routes and depriving the Boko Haram group of their safe havens as well as 
preventing them from establishing new bases in the Lake Chad region.38
However, sustenance of the joint efforts will depend on the effectiveness of the AU’s 
Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and the West Africa Early 
Warning Network (WARN) of ECOWAS. It must be stressed that the two organisations 
have had difficulties preventing crises. The inability of the AU and ECOWAS to 
prevent crises was evident in Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. According to the 
International Peace Institute (IPI), while the ouster of President Amadou Toumani 
Touré of Mali occurred only two days after a ministerial meeting of the AU Peace 
and Security Council was held in the capital Bamako, the crisis in Guinea-Bissau 
erupted when an ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council ministerial meeting was 
taking place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in April 2012.39 In Mali the growing Tuareg 
rebellion was an early signal of potential conflcit, while long-term drug trafficking 
and the chronic tension between the military and political leaders could have been 
understood as clear signs of possible instability.40
Moreover, capacity to respond is most often lacking, both at the AU and ECOWAS 
levels despite clear warning signals. It is in this regard that the AU has established 
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the emergent African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). For 
this mechanism to be effective, however, the AU should improve its co-ordination 
with the RECs in terms of early warning signals. Such co-ordination of effort is 
even more important because of the continued mutation of terrorist groups in the 
region. Currently, there are multiple strategies being adopted by states and regional 
organisations to respond to evolving violent extremism and terrorism in West Africa 
and the Sahel. This needs to be enhanced in a much more nuanced and robust manner.
Independent source of funding
The capacity of ECOWAS to respond to emerging threats must be dependent largely 
on independent sources of funding. Although the establishment of ECOWAS Levy 
is significant, both ECOWAS and the AU depend hugely on external funds for 
responding to threats. In most cases, when the interest of external funders diverges 
from that of the AU and ECOWAS, the release of funds is likely to be delayed unduly 
and consequently hamper the effectiveness of the response mechanisms in Africa. 
This approach needs to change by creating an independent source of funds that 
can be readily accessed and utilised during emergencies. It is in this regard that the 
discussion by the AU to raise funding by way of levies on imports should be welcome 
news. But the realisation of such funds will be contingent on significant growth 
in African economies and commitment of Member States and, more importantly, 
for the funds to serve the intended purpose, mechanisms should be put in place to 
reduce mismanagement of funds.
Increased training and capacity-building
In many instances the quality of AU and ECOWAS militaries has been questioned, 
especially when compared to those deployed by the United Nations (UN) to respond 
to crises situations.41 Perhaps the experience of UN forces stems from long years 
of engagement in peacekeeping operations. With the establishment of various 
training centres in Africa over the last decade or more, African armed forces are 
increasingly undergoing various forms of training at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels to improve efficiency. However, ECOWAS and the AU should invest 
and focus attention on training that reflects the changing tactics of terrorists. At the 
same time, efforts should be made at training the youth about the misconceptions 
and misinterpretations of the concept of “jihad”, which has become a springboard 
for engaging in radicalisation, militancy and terrorism in West Africa. However, for 
such training to be effective there is the need to ensure that state institutions are 
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effective in addressing governance challenges such as corruption, inequality and 
youth unemployment.42 Failure to address these challenges will defeat the purpose 
of training programmes and create conditions for the youth to be lured by violent 
extremism and terrorism.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has illustrated that ECOWAS has so far made strides in establishing its 
peace and security architecture. Progress has been made with the operationalisation 
of the ESF, tracing its antecedents from the ECOMOG days in the early 1990s, when 
it established the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. It has also 
made substantial progress since the ECOMOG was renamed ESF and became part of 
the ASF in June 2004. However, challenges relating to strategic decisions, especially 
between the AU and ECOWAS, financial and logistical challenges, and issues of 
personnel and their deployment still exist, impeding the early response of the ESF as 
a building block of the ASF. These are compounded by disruptive unpredicatability 
in threats such as violent extremism and terrorism, especially in the Sahel regions of 
West Africa. The changing dynamics of these threats and the associated complexities 
weaken the effectiveness of regional security mechanisms and, by extension, the AU 
as a continental body. What is imperative after ASF’s 2015 deadline of achieving full 
operational capability is the need to interrogate and explore new ways of improving 
the existing response mechanisms and to develop a forward-looking and adaptable 
mechanism, taking into account the nature of emerging threats in the region.
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East Africa Standby Force: Diffused 
Asymmetries and the Challenges of 
Constructing a Security Architecture
Musambai Katumanga1
INTRODUCTION
An estimated three divisions from the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) milieu are 
engaged in peace-keeping and enforcement operations under both multilateral2 and 
state-centric initiatives.3 The fact that none of these is deployed under the auspices 
of the subsystems’ security architecture highlights challenges and potential for 
operationalising a durable Full Operational Capability (FOC) attained by EASF in 
December 2014. Underlying this is the EASF geography characterised by multiple 
widespread economic and military asymmetries and immature anarchy. This chapter 
recapitulates on the process while contextualising its current geopolitical, economic, 
and strategic and security dilemmas. Contingent appreciations are anchored on the 
impact of the apparent military overstretch of EASF core states when it comes to the 
variables of force generation, readiness and financial sustenance in relation to FOC.
We seek to test the assertion that while the existence of deconcentrated economic and 
military asymmetries provides a challenge for a security architecture, if innovatively 
exploited the asymmetries can equally serve as an inverse platform for constructing a 
viable regional security architecture. This is to the extent that the process is followed 
by efforts at state consolidation and a mutual defence pact that seeks to resolve 
immature anarchies.
EASF – A HISTORICAL RECAPITULATION
As part of the African states’ response mechanism to conflicts, EASF4 emerged 
consequent to the AU summit of 6–8 July 2014 and the Council of Ministers of 30 
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March 2007 that argued for its transformation from a brigade into a force. It also 
called for the establishment of a co-ordination mechanism. The standby force was 
deemed critical in providing the AU with capabilities to respond to conflict through 
preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace-building for conflict disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration and humanitarian assistance.5 In so doing, the 
force was set to affirm the continent’s transition from a non-interference to non-
indifference principle. At full operational capacity the force was to consist of standby 
multi-dimensional contingents of civil and military components located in the 
states of origin ready for deployment anywhere in Africa at appropriate notice. It 
was to pack effective Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems 
(CIS3) with appropriate continental integrated inter-operational infrastructure that 
would link deployed units with mission headquarters as well as AU and regional 
planning elements.
As part of AU Road Map 1 2003 to 2006, EASF was expected to set up legal frameworks, 
standard operating procedures, approved doctrines and logistics, and establish 
structures such as a planning element and actual brigade, logistical base and EASF-
COM secretariat. The adaptation of AU Road Map 2 of 2006 and 2010 outlined a set 
of objectives that included capacity development and incorporation for integration 
of multi-national civilian and police components. Other critical components 
included harmonisation of doctrines and standard operating procedures to enhance 
inter-operability. Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Field Training Exercise (FTX), 
with an end state of attaining an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by 2010, were 
carried out in Kenya in 2008 and Djibouti in 2009 respectively. The AU Road Map 2 
outlined ten objectives to be met between 2010 and 2015. These were to lead to the 
operationalisation of FOC by 2015. Core objectives were:
 ◆ the decision-making structures, including the process of authorisation mandate 
and mandating process to oversee the deployment and employment of EASF;
 ◆ the development of information management and the Communication 
Information Systems (CIS) support structure for preparing, planning and 
commanding of forces deployed by 2015;
 ◆ FOC of land force structure, brigade headquarters and standby force maintained 
in states to required standards;
 ◆ trained police elements by 2015;
 ◆ trained civilian component with an established data base (roster);
 ◆ logistical system supporting deployment and sustaining regional capabilities;
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 ◆ integrated regional training system; and
 ◆ efficient financial administrative process and structures, including resource 
capitals.
Road Map 2 also set out projections for the establishment of a regional maritime 
component for maritime peace operations, safety and security tasks and attainment 
of FOC by 2015. FOC would manifest itself through the presence of capacity to 
execute six mission scenarios along their associated deployment timelines and force 
generation6 imperatives.
The fact that both AU and EASF had not conceptualised FOC’s operational requirement 
guides implied that relations with both the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and 
African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) components would 
remain unclear. This underpinned the subsequent paralysis EASF experienced prior 
to FOC status declaration. Over time, this was compounded by differentiated covert 
interests and misperceptions states held over these two structures. This became 
apparent in its After Action Review (AAR) of FTX Mashariki Salam held in Jinja, 
Uganda in 2013. For instance, given the multinational and standby character of the 
ASF, it was challenging to have units preassembled in the staging area earlier. It was 
also apparent that forces based on a single nation or largely drawn from a state’s 
armed forces were much easier to maintain at high readiness. This was more obvious 
especially with respect to Scenario Six deployment of the military component within 
fourteen days. It became apparent that such a deployment was better performed by 
forces readily assembled, fully equipped and exercised, with the available transport 
on immediate call in addition to available logistics supplies prepacked and ready for 
delivery by air. Differentiated levels of readiness among various units also surfaced.
Other challenges included the absence of valuation and validation systems affirming 
and confirming, first, a triage of operational readiness: the state of readiness in 
the entire force, the validation of the training instructions and organisation with 
a focus on the headquarters, regional brigade and unit levels; secondly, the co-
ordination between the various components and humanitarian organisations and 
agencies; and thirdly, infusion of lessons learnt during operations and training at 
all levels. Both AAR and the AU’s Panel of Experts reports increasingly affirmed the 
constraints towards realisation of FOC. This mediated a Strategic Review Scan and 
an experts working group meeting in Naivasha, Kenya between 22 and 27 March 
2014 that sought to grapple with five issue areas. These included the how process of 
and implications towards FOC. Second was the need to reconcile and undertake a 
conceptual convergence of the RDC and ACIRC within the context of EASF. Third, 
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contextualisation of EASF’s administrative and operational structural frameworks 
such as the secretariat, the planning element, brigade headquarters and the log BASE 
in the broad attainment of FOC. Fourth, financial and logistical sustainability issues, 
and fifth, legal questions revolving around mandating and authorising processes.
FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY: A CONCEPTUAL NOTE
While broadly used in reference to a system, FOC can be argued to refer to the 
attainment of that ability to be fully employed and maintained to the extent of meeting 
desired operational ends. FOC can equally be stretched to apply to structures. Tyson 
is apt on this when he notes that FOC, that desired end state of ongoing efforts, is 
conceived to entail the attainment of a joint, combined, integrated and comprehensive 
headquarters manned, trained and equipped to an operational standard to cope 
with requirements of AU Scenarios 1–6, with adequate contingency plans in place.7 
This conceptual appreciation of FOC sets out and allows for the appreciation of the 
expected tasks while outlining both parameters for measuring the end state (FOC) 
and the cost appreciation in terms of effort. While this is critical, this conception 
is silent on other variables fundamental to attaining capability to operationalise 
intent and that are underpinned by force component sustenance, political will and 
supporting legal frameworks.
Notably, FOC8 is conceived to imply the attainment of the capability by the EASF to:
 ◆ launch itself into an operation as authorised by the mandating authority within 
the stipulated mandated timelines using the optimum complement of its 
multidimensional and multinational kinetic and non-kinetic components in 
accord with the stipulated six scenarios;
 ◆ sustain itself logistically for the duration prior to mission takeover by the AU; and
 ◆ recover as per the dictates of the mission deployment criteria.9
The foregoing conception is underpinned by three components: the first is made 
up of kinetic elements such as the RDC within the TCC, the Planning Element 
(PLANELM) and the Brigade Headquarters.
COMPONENT ONE: RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY (RDC)
FOC was contingent on the existence of a RDC trained, kitted and armed, among 
troop-contributing states. The challenge for EASF states was the fact that some of 
the equipment and units projected in the RDC force structure, such as an aviation 
component and field engineer squadron, remained problematic in sourcing. FOC 
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for the RDC also presupposed the existence of standardised operating procedures 
among these units, the development of a common doctrine and training manuals, 
and agreed upon certification standards including operational readiness standards. 
Yet EASF was marked not only by the apparent absence of a consensus on the RDC 
concept, but also the dilemma about which option between RDC and ACIRC it 
needed to adopt within its framework. While Ethiopia and Sudan were opposed to 
a RDC concept, the former was amenable to ACIRC.10 Uganda, on the other hand, 
accepted both RDC and ACIRC concepts. Like Kenya and Rwanda, Uganda had 
established a RDC component within its own force structures.
By 2014, however, the linkage between EASF and existing RDCs remained weak. If 
the framework was to be maintained, EASF Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) 
needed to enter into legal arrangements with states on the issue of force generation 
and deployment, and standardisation of training, verification and certification. If the 
option of a single nation force were adopted, given the inherent value of cohesive, 
common equipment, language, tactics, procedures and logistics, EASF would have 
had to accept the reality of a single nation force RDC, in effect negating the principle 
of multinationality. The converse implied heavy investments in training both at 
individual level and collective level of the RDCs established by the region to an 
acceptable standard followed by stringent monitoring and evaluation.
Without reconciling this, EASF risked paralysis underpinned by risks of overstretch 
and lack of commitment and political will. It was notable that while RDC and 
ACIRC were AU-approved concepts in accordance with ASF Scenario 6, they had 
not been discussed and adopted at the regional level. Beyond apparent state-centric 
suspicions, the two were not mutually exclusive as long as neither was being imposed 
on the security arrangement. In any case the broad deployment of troops from EASF 
states across the geographical expanse of Eastern and Central Africa pointed to the 
existing reserve potential to respond to security situations under the EASF concept.11 
Notably a shift from emphasising a standalone RDC component within existing 
force structures would allow nations to retain the potential of the ACIRC notion 
essentially as a coalition of the willing concept at the AU level.12 This would allow 
some of the EASF members to participate on voluntary basis without affecting the 
residual existence of RDC. The foregoing perspective recommended by the Naivasha 
experts group meeting to EASF policy organs in effect sub-sumed the RDC and 
ACIRC within an enhanced EASF structure.13
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THE PLANNING ELEMENT (PLANELM)
Under article 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),14 the PLANELM 
was set to act as a multinational full-time planning headquarters for EASF within 
the framework of the ASF and the UN Standby arrangement system. It was to submit 
frequent reports, at least quarterly and as necessary, in detail through the committee 
of the East African Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) to the Council of Eastern African 
Ministers of Defense and Security (CEAMDS) and the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union (PSCAU). The MoU called for a composition of “Military, Police 
and Civilian components to reflect multinational and multidimensional dynamic”. 
The latter was lacking, as was the need to align the policy framework and the MoU 
to accord the two with the Ministerial decision of 2008, 3rd Extraordinary Council 
meeting held, in Kampala, Uganda that argued for the harmonisation of reporting 
lines. It also needed to grapple with challenges of motivation and morale of the 
staff affected by recruitment mechanisms of seconded officers. This tended to bring 
to the PLANELM differentiated capacities that distorted rather than facilitated 
structural cohesion. Additionally, the duration for seconding officers was short (two 
years), in effect limiting the ability of officers to engender any meaningful impact. 
Internally, there was an apparent lack of direction and tasking critical to facilitating 
not only rationalisation but also utilisation of some of the capacity available in 
this component. Attainment of FOC was going to be contingent on the extent to 
which policy-making extended functions for the planning element to serve as a 
multinational multidimensional full-time structure tasked to conduct strategic 
appreciation of all possible missions and operating conditions of the force, taking 
into account geography and requisite capabilities to facilitate accurate determination 
of force material and equipment requirements.15
One imperative was that PLANELM supports EASF by reviewing existing peace 
support operations, while generating operations, logistics and planning concepts 
and standardised training requirements. Together with an established early warning 
system, PLANELM was to monitor and analyse regional, continental and global 
trends in a bid to keep the EASFCOM director fully briefed on impending crisis. Such 
a planning element needed to be in a position to plan upcoming missions, and record 
and evaluate lessons learnt while retaining its core role of maintaining documentation 
on EASF planning processes, procedures and estimates. The planning element also 
had to keep, maintain and monitor a register of pledged resources and capabilities 
of Member States. It was to constantly check on and evaluate readiness of available 
resources and capabilities with states; evaluate and check on the critical aspects of 
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equipment compatibility and inter-operational profile with EASF; plan and negotiate 
with Member States for rotation of forces in the course of long-term rotation of EASF 
forces in conjunction with a mandating authority; and advise the Force Commander/
Commissioner of Police/Head of Civilian peace keeping complement. A further 
imperative stemmed from setting out to produce initial mission documentation 
such as Concept of Operations and rules of engagement, besides maintaining and 
operationalising rosters especially for police and civilian components.
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
The Headquarters (HQ) component was the weakest link towards the operationalisation 
of FOC. By 2014 EASF had no specific headquarter structure that anybody could 
flesh out to the extent of saying, “this is how the said Brigade HQ is and will operate”. 
Underpinning this were several factors. First, the issue of dual location of the Brigade 
HQ in Ethiopia and the PLANELM in Kenya was a factor that impacted on staffing. 
Secondly, the dynamics requisite to operationalising a functional mission HQ 
were not clear. Critical operational questions to be answered in any evaluation of 
FOC included the form and nature of the structure to be manned at HQ level. The 
desired end state had to be influenced by the mission, in turn informed by the broad 
conception of scenarios. This would in turn determine the size and sustainment 
capability to be designed and the equipment to go with it. The introduction of the air 
and maritime components negated the initially proposed size and composition of the 
units that fell under the brigade as per the initial policy frame.16 This was imperative 
now that the new dynamics called for military, civilian and police components for it 
to be complete to the extent of coping with tasks stipulated under Scenarios 1–6 in a 
joint, combined and integrated logic.
A critical challenge was in the selection criteria of officers. It was imperative to assure 
competence if expected roles and assignments were to be executed. This called for 
collective training. While mission HQ training had been conducted with respect to 
CPX and FTX, “little if any enduring, residual effect has been captured”.17 Not only had 
there been no procedures developed, but also process was constantly undermined by 
changed appointments of trained staff or return to mother units after training. There 
were no mechanisms in place to ensure refinement of procedures and adjustment 
of structures.
The design and the equipment of the HQ and JOC were also critical as was the need for 
writing up, planning and developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), setting 
up of a built staff table, established air staff, integrated maritime and air components, 
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and integrated police and civilian components. This had to be followed by a status 
of trained and rehearsed uniformed HQ, an integrated civilian component, and 
the transition to integrated planning and operations. These needed to be rehearsed 
and tested before December 2015. Progressive programmes for collective training 
that include FTX and CPX had to be undertaken as a build-up towards combined 
and integrated capabilities. The operationalisation of a HQ then presupposed the 
normalisation of planning procedures to cover Scenarios 1–6. Equally critical was 
the need to procure equipment and infrastructure for the HQ, identify sustainability 
requirements, and establish command, control communication, technological and 
information systems. To support these functions, required the establishment of a 
best practices unit, which through experience and research would set up guidelines, 
ethics and best practices that could be applied to achieve desired results. This process 
was captured in a conceptual sequence of three steps, as follows.
Staffing
The operational question here revolved around the determination of the extent to 
which the staffing structure was sufficiently integrated and balanced in relation to 
the functions required to fulfil the given mission. It became apparent that the time 
available between January 2014 and December 2015 would not be adequate to establish 
the air cell, develop air operations concepts and pledging of capabilities critical to a 
full air operational capability unless Member States redoubled their commitment. 
The fact that some of the staff in the PLANELM were either inadequately qualified or 
insufficiently experienced to fulfil their roles called for a holistic and detailed review 
of staffing.18
Training
EASF needed to liaise, advise, form and validate pledged TCCs capital contributions 
to the force. It was advisable that individual training and preparation of force elements 
was left largely to states. This would enable EASF to direct attention and resources 
to critical areas of need, such as collective training. Core here was the need for a 
progressive programme with in-built integrated procedures of mission HQ gradually 
binding together with parallel training LOE in a bid to achieve FOC.19
Equipment
EASF staff needed to be equipped at both conceptual and physical levels. Under 
the former were doctrinal procedures and mechanisms that define the operation of 
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the HQ together with adaptable, agile contingency plans critical in enabling a rapid 
transition to operations. The physical component involved infrastructure, fitting, 
furniture, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information 
Systems (C4IS) and expendable stock, packaging, storage and transport facilities.20 
“Each of the major training events was conceived as essential (mission critical) in that 
progression. They called for planning, funding and support21 with a focus on clearly 
identified product deliverables at the end of each event. Effective, intuitive evaluation 
and lessons needed to support the process from the onset.”22
In Figure 1 the lines of effort in the journey to FOC are shown conceptually. These are 
focused around an integrated collective training programme. For Tyson, the process 
commences with the development of an effective set of SOPs, which are subsequently 
rehearsed and refined. Cell, branch and subordinate HQ training (team) is conducted 
in parallel and gradually bound closer together. The staffing, doctrine and equipment 
programmes run simultaneously. They inform each other through an intuitive rather 
than an imposed continuous evaluation and lessons (E+L2) process. It is imperative 
that Exercise Planning Staff (EPS) design and adjust each step of collective training 
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Figure 1 EASF Mission HQ Progression
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Figure 2 of the Tyson model depicts the steps in the collective training plan to 
FOC. While the only events in the figure currently in the activity schedule are those 
with a solid outline, events with a dotted outline are a combination of opportunity 
training events and proposed training events. These are conceived as the minimum 
requirement to achieve a credible FOC in 2015. L2 represents a continuous 
lessons process. Although this figure shows integration of the civilian component 
commencing in early 2015, there was a need to underline the fact that this indicated 
weight of effort only. The integrated and comprehensive nature of EASF Mission HQ 
needs to be stressed from the outset with a gradually increased integration of the 
Force taking place throughout 2014.24
The salience of and challenge of setting up the Mission HQ implied that serious 
investment of political capital was solicited to stimulate resources and will.25 Hence 
the need for directives from the decision-making organs as eventually recommended 
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Figure 2 EASF HQ Collective Training Development Progression
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by the Naivasha team and approved by the Malabo Summit of EASF heads of State 
and Government in 2014.26
COMPONENT TWO: A REVIEW OF PROGRAMME STRATEGY
In the second component one finds the sustaining elements underpinned 
by logistics. There was necessity for procuring requirements of the structure 
including infrastructure for the HQ equipment identification, Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Information Systems [C4IS]. Equally imperative 
was the need to package sustainment requirements and their storage. Challenges 
revolved around the issue of whether this ought to be a Member State contribution, 
pooling of resources on standby, or identifying and earmarking how to procure them 
when required. There was also the questions of what equipment programme needed 
to be placed at levels 1 and 2, and whether the equipment programme provided for 
compatibility and inter-operability especially where Member States contributed. 
Where levels 1 and 2 were in place, preparation for core planning was done in a bid to 
design the force on the basis of missions, size sustainment, capability and the requisite 
gear. The fact of the matter was and is that equipment remains a critical challenge 
with most African militaries, constrained by old, obsolete systems. Worse still is the 
fact that they are challenged by lack of standardisation, given the fact that they are 
subject to dumping. There have to be continuous progressive programmes under 
collective training that must include lessons from the inception of the organisation 
to confirm efficiency.
Equally important was that fundamental questions of sea- and airlift and sustenance 
were grappled with. These did, and continue to, constrain operations of African 
Forces in Mission. Units from EASF States in Mission are constrained by lack of air 
support with respect to attack and utility helicopters, and tactical strike and airlift 
assets.27 As part of its strategic programmes for enhancing state commitment, EASF 
needed to consider options such as mandating designated nation(s) in developing 
these roles with support of others, or the setting up of a pooling process for the same 
if necessary. While the former is currently plausible, its durability is a function of the 
extent of a state’s commitment elsewhere. The latter could engender self-sustainment 
in the region to the extent that it is structured around collective security.
Attainment and sustainment of FOC and survival of the organisational mechanism 
beyond 2015 are equally dependent on the extent of Member States’ commitment 
to their financial obligations. EASF is challenged as manifested by pending arrears 
afflicting its operations prior to 2015. Arrears had risen from US$0,8m in 2009 to 
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US$6,6m by December 2013. Yet contributions as a sign of commitment by a Member 
State to any given mechanism are largely a function of the conception of value derived. 
What is apparent with respect to EASF is the fact that its actual potential is yet to be 
maximised. The challenge here lies in the design, which in turn impacts on functions. 
While the AU anticipated a broad task of providing security for the individual, the 
state, the region and the international system, emphasis in design has been the 
anticipation of collapse in smaller states. This orientation engenders costliness in 
terms of financial capital, military and eventually political will from the onset. It 
essentially ignores security-enhancing prevention and state-building programmes 
geared towards containing asymmetrical threats through distance decay reduction,28 
maritime security, containment of organised crime and trafficking. Anticipating the 
collapse of small states fortunately retains the potential for attracting external support 
as a result of converging interests. Such external participation in capacity-building 
within a collectivised regional framework could stimulate how resource reallocations 
and savings are initiated.29 The contention here is that a demonstration of relevance 
as value exchange is directly related to financial sustainability. Support for decisions 
about structural changes at the level of legal and mandating processes, internal 
management and an accelerated process of attaining FOC needed to be undertaken. 
Worse still were the issues of the presence of other competing organisations to which 
states seemed to have more geo-political commitment and internal institutional 
weaknesses. The converse had to be understood in the context of the costs inherent in 
multiple memberships in regional organisations that eventually allow states to make 
rational decisions about which organisations should receive commitment in term of 
resource allocations. The basic argument here is that multiple membership, while 
constraining shared values of trust, governance and positive institutionalism, also 
reinforces state weakness.
COMPONENT THREE: TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE SUPPORT VARIABLES
The tangible and intangible support variables inherent in the legal, institutional, 
political and organisational frameworks were also core to launching, sustaining and 
recovery of the force. By early 2014 EASF’s desire to achieve FOC was challenged by 
the twin issue of the mandates and role of the force. Article 13 of the Protocol relating 
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (“the Protocol”) 
situated the mandates of its missions within the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union (PSCAU). Article 6(1) of the MoU on the establishment of EASF 
states that the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments shall be the supreme 
183
East Africa Standby Force
authority of EASF. Under article 6.3(b), the Heads of States and Governments 
authorise the deployment of EASF in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the AU 
and the Protocol. Read together, the Heads of States and Governments exercise their 
authority derived from the mandate of the AU Peace and Security Council.30
Article 13(1) of the Protocol does not expressly pronounce itself on how a regional 
mechanism can quickly intervene to contain mutating security situations in its region. 
Article 13(2) presupposes a regional intervention if the wording “or intervention 
authorised by the Assembly” is interpreted in broad terms. The challenge for regional 
mechanisms such as EASF arises in meeting the response times required by Scenario 
6. Under regional economic groups, existing legal frameworks that anchor collective 
security and defence, which affect a legal mandate, mitigate this challenge. EASF was 
challenged by its relatively weak legal basis. This could be traced to the 2005 MoU 
and the Policy Framework31 for the establishment of the EASF. The need for legally 
binding documents between EASF and Member States was critical32 to mediate force 
generation and deployment. Efforts towards this are apparent in the updated MoU and 
Policy Framework.33 While this was now made clear, including the conceptualisation 
of a Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) leading to the process of authorisation, it did 
not seem to respond to the apparent fact that EASF as constituted remains entirely an 
AU instrument. The region by inference has no organisational framework through 
which it can collectively secure itself except through a time-consuming continent-
level process. Five steps were outlined under CRM to include: crisis assessment 
analysis by the EASF secretariat, meeting of the crisis response group, extraordinary 
meeting of policy organs, communicating decisions to the AU Peace and Security 
Council (AUPSC), and mission mandating by AUPSC.34
INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES
FOC attainment equally remained constrained by existing frailties within its 
administrative structures. It was imperative that a mechanism for monitoring and 
evaluation was put into place. This was critical to facilitating the review of activities 
and indeed the performance of individuals holding positions. For purposes of 
operationalising functions, it was vital that the process of recruitment/selection 
and deployment was re-evaluated. While a state-centric rotational logic was 
important for purposes of inclusion, it was necessary that professionalism, capability 
and performance were emphasised. The process of rationalisation of staff-based 
needs assessment and capacity needed to be undertaken quickly to ensure that 
competent persons held requisite positions. The foregoing were subsumed in the 
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recommendations of the expert committee, which called for restructuring to make it 
administratively and operationally more capable of executing mandates and attaining 
FOC by 2014.
FROM NAIVASHA TO MALABO AND THE DECLARATION OF FOC
The working group outlined a tracking framework towards the establishment of full 
operational capabilities by 2014 that set out eight decisive points:
 ◆ approval of the EASF Assembly of the reviewed EASF policy framework by 
June 2014
 ◆ approval by the EASF Assembly of the agreement establishing EASF by June 
2014
 ◆ ratification of the agreement establishing EASF by Member States by 
November 2014
 ◆ approval of EASF Crisis Response Mechanism by the EASF Assembly by 
June 2014
 ◆ review of the Table of Organisation and Equipment (TOE) by EASF secretariat 
for approval by June 2014
 ◆ force pledging by Member States by June 2014
 ◆ approval of draft MoUs on commitment of pledged forces by June 2014
 ◆ establishment of EASF Peace Fund by April 2014 as stipulated in article 13(5) 
MoU establishing EASF.
They also outlined modalities for supporting the fund to include a number of 
measures: 12% of EASF’s annual budget inclusive of partner support and arrears 
owed to EASF by Member States as at December 2012 were to be constituted as a 
start-up fund. Other sources included any surplus from internally generated funds, 
voluntary contributions from Member States, and external sources such as support 
from the African Peace Facility and possibilities of levying common commodities 
traded within Member States of EASF.35 
These steps were quickly followed up by ministerial decisions in Kigali in April 2014 
that approved the recommendations by the Committee and following the meetings in 
Malabo on 26 June 2014. Agreements establishing the EASF and MoU were upgraded 
to an agreement with a clear mandating process for deployment. Equally approved 
was a policy framework establishing the EASF, the Peace Fund and the Commitment 
to FOC by 2014. A follow-up meeting in Kigali on 22 August 2014 adopted the table 
of organisation and equipment, organisation of a donor conference and an MoU on 
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pledged forces, and in addition affirmed the CPX Masharik Salam at the end of 2014 
in Adam (Ethiopia), eventually also led to the validation of the FOC.36
Other critical elements attained include: operationalisation of financial sustainability; 
development of SOPs (military, civilian and police); early warning system and the 
development of a wide range of conceptual documents on financial sustainability, 
variegated SOPs (military, civilian, police), Early Warning System, Conceptual 
Documents, EASF Integrated Mission Support Concept, EASF Operational Concept, 
Force Generation Concept, EASF Training and Evaluation Concept, Command, 
Control, Communication, Computers and Information Systems (C4IS) concept, 
EASF Rapid Deployment Concept, EASF Medical Support Concept and Maritime 
Concept of Operations.37
GEO- POLITICAL VARIABLES: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOC
A third variable fundamental to FOC is the support component. This can be 
divided into political, legal and organisational frameworks.38 These are critical in 
the launching, sustaining and extrication of force components for mission areas. 
The political component has the element of political will, critical in mobilisation, 
coalescing and sustaining tangible and intangible centres of gravity. This has to be 
derived and built around a region-centric interest if it has to underpin a mandating 
and sustaining processes in addition to force regeneration. The challenge lies in 
weaving a region-centric interest from states with differentiated and sometimes 
contending state-centric values and interests. The multiple security and economic 
security driven architectures within EASF’s geography reflect not only this but also 
the underlying covert hegemonic imaginations that states harbour. In the economic 
realm, there are economic integration, organisations and institutions such as EAC, 
to which Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi belong, and COMESA. There is also 
IGAD, which, despite its original human security roots, is inclining itself towards 
joint infrastructure projects. Only Kenya and Uganda among the EAC states are 
members. In the security sector it is EAC with its defence and security co-operation 
pact that brings together Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda under the Coalition of the 
Willing to the exclusion of Tanzania and Burundi.39 This multiplicity of institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms leads to competition not only among organisations 
but also Member States, engendering duplication and high costs in capital, time and 
resources, besides waste. Consequently, the resultant mechanism’s utility potential 
remains unexploited, given the tendency of states to bypass it in favour of other 
institutional arrangements they consider better at serving their interests.
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The region is currently challenged not only by the phenomenon of disputed elections, 
most of which forster violence, but also fundamental questions and consequences of 
disrespect for term limits. The fact that there are no common values, the basis upon 
which critical decisions can be predicated, implies that states in the EASF region 
remain constrained at the level of political will necessary in framing the decision 
to intervene or not to intervene in cases such as that of Burundi. Subsequently 
tensions and polarities prevail that paralyse institutions such as EAC and the EASF. 
The Burundi turmoil is the very reason for the existence of EASF. That the same 
structure cannot be used reinforces the logic of non-interference while challenging 
the rationality of EASF’s FOC as a peace enforcement instrument.40 The decision-
making process will remain constrained because of multiple regional security and 
economic architectures that prevail in this geography, given lack of clarity as to which 
organisation among IGAD, EAC and EASF should take the lead in matters of security. 
Unlike other regions, EASF stands out distinct without a regional economic domicile. 
Unlike other standby forces that are mediated by common norms and values rooted 
in a single regional body, the same cannot be said of the EASF region. The durability 
of immature security anarchy41 will continue to impact on the operability of FOC.
State forming logic and its twin pastoralist identity, the differentiated economic 
dependencies, and the instability enhancing governance dilemmas will continue 
shaping state interactions and durability of any FOC. Informing the first question 
are the geopolitical imperatives and imaginations of colonial actors that continue to 
mediate frontier relations among states and cross-border communities. Of interest 
for us are the JIE and Somali–Oromo clusters. The JIE communities cut across a 
geographical expanse encompassing North Western Kenya, North Eastern Uganda, 
South Western Sudan and North Western Ethiopia, a home to Turkana, Pokot, 
Ndongilos, Karamajong, Tuposa, and Desanech population groupings respectively. 
This quadrifurcation and subsequent post-colonial state policies constricting 
community cross-border movement and political and economic marginalisation not 
only distorted age-old cosmology that mediated access to pasture and water, but also 
activated militarisation that continues to underpin the demand and supply of guns 
at one level and conflict at another. Three modes are discernible. The first revolves 
around intra- and intercommunity conflicts within states. The second takes place 
among communities across state frontiers. The third pits communities against state 
security formations within and across frontiers.
It is, however, the different strategies adopted by states to respond to these that could 
impact negatively on force generation and the eventual stability variable critical to 
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FOC durability. FOC is an outcome of prevailing mature anarchies in a subsystem. 
Where the converse is the case, its durability will be challenged by destabilising 
factors with a potential of locking down military assets of lead states42 either within 
domestic constabulary roles or interstate tensions. For instance, Kenya and Uganda 
have differentiated strategies that anchor their responses to the militarisation of the 
pastoralist communities rooted in their ruling elite’s conception of state-building 
projects.43 While the former pursued politics of benign negligence that outsourced 
security provisioning to community militias, referred to as police reservists, the 
latter’s NRM engendered inclusion through forced disarmament and deployment 
of a division of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in the Karamajong 
country.44 While the Ugandan option has increasingly subdued the Karamajong, 
especially their forays against their neighbours in Kenya, it has essentially implied an 
apparent process of statisation anchored by the provision of security and other social 
development activities. The failure of the Kenyan option is apparent in intensities of 
conflicts that have prompted mass dislocations of communities and social services, 
constant attempts at halfhearted disarmaments, and the current mutations that have 
seen well-organised attacks against other communities and state paramilitary forces. 
In one incident in 2015, sustained attacks occasioned the killing of over 100 civilians45 
and displacement of over 40 000.46 A company minus of paramilitary forces sent 
in to contain the situation were also ambushed, causing the death of twenty men. 
This led to the subsequent deployment of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and 2 000 
paramilitary officers.47
The UPDF’s presence in Karamajong is largely hinged upon the extent of stability of 
state relations within the region. Where regional obligations entail increase and shift 
of sizable units, the net result may include a situation in which Karamajong fall victim 
to Pokot and Turkana aggression. Kenya has had to constantly redeploy elements of 
an already overstretched KDF in efforts to supplement paramilitary units increasingly 
overwhelmed by heavily armed pastoralists. This dynamic is bound to increase given 
the intensity of energy exploration and construction of strategic infrastructure across 
the geography that now constitutes a huge geo-economic space referred to as the 
Lamu Port, South Sudan, and Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor.48 Notably 
Kenya’s commitment to EASF will be underpinned by a fait accompli need to expand 
its military from its current size if it has to meet the growing challenges of force-to-
space ratios at internal level, pledges to EASF and commitments to AU and the UN. 
For both Kenya and Uganda the creation of a force surplus is incumbent on either a 
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costly expansion with its inherent challenges of security dilemmas or the evolution of 
security, defence and non-aggression pacts among states in the region.
The Somali–Oromo Cluster has over time been animated by irredentism and 
nationalism underpinned by the failures in the process of inclusion in both Kenya 
and Ethiopia with respect to Somalia and Oromo nationalities in both states. The 
broad colonial geopolitical imaginations saw the trifurcation of the Somali nation 
in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti while retaining a vast majority in the Somali state. 
In the process it created the phenomenon of part nation state and the contemporary 
challenge of irredentism that both Ethiopia and Kenya have had to contend with. The 
former is currently battling the same on two fronts in its Ogaden province against the 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) at one level and Oromo Liberation Front 
at the other. Both movements will continue to impact on stability in the Eastern 
African Region and, by inference, reactions and tensions among states.
Unlike other regional subsystems with a lead state endowed with both military and 
economic muscle in comparison to others, EASF states are characterised by diffused 
multiple asymmetries. Several states with comparatively strong military capacities 
are outrightly challenged at economic level. The converse is also true and to this 
should be added the differentiated capacities of managing diversity. The net effect is 
the prevalence of insecurity engendering mutual dependencies. It is this that anchors 
diffused asymmetries. Despite the apparent durability of the foregoing dynamics, 
there exist potential economic growth factors in some of the states that could over 
time in space translate to the emergence of a convergence of political, military and 
economic power. While these could in the initial stages create tension-animating 
symmetries, they could also produce new balances of power to underpin new mature 
anarchy platforms. For instance, both Ethiopia and Kenya continue to show signs of 
infrastructural development, with Ethiopia evolving potential economic growth that 
could anchor its current huge military force. This runs inverse to Kenya’s attempt at 
regional economic dominance that is constantly undermined by internal political 
instability, a leadership gap deficit, corruption and a small military complement.
The problem for FOC lies in the fact that states tend to blame each other for the 
governance crisis, in the process allowing such tensions to constrain security co-
operation. The phenomenon of weakness as an internal dynamic of the state 
eventually spills over to the regional realm. Internal anarchy evolves into regional 
anarchy that is mediated by kin country logic.49 Regional dynamics are animated 
by the states whose design cuts across ethnic groups. In effect, failure to manage 
diversity may lead to a wide range of effects, from internal displacements of persons 
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who consider themselves targets, to the logic of armed refugees, militarised local 
spaces50 or ungoverned spaces. The latter is even more challenging given the emerging 
ability of non-state globalised terror networks with ambitions for reconfiguring 
global state geographies. The challenge for EASF states is their apparent growth in 
operational capabilities and the impact this is likely to have on FOC. The ability 
of global networks to recruit deep within the region, maximising obstacles and 
sanctuaries and to transform its geography into a global theatre for wars against other 
global interests introduces the dynamic of a security overlay.51 Together with other 
internal and regional security threats and the pursuit of conflicting and sometimes 
converging interests, states are wont to produce security complexes.52 In the case of 
Eastern Africa there exists apparent high- and low-security complexes. The former 
are informed by asymmetrical and conventional global actors’ interactions with non-
state and state actors within the EASF geography. The latter, on the other hand, is 
about local states with differentiated political and economic power structured in a 
manner such that they are limited in projecting their power. To the extent to which 
these may call for military engagement without requisite security agreements, a 
durable EASF FOC will run into rough winds.
The foregoing may, however, be tempered by the ability of states like Rwanda, Uganda 
and Ethiopia to continue internal security consolidation as state-building projects. 
This is likely to see them project military power in pursuit of both their state-centric 
interests and for broader continental and global security interests. While this 
points to demonstrable political will and an apparent affirmation to raise a rapid 
deployment capability such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to 
Crisis (ACIRC)53 it also holds risk. Over-commitment and the inclination towards 
state-centric measures with external support through regional organisations can 
well operate to the detriment of commitment to the EASF. The latter interrogates 
the whole concept of troop pledges and the necessity to evolve mechanisms for 
continuous reaffirmation of availability. An option here would be for EASF states to 
evolve bilateral and multilateral defense pacts that provide the additional and much-
needed flexibility as the pacts lower state-centric threats.
The willingness manifested in troop contributions within the EASF and beyond 
its geography points to two dynamics. The first is the apparent interlocking nature 
of subsystems such that the security interests of EASF states overflow across other 
subsystems, a factor that reinforces the rationale for stabilisation engagements. The 
second highlights the apparent volatility and blurred boundaries of the regions as 
defined by state weakness and kin country dynamics. There is also the variable of 
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permeability of borders, which ensures that threats to the states or a region cascade 
to others.
MULTIPLE ASYMMETRIES AS A PLATFORM FOR A VIABLE REGIONAL 
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Given the foregoing, operationalisation and durability of EASF’s FOC will remain 
challenged at the level of launching, sustaining and extrication. EASF states are 
not destined to durable insecurity and security complexes. To the extent that past 
social relations and the resultant structures are rooted in shared knowledge, material 
resources and practices, attempts at redesigning or re-engineering alternatives imply 
existence of ideas rooted in the conception of common threats and interests. This is 
likely to be the case if rethinking of regionalism seeks to generate new knowledge 
for appreciating and evolving policy frameworks for the containment of common 
threats over time and space. The same goes for strategies on state consolidation 
through the transformation of insecurity-enhancing multiple asymmetries into 
platforms for security-enhancing interdependence and inclusive state-building 
efforts. This process of appreciating and conceiving alternative notions of collective 
threats and containment not only animates the emergence of alternative structures 
but also a regional security community.54 This is likely to be characterised by the 
renunciation of the use of military force to alter what states disagree with. In addition, 
there will tend to be a broadening of the conception of national interest to recognise 
that of others, while replacing fear with relations of trust, shared knowledge, material 
resources and practices.55
The resultant mature architecture, based on shared knowledge, prompts the pursuit 
of absolute gain, trust, collective interest and peaceful resolution of disputes. Such 
architecture will tend to enhance political will by way of capital and human sacrifice. 
Such sacrifice underpins FOC durability as conceived here, speed and sustainability 
while retaining capacity to extricate in response to threats. Conversely put, FOC 
sustainability is challenged by state actors with limited outputs through collective 
effort while sustaining an environment under which the potential for inter-state 
wars remain a constant possibility. Underlying this is a destabilising structure based 
on unregulated power competition in an anarchic setting, internal instability and 
lack of shared values in economic, political and security realms. Alexander Wendt’s 
observation that anarchy is what states make of it and wars are the result of self-
fulfilling prophecies56 is apt in the EASF geography.
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An analysis of the interest matrix in the EASF geography holds the possibility of 
collective security based on construction of shared interests. Interest aggregation of 
states can be organised around four clusters: Survival, Vital, Major and Peripheral.57 
The intensity to protect these interests depends on their point of location across 
the four clusters. This apparent salience, determines options and efforts and in 
response, states mobilise either individually or in alliance with others. This process 
runs through logic of interest appreciation in space over time and in effect explains 
intensity. The higher the threat, the higher the intensity of activities geared towards 
securitisation to protect the object threatened and, by inference, the interest being 
pursued. The objects can be clustered around defence of the homeland, economic 











Figure 3 National Interest Matrix (adapted from Neuchterlein, D. “National interests 
and national strategy”. In: Heyn, T.L. (ed). Understanding US Strategy: A Reader 
Washington, DC: National Defense University. 1983. p 38).
Survival interest exists when the physical existence of the entity is threatened by 
destruction. In EASF geography there are potential environmental threats anchored 
in state-collapsing disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, methane gas 
emissions and pandemics. To this should be included asymmetrical threats that seek 
to collapse states through organised genocides or exclusivist ideologies by groups such 
as Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, FDLR, ADF-NALU and the Lord’s Resistance Army. These 
threats notwithstanding, the current security architecture provides a collectivised 
responses to state collapse or when possibilities of prevention are already constrained. 
Not only do such interventions become costly but they also open up the architecture 
to the possibility of being overstretched and overwhelmed by demand given the 
persistence of weak and collapsing states in the region.
Under the vital interest cluster are situations where serious harm to both individual 
states and the region may result if no measures are effected, including the use of force.58 
These include sustaining strategic interests such as region-centric infrastructure and 
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assets (port facilities, pipelines, rails, dam and road infrastructures) designed by states 
for purposes of extracting and exporting strategic resources. Any destabilisation here 
would have a broad regionally destabilising effect. Equally any push for insecurity-
enhancing self-help inclinations would result in attempts at similar insecurity-
enhancing options for strategic flexibility. Both forms of destabilisation provide a 
potential platform for collective securitisation. Three measures are apt. They include, 
first, the creation of a broader role function to EASF that would include region-
centric land and maritime infrastructure protection to complement state-centric 
measures. Secondly, is the evolution and signing policies and legal frameworks that 
can underpin mutual defense and security management and co-operation. Third, is 
the development and sharing of requisite assets. It is at this third level that alternative 
options are on offer for joint support in a given asset area by way of comparative 
advantage in maritime and air assets in particular.
In the third cluster are major interests. The assumption here is that political, economic 
and social well-being may be affected if nothing is done. Here options may not 
include the use of military force. Expanding economic interactions, currently the 
centrepiece of regional economic organisations, crime, economic interactions, efforts 
aimed at combating drug activities and laundering fall in this category. The ongoing 
efforts geared toward rationalising regional organisations point to the acknowledged 
necessity of integration and need for investment in stability and security as a 
collective interest. EASF states are negatively affected by multiplicity of memberships 
in multiple organisations. Core here are costs in time and materials. Worse still 
are covert inclinations that eventually militate against political will and resource 
commitment. Operationalisation and sustainability of FOC status will demand the 
redesign of economic and security architectures to engender convergence rather than 
the current diffusion. This has to be geared towards evolving common norms and 
value systems in the region that can contain state instability and unviability cycles.
The fourth cluster anchors interests that are deemed to be general and more to do 
with continental and global common interests such as global peace and stability. 
Given the four clusters, the fact that the challenges of threats continue to mutate, calls 
for the broadening of the functions of the restructuring of EASF. Indeed, it should be 
seen in the unexploited potential currently limited by the idea behind the design that 
also underpins the legal frameworks. Convergence of interest, especially survival and 
vital in kind, allows some of the conceptions below.
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FUSING EASF AND IGAD
Given the foregoing broad convergence of survival and critical national interests, 
merging EASF with IGAD becomes an option that may be considered. The emerging 
state-centric infrastructure such as LAPSSET and the new Ethiopia rail networks, 
the interconnecting pipelines and rail systems linking Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
at one level, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia to Kenya and Djibouti waterfronts 
provide a future security threat anticipation to fuse EASF into an enlarged IGAD. The 
only non-IGAD members in EASF are Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros and Seychelles, 
yet in the definition of environmental security threats and the need to contain them 
regionally, all these states share close interests with their IGAD partners. One of 
IGAD’s core functions is mitigation of environmental threats. Rwanda and Burundi 
also converge with Kenya and Uganda (who are also core members of IGAD) on 
environmental security and management of the Nile under the Nile Basin Authority 
and in the East African Community (EAC). In any case, assuming that the political 
integration project in EA continues to advance as fast as it is doing, these two states 
will by implication become members of IGAD. Both Comoros and Seychelles 
share not only the Indian Ocean maritime space but also economic, security and 
environmental interests with states in IGAD.
Mutation of economic activities, especially the need to access new resource discoveries 
in the EASF states at one level and threats from piracy, chemical dumping, and others 
at another, demands that they increase co-operation. This will become more critical 
as geo-economic resource access and denial transforms the Indian Ocean into a 
critical geostrategic space. This has to be grasped within the logic of geopolitical 
imagination, where the Indian Ocean soon becomes a lake mediating intense 
economic, environmental, societal, political and security interests. Anticipation of 
this should raise the possibilities and need for joint or shared maritime assets for 
common security. This factor should provide the rationale for the two island states 
to join IGAD.
Where this is the case, the convergence of IGAD and the EASF mechanism would 
provide the critical political decision-making anchorage, and reduce competition 
and duplication of effort. It would also engender rationalisation of structures 
while increasing regional synergy and evolution of mature anarchy to stabilise 
institutionalism. It would engender a collective effort at resolving insecurities while 
attracting meaningful friendly support. For states being challenged by asymmetrical 
194
the african standby force
threats, mechanisms for combating this will be facilitated easily by such regional 
convergence and not constrained by the need to seek a mandate from the AU.
TOWARDS A SYNOPSIS: EASF AS A REGIONAL SECURITY PACT
A regional security pact presupposes a limited restructuring of the mechanism to 
bring in the regional security component. In addition to the AU-driven EASF function, 
there would be a security-driven component under the Summit allowing its use at 
the regional level. EASF could transform into a Mechanism for Peace and Security in 
Eastern Africa (MEPSEA) or the Eastern Africa Security Coordinating Mechanism 
(EASCOM). This would call for a security pact with functions that seek to enhance 
the capacity of states to mutually confront threats. It would seek to develop capacity 
and frameworks for kinetic region-centric interventions for security sustenance. 
Under this model the mechanism would envisage the introduction of a troika made 
up of a chairperson of EASF Summit of the Heads of States and Governments, the 
Chairperson of the EAC members and the chairperson of IGAD. Fed with situation 
analysis of the security status in the region, the Organ would co-ordinate early 
response efforts among the states and across the multiple institutions. This would 
avoid duplication and allocate lead roles based on the principles of subsidiarity, 
complementarity and competence. The troika would have authority to commit EASF 
assets for conflict prevention, management and resolution on behalf of the summit 
where the need arises. It will also necessitate the introduction of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs or a committee that brings in their representation and a similar one for the 
chiefs of police in the region.
Internal structural changes would presuppose the setting up of a strong secretariat 
headed by an executive director mandated, among other functions:
 ◆ to harmonise and co-ordinate co-operation with a regional mechanisms and 
organisations;
 ◆ to receive and share information on potential violent conflicts/outbreaks, 
pastoralist conflicts, illegal trade, smuggling, refugee inflows and outflows;
 ◆ to initiate fact-finding missions, facilitate, negotiate and undertake roles of 
reconciliation actions as part of conflict resolution and management in the region.
The secretariat could be organised around two mutually reinforcing departments 
or directorates. The first would be that of EASF that would anchor the core kinetic 
components of military, police and civilian aspects that seek preparation and 
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generation of EASF for conflict management and resolution. Components such as 
brigade headquarters, log base and rapid deployment would belong to this cluster.
The second directorate could be EASFCOM in charge of the broad strategic direction 
and co-ordination. It could be in charge of critical sustaining components such 
as administration and finance, planning, political affairs (politics and diplomacy 
(mediation), peace building, early warning and situation room (a component that 
would serve as information and analysis cell to feed both EASF and EASFCOMs), 
disaster and risk reduction, and regional peacekeeping and training. In this 
department/directorate, there can be cells for defence and correctional services/
immigration. It should be stated clearly that the legitimate mandating authority 
could be the summit of EASFCOM; however, a force may be deployed on the UN or 
AU mandates.
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The North African Regional Capability 
in a Changing North Africa
Mohamed Hatem Elatawy1
INTRODUCTION
At the crossroad between Africa and the Middle East, North Africa remains an 
important region for the world’s peace and security. Indeed, in the aftermath of 
the “Arab Spring” in North Africa in 2010, and with the proliferation of security 
challenges, an operational regional mechanism in North Africa would have been the 
logical vehicle for regional action. However, instead of playing this role, the regional 
setup specifically designed as the North African Regional Capability (NARC) of the 
African Standby Force (ASF), and part of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), suffered a setback. Indeed, the absence of the NARC in events unfolding in 
North Africa can be traced to the circumstances surrounding its establishment and 
its development ever since.
This chapter reviews how the NARC was established as the regional mechanism (RM) 
for North Africa within the APSA and the reason the other previously established 
regional arrangement, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), was not integrated in the 
APSA. It discusses the initial expectations from the NARC proportionate to the 
military, political and economic capabilities of some of its Member States. The initial 
steps taken to operationalise the NARC are reviewed, as well as the challenges that 
followed its establishment, especially after the upheavals in North Africa in 2010/2011. 
Current attempts to revitalise the NARC and a future outlook conclude this chapter.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASF: SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW
To address the conflicts that plagued the continent, African countries decided to 
establish an overarching system to deal with challenges of peace and security as they 
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were moving from the original Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the more 
ambitious African Union (AU) in 2001. Later known as the APSA, it developed 
components to deal with the different stages of the conflict cycle, including inter alia 
the establishment of the ASF. In establishing the ASF the AU decided against an 
all-encompassing pan-African unified force. Rather, it decided to rely on Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) and RMs of the five African regions (East, Central, 
West, South and North Africa).
The decision to rely on the RECs and RMs as building blocks for the continental 
structure was not without precedent. Indeed, the earlier and equally ambitious plan 
for the establishment of a pan-African economic community, the so-called Abuja 
Treaty (1991), also relied on existing RECs and their establishment where they do 
not already exist.2 Moreover, regional interventions to address threats to peace 
and security were already experienced, not least of which through the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) interventions in conflicts in West 
Africa (starting with the civil war in Liberia and the ECOMOG deployment 1990–
1997).3 In this context and under the AU, the regional capabilities of the five regions 
were established wherever there were none. So in addition to the Western region, 
which has its origins in the ECOWAS Protocol of 1999, the Eastern region force 
originated in 2004, which developed into the East Africa Standby Force (EASF); the 
Central region established its force in 2006, which became known as the Economic 
Community of Central African States Standby Force (FOMAC in French),while both 
the Southern region force (SADC Standby Force or SSF) and the Northern region 
NARC were established in 2007.4
A CHALLENGING START IN THE NORTH
The North African region lacked a viable REC that could be used in the context of 
the ASF. While at first glance the AMU may have seemed to be the logical option to 
anchor the North African brigade, it proved too problematic as well as ineffectual.
The AMU was originally established by the Marrakesh Agreement in 1989 consisting 
of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.5 Pre-eminently it was supposed 
to serve as an economic negotiating vehicle for the Arab Maghreb countries (mainly 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) vis-à-vis the northern Mediterranean countries as 
the European Union (EU) was going into closer integration and harmonisation. 
However, this grouping proved ultimately ineffectual as constant political tensions 
among members hindered any potential co-ordination. This was more evident 
in failure of the grouping in its raison d’être: to co-ordinate the negotiations with 
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the EU as was the case in negotiations of North African countries with the EU on 
the Partnership Agreements. Instead, North African countries pursued their own 
individual negotiation tracks with varying speeds and results, and with Libya being 
completely sidelined. Moreover, the group failed to present a unified political block 
within international and regional fora, thus leading the Libyan leader at the time 
Muammar Gaddafi, to declare the group as a “lie” in2008.6
Despite such perception of ineffectiveness of the AMU, there was still interest in using 
it as the North African capability of the ASF when the latter was being established, as 
it was the only grouping existing exclusively in North Africa and could be considered 
a REC in that region. However, the membership of the grouping proved difficult to 
surmount in two ways. First, the AMU included Morocco, with the headquarters 
itself being in Rabat, Morocco. But Morocco had previously withdrawn from the 
OAU since 1984 owing to the admission of the so-called “Sahrawy Arab Democratic 
Republic” (SADR) to the OAU. Absent from the AU at its establishment, Morocco 
was also not a party to the AU peace and security set-up. Secondly, the AMU did not 
include Egypt in its membership, which could have proved limiting to the regional 
capability, given Egypt’s major political and military weight in Africa. As a top military 
contributing country in the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, Egypt’s role in 
any potential African Union Standby Force was simply too important to ignore.
In the absence of a facilitating REC, the best available option for the North Africa 
region was to establish a RM specifically for the purpose of the ASF, thus the 
emergence of NARC.
THE NARC: INITIAL GREAT EXPECTATIONS
In 2007, with much fanfare, the NARC was established. Algeria, Libya and SADR 
quickly signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) establishing the NARC 
in 2007, while Egypt and Tunisia signed a year later. With the backing of one of the 
strongest proponents of African integration and common action, the Libyan leader 
at the time, Muammar Qaddafi, and with the membership of two North African 
powerhouses (Egypt and Algeria), the NARC was expected to rise to a great potential.
Before the Arab Spring the North African region was considered one of the richest 
regions of Africa. With only 17% of the continent’s population in 2009, it contributed 
almost one-third of its GDP for that year.7At the time of establishing the NARC 
three members of the NARC were responsible for 45% of the AU’s General Budget.8 
Moreover, the generous backing of Libya to pan-African causes in general, and the 
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NARC specifically, had a potentially positive impact on the future role of the NARC 
within the ASF and the APSA at large.
On the military front, two countries within the NARC stood out in their capabilities, 
with the potential to support the ASF in general. Egypt continues to be the most able 
military force in Africa.9 Not only does it have the largest standing army (and total 
army size counting the reserves), but it also has the most sophisticated inventory 
of equipment and efficient command structures. Moreover, within the context of 
the ASF Egypt had a long history of peacekeeping that dates back to the 1960 UN 
peacekeeping mission in the Congo (ONUC). By the time of the establishment of 
NARC, Egypt was one of the top TCC in UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, it 
played an influential role in the United Nations within the Non-Aligned Movement 
on policies and consideration of the UN peacekeeping  missions.
Algeria also possesses a significant standing army and a wide range of hardware and 
equipment10 that could potentially be instrumental not only to the NARC but to the 
ASF in general, especially in strategic airlift, which continues to be one of the top 
needs of the AU in deploying missions. Despite not engaging in external military 
operations, nor participating in peacekeeping missions owing to an interpretation 
of the Algerian constitution prohibiting the deployment of Algerian troops outside 
its borders, the Algerian armed forces was indeed battle-hardened in its operations 
against terrorist organisations through the nineties.
Combining economic and military powers, the North African region had yet another 
significant power: political and diplomatic clout. Egypt had traditionally been one of 
the “big powers” of the African Union dating back to the institution’s predecessor, the 
OAU, and the role Egypt played in its establishment in 1963. It continued to hold this 
clout, including leading the African voice on a multitude of issues. As for Algeria, it 
has been a major player in the AU, especially in the peace and security fields. Indeed, 
during the lifetime of the African Union Commission (AUC), only Algerians have 
held the position of Peace and Security Commissioner. And as mentioned before, 
by the time the NARC was established Libya was already playing a very important 
role in the African continent. Indeed, the strongest proponent of a closer integration 
within the AU was none other than the Libyan leader at the time Muammar Qaddafi.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NARC
While originally planned to include six members, by the time an independent 
secretariat was formed for the NARC in 2009, only Egypt, Libya, Algeria and the 
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so-called SADR had become full members. While Tunisia signed the establishing 
MoU establishing the NARC in 2008, it has yet to ratify it. Its participation in the 
NARC activities continued to be limited and usually restricted to formal diplomatic 
meetings11 at different levels.12 As for Mauritania, to date it has not signed the MoU 
establishing the NARC. While some argue that the absence of Mauritania from the 
NARC can be traced to the suspension of membership in the AU because of the 
military coup that took place in August 2008,13 it is worth pointing out that all the 
other members of the NARC signed the MoU well before that time.
In trying to emulate the APSA structures, the MoU establishing the NARC was quite 
ambitious. It stipulated the establishment of certain major components (executive 
secretariat, military brigade, planning element, and two logistical bases). It also 
envisaged the establishment of military (Table 1 outlines indicative structure of the 
military component), police and civilian components. While presenting the general 
structure, it left the details to be determined through meetings and workshops of the 
Member States.14
Table 1 Indicative elements of the NARC military component15
Brigade Headquarters 
Mission Support Unit for Brigade Headquarters 
Light Infantry Battalions
Engineers Unit 
Light Signals Unit 
Reconnaissance Group (Company Level) 
Helicopter Unit 
Military Police Unit 
Multifunction Administrative Unit 
Medical Unit (Second Level) 
Military Observers Unit 
Civilian Support Unit (including administrative, financial and supply) 
With the full political weight of the Libyan leadership, NARC structures began to take 
shape. The executive secretariat was established and hosted in Libya in 2009, with the 
headquarters being inaugurated in Meetiga Airbase in Tripoli on the sidelines of the 
Fourth Meeting of the NARC Chiefs of Staff in April 2009. The Fourth Meeting of the 
NARC Chiefs of Staff held in Algiers also adopted the initial budget for the NARC.16
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In assigning the different locations and positions in the NARC, planners were careful 
to address the interests of major players in the NARC in a balanced way, especially 
those contributing to the establishing budget. So, while the Executive Secretariat and 
the Planning Element were established in Libya, 2010 witnessed the establishment 
of an administrative/logistical base in each of Algeria and Egypt, and the Brigade 
Headquarters in Egypt. In addition, requests for contribution of units (military 
and police) as well as personnel for the positions needed to be filled in the different 
permanent structures were agreed amicably among the stakeholders. Heeding the call 
of the MoU establishing the NARC in designating or establishing a training center(s) 
for the NARC, Egypt designated the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict 
Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in Egypt, Algeria designated the 
Rwayba Center and a third in Libya was envisaged. Overall, the outlook was positive 
regarding the NARC and for a while the arrangements seemed to foster co-operation 
among the different members, who engaged positively with the NARC.
SURVIVING THE ARAB SPRING: STORMS IN THE NORTH
In late 2010 tectonic shifts overtook North Africa. What started initially as a protest 
over economic conditions in one small town in Tunisia soon escalated into a region-
wide phenomenon, taking in its path some of the well-established political systems in 
the region. Ironically, yet accurately, this was called the Arab Spring.17
For the NARC the upheaval resulted in the downfall of the Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi, who was its biggest champion. The most serious challenge facing the NARC 
was the fact that the secretariat and the headquarters of the NARC were located in 
Tripoli. Moreover, developments in the area forced members in the NARC to be more 
inward looking and concentrate on more immediate challenges to national security. 
Regional interests and capabilities thus suffered and the NARC in particular had its 
main proponents silenced.
The effect of the Arab Spring was most severe in Libya. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, 
where changes in the political system resulted in a political process that maintained 
control of the central government over the territories, the situation in Libya proved 
to be more chaotic. Initial demonstrations against the Libyan leader, emulating the 
Tunisian and Egyptian model, soon developed into a civil war. Worse, with the fall of 
Qaddafi the whole Libyan state disintegrated and few governments since were able to 
demonstrate total control over the territories of Libya, especially in the presence of 
numerous militias and/or terrorist organisations exercising control on the ground. In 
the resulting chaos the security situation in Tripoli continued to deteriorate, forcing 
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Egypt to evacuate its diplomatic missions.18 Moreover, in August 2014 the officially 
recognised government was itself also forced to relocate to Tobruk. This chaotic 
situation had detrimental effects on the NARC as Egypt was forced to relocate its 
personnel attached to the NARC secretariat back home, albeit it continued to work 
from its Egyptian home base. Furthermore, the expiration of the initial budget of 
the NARC and the inability to agree on a new one (owing to the non-convening of 
the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff and/or Ministers of Defence) forced the NARC to 
repatriate, and eventually temporarily freeze, some of the positions previously hired.
Unrelated to the Arab Spring, but still having an impact on the operability of the 
NARC, two important matters arose during the lifetime of the NARC. The first is the 
previously mentioned Algerian position on deployment of forces outside its borders. 
Simply put, the orthodoxy in the decision-making circles in Algeria is that Article 
26 of the 1989 constitution prohibits the deployment of Algerian troops outside 
its borders, even in peacekeeping operations. Although the article simply refers 
to the non-resort to undermine the sovereignty and freedom of others, the strict 
interpretation of this article has caused Algeria to refrain from participating with 
troops in any peacekeeping operation.19
The other aspect that generated many discussions, especially within the assessment 
study commissioned by the AU of the APSA, is the membership of the so-called 
SADR. In its 2010 version the report indicates that the “fact that four of the six 
members of the NARC20 do not recognise the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic 
(ADR(sic)21) complicate how these states relate to it in the context of the NARC and 
beyond. This was identified as a crucial challenge that continues to impact on the 
operationalisation of NARC.”22
FLICKERING OF HOPE: KEEPING THE FLAME GOING
Despite the many setbacks, interest in the NARC continued. Thus, even when the 
budget for the establishment year expired in 2012 without the adoption of a new one, 
mainly owing to the developing situation and the inability of the Ministers of Defence 
to meet to approve a new budget, some of the Member States chose to maintain the 
infrastructure dedicated for the NARC whether in terms of personnel or bases. For 
example, during the period 2010–2016, Egypt maintained the headquarters of the 
NARC’s brigade as well as the one logistics/administrative base it was hosting.
Moreover, a leaner form of a combined NARC’s executive secretariat/planning element 
continued to exist and function, thanks mainly to funds from the EU channeled 
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through the AU. Expert level meetings among the Member States and the secretariat/
planning element continued, often either in Cairo or Addis Ababa. Moreover, the 
NARC continued to be represented in some of the ASF meetings and workshops,23 
thus gaining experience for the different aspects of the regional capabilities of the 
ASF. In addition, through the EU support to African training institutions (channeled 
through the AU), training activities were conducted during the period 2013–2015 
for the civilian, police and military components of the NARC, with nineteen training 
courses organised in Cairo by CCCPA with a total of 244 trainees.24
Thus, despite not having declared operability by the time the pan-African exercise 
of the ASF took place in South Africa (19 October – 8 November 2015), the so-
called AMANI Africa II, NARC elements were still able to be present as one of the 
African regional capabilities. Indeed, the African Union Commissioner for Peace 
and Security noted that “over 6 000 military and civilian officers from across all five 
standby brigades participated in the exercise”,25 which reflected the participation of 
officers from Egypt, Algeria and the NARC Executive Secretariat,26 in addition to the 
valuable contribution of Algeria in strategic lift (by bringing troops from the Niger 
to South Africa27).
A NEW DAWN: RENEWED INTEREST
In November 2015 the Fourth Ministers of Defence Meeting of the NARC was held 
in Addis Ababa, after a five-year delay.28 This allowed the long-overdue transfer of 
the presidency of the NARC from Algeria to Egypt and the approval of a new interim 
budget that would allow for the resumption of financing of some positions and 
undertaking select activities of the NARC.
Housing the new President of the NARC, Egypt has already shown great interest in 
revitalising and restoring the NARC and ushering steps to undertake that. Following 
the directive of the Fourth Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the NARC, Cairo 
is pursuing diplomatic contacts with Tunisia and Mauritania to encourage them to 
pursue the legal steps for joining the NARC (to ratify the MoU in the case of Tunisia 
and to sign and ratify in the case of Mauritania),29 thus giving new impetus to the 
NARC and contributing to achieving universality of membership within the North 
African region.
However, the most important decision coming out of the meeting is a series of 
envisaged workshops proposed by the new President (Egypt). As expressed by the 
Egyptian delegation in the meeting, the workshops are seen as platforms to discuss 
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the current status of the different components of the NARC (military, police, civilian) 
as well as its methods of work with the view to completing the operationalisation of 
the capability, within the context of the development of the ASF in general.30
TIME TO CATCH UP
Under this ambitious plan the first workshop was held in Addis Ababa on “Developing 
the NARC” on 25– 27July 2016. During the workshop, representatives of Member 
States agreed on the objective of facilitating the quick development of the NARC in 
time to assume the role of the Framework Region of the ASF (scheduled for July 2018).31 
Towards this end, the Executive Secretariat/Planning Element of the NARC was 
requested to prepare a proposal for the phased resumption of the operationalisation 
of the capability. This proposal is expected to include the list of essential positions 
that need to be filled and a training plan for the different components, as well as the 
required budget. This plan will also be discussed and – hopefully – approved during 
the coming high-level meetings (expected by the end of 2016).32
In addition, Egypt has presented a proposal for the establishment of the civilian 
capacity for the NARC, including the structures needed, the required training and the 
functions envisaged for the civilian capability. This proposal was presented officially 
through the Executive Secretariat for the Member States to consider and discuss 
during the coming meeting/workshop on the civilian capability, and recommend a 
course of action to the next Meeting of Chiefs of Staff and/or Meeting of the Ministers 
of Defence. Another proposal on the establishment of a mediation structure for the 
NARC, to emulate and mirror similar structures in other RECs/RMs as well as the 
AU, is also being developed by Egypt to be presented to other members of the NARC 
in due course. This proposal stems from an idea that Egypt shared at the workshop.33
CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD FOR A NEW HORIZON
The NARC is growing its potential as one of the regional components of the ASF. 
Although hampered by developments in North Africa since early 2011, countries 
of the region remain some of the most influential military, political and economic 
powers in Africa. The last five years have shown that some level of co-operation and 
co-ordination is possible and can allow the NARC to function progressively until 
such time that the full operationalisation of the capability can be achieved.
The challenge, however, remains in the ability of the members to transcend political 
disagreements and channel a course for co-operation that would address the 
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sensitivities and sensibilities of all parties towards areas where some of the members 
have comparative advantage, as shown by AMANI Africa II. Other political issues, 
however, will need to be equally, and similarly, addressed. Early signs of interest 
and dynamism among the Member States are cause for cautious optimism that the 
NARC can indeed catch up with the other components of the ASF and meet its great 
potential within the APSA.
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The Future of African Standby 
and Rapid Deployment 
Capabilities: Theoretical Dreams 
or Practical Constraints
Abel Esterhuyse1
The concluding chapter reflects on the future of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) in view of what was said in the various contributions to this 
volume. As was pointed out in the introduction, in spite of being heavily criticised, 
the AU has become the single most important actor in the field of peace and security 
on the African continent. And there is reason to believe that the need will persist 
for mechanisms to address peace and security on the Africa continent. Firstly, many 
African states remain fragile and weak. This relates amongst others to the origin of 
African states; the failure to consolidate democratic rule and, as a result, the often 
corrupt and authoritarian nature of many governments; and the failure to legitimise 
state institutions through the delivery of appropriate services at grassroots level. 
Secondly, political instability continues to characterise the African political landscape. 
Even countries with established constitutional democracies are prone to election and 
other forms of cyclical violence. Inequalities, ethnic differences, rivalries and violence 
continue to cloud the domestic political landscape of many African countries. Thirdly, 
economic instabilities, persistent high levels of poverty and ongoing struggles over 
scarce resources remain a feature of many countries and regions in Africa. These 
threats are often linked to climate change and conditions such as floods, droughts 
and other manmade disasters.
Given that conflict and violence – often war – will continue to characterise many 
African countries and even regions, it is imperative to consider the nature thereof. 
It is a truism to say that most of African conflicts are and will continue to be of an 
irregular and intrastate nature. However, the broad spectrum of activities that make 
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up irregular interstate conflict simply imply that this phenomenon is diverse in nature. 
Most irregular African conflicts, as is the case in the rest of the world, are rooted 
in complexity, involve a multiplicity of actors, and are drawn-out and persistent in 
occurrence. Add to these realities the widespread availability of Cold War weapon 
arsenals in Africa, particularly small arms, and often loosely organised, ill-disciplined 
rebel groups that are inexperienced, or simply not interested, in negotiations. Irregular 
African conflict as a prominent threat to Africa’s people is known for its disregard 
for human rights and accountability, a preference for unconventional methods of 
combat – including rape, mutilation and the use of child soldiers – and the pursuance 
of non-political objectives. From a geographical perspective many African conflicts 
emerge in ungoverned spaces on the continent or lead themselves to the collapse 
of state institutions and law and order. Moreover, the nature of state boundaries in 
Africa means that, though the conflicts are irregular and predominantly intrastate, 
neighbouring countries are either adversely affected or so often directly involved, 
giving many of these conflicts a regional profile.
What kind of peace and security architecture is needed to deal with the aforementioned 
realities? The answer is not up-front and the APSA had to, and will in future need to, 
overcome substantial challenges in operationalising their peace efforts. To be blunt, 
the APSA is faced with challenges that originate from its own dynamics, as well as the 
complexity of threats and vulnerabilities populating the African conflict landscape. 
Deliberations on the future of the APSA tend to centre on three key concerns. First, 
a normative debate rooted in questions about how best to respond to armed conflict 
and instability in Africa – in the words of Paul Williams, “what constitute proper 
and legitimate conduct by African states and institutions in the field of conflict 
management and when faced with mass atrocities in particular”.2 Secondly, though 
APSA and its institutions represent a huge improvement in the conflict management 
activities of the OAU as predecessor of the AU, APSA institutions continue to be work 
in progress. The pathway towards operational readiness and maturity is cluttered with 
political, financial, institutional and other complexities. Thirdly, debates continue 
about the large regional differences in relation to rates of development and levels of 
success that continue to characterise APSA activities. These differences and variations 
between the continental level and regions are exacerbated by tensions caused by 
different expectations, distributions of power and roles between the regional and 
continental level. These tensions are not only prevalent at the nexus between the 
continental and regional levels; they extend to the nexus between the UN and the 
AU and, more important, the said tensions also play out between key role-players 
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within the various regions. The drive for international and continental legitimacy 
through UN mandates vis-à-vis the operational scenarios confronting African forces 
in undertaking dangerous missions more often than not creates a conundrum of 
uncertainties and tension.
Thus, it seems as if the future of the APSA revolves around the extent to which it 
would be able to manage, and in some instances resolve, a number of key tensions 
that at present tend to dominate, obstruct or hinder the effective functioning of 
APSA structures. One of the key tensions is the interplay between the idea of African 
solutions for African problems and the continued reliance on international actors 
and donors to finance and facilitate African solutions. This particularly relates to 
the dependence on external support and funding for the ambition to create a strong 
indigenous military capability and the deployment of peacekeepers and more 
interventionist-oriented forces for operations in Africa. It may be true that Africa 
has progressed beyond the notion that those who are footing the bill are also setting 
the agenda. Yet donors will always have some say and Africa should rather work 
with donors in more constructive ways to promote peace and stability. Financing 
for APSA-related activities continues to inform decisions by African governments 
about participation, with some seeing operations of this nature as a way of extracting 
money and supplementing the shortfalls in their own defence budgets.3 The funding 
question also raises the issue of commitment. Reliance on external funding will always 
bring about questions about ownership of APSA by African states; the fact that the 
APSA and its operations continue to rely on external financial support highlights the 
need of political buy-in and financial commitment from many African states in order 
to operationalise the call for African solutions.
The tension between financial independence and political will has a direct impact on 
the interoperability of African armed forces and the sustainability of APSA activities. 
African militaries continue to rely on external military assistance in the deployment 
of forces and sustainment of operations. External funding has a direct bearing on 
the problem in African armed forces, described by Howe as the lack of urgency – a 
reliance on external military support often reducing the need for capable militaries.4 
In a paradoxical way, APSA is receiving financial support from external actors, yet 
the participation of African armed forces in APSA-related activities keeps them 
externally oriented and helps simultaneously in their quest for professionalisation.
There is a clear tension between the OAU-established tradition of non-interference 
and self-determination and the drive towards operationalising the notion of non-
indifference that gained much popularity since the establishment of the AU. It is a 
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tension between the sovereignty of the Westphalian logic and tradition of Western 
states, on the one hand, and, on the other, questions about what is needed in and for 
a secure and prosperous Africa whose borders are the result not of a long process 
of state formation, but a Western decision-making process upheld by African 
rulers. The normative debate and values driving the notion of non-interference find 
expression in the dualism between questions about the legitimacy of humanitarian 
and other interventions in complex emergencies and questions about the legitimacy 
of undemocratic changes in and actions by African governments. Both are subjected 
to the legal argument of state sovereignty and non-interference as a right, not a 
responsibility. Non-indifference constitutes a key element of African collective 
security and commitment to the “Pax Africana”.5
There is also a tension in the drive towards a common vision of “a united and strong 
Africa”6 between those favouring a more traditional state-centric approach to security 
as a prerequisite for societal development and economic growth and those who stress 
human security, with its emphasis on growth and development as the pathway that 
non-traditional approaches offer, in creating a more secure Africa.7 What are the 
ideas and norms that drive security as an input; what are the ideas and norms that 
underpin social development and economic growth rooted in a respect for human 
rights, sanctity of human life and democratic principles, and good governance with 
security as an output? Of course, the strain also highlights the dualism between the 
declared norm of “a united and strong Africa” and the de facto reality of internal 
power struggles and competition between people, rulers and countries in Africa.
Another tension seems to exist between those favouring strong military-oriented 
peace missions and the preference, drive and need to civilianise peace processes 
and operations. The idea of an Africa Standby Force was specifically developed and 
designed to include non-military personnel, police and civilian contingents. The shift 
in emphasis towards the availability of an immediate crisis response capability was 
seen by many as a militarisation of the envisaged rapid deployment.8 The redesign, 
expansion and militarisation of the rapid response capability as proposed through 
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was triggered by 
the uncertainty, if not non-functionality of the regional brigades and the ASF, South 
African experiences in the Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2013, and the 
successful French military intervention in Mali in January 2013. ACIRC, based on a 
“coalition-of-the-willing” continent-wide model, was seen as a stopgap measure for 
rapid deployment while individual regions are standing up the ASF.9
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The design of the rapid deployment capability through the ASF and ACIRC seems 
to raise the deep-seated question of control over forces making up the envisaged 
rapid reaction capability. Countries prefer to maintain control over their own forces 
– the ASF is a regionally based instrument, whilst ACIRC represents a continental 
rapid deployment capability. The APSA at present depicts the interplay between the 
possession of national rapid deployment capabilities and the control of the standby 
and rapid reaction forces at regional and continental level. The uncertainty, danger, 
intensity and institutional nature of standby and rapid reaction operations and types 
of forces point towards more national control over these forces. The tension seems to 
centre on the question of reaction time and, more specifically, questions about the pro- 
or reactive nature of conflict resolution by the APSA. It is a fact that the early warning 
mechanisms and systems of the APSA remain work in progress and that intelligence 
co-operation between states and within the APSA seems to alternate between non-
existence and poor. Paul Williams argues quite convincingly that the creation of 
ACIRC as an alternative or extension of the Africa standby capability addresses three 
critical shortcomings in the rapid reaction time inherent to such forces: first, the 
cumbersome and problematic nature of the decision-making processes of the APSA 
institutions; secondly, the changeover of the logistical responsibility of quick reaction 
forces from national to regional and AU level; and, thirdly, the continental scope of 
ACIRC in contrast with the ASF.10
There is no doubt, though, that tension exists between the idea and efforts to 
operationalise the ASF through its regional brigade structures and the proposal, 
plans and efforts to create a more continentally oriented ACIRC. Indeed, some 
analysts argue that ACIRC is a reflection of the failed attempt to operationalise a 
regionally based pan-African standby capability.11 Others are seeing this as a trade-
off type of either/or situation that is unfolding, with funding and support earmarked 
for the ASF now flowing towards the ACRIC and, on a more conceptual level, ACIRC 
drawing attention away from and undermining the effort that went into readying the 
regional standby brigades.12
The increasing presence of private security and private military companies in the 
African security environment adds another layer of complexity and tension in the 
management of already compounded security challenges. Yet the role of private 
military and security companies is not only increasing; it is also becoming progressive 
tactical and operational examples in the laboratory of history that African armed forces 
can draw from in the development and design of their own military doctrines. The 
private military model is designed and often demonstrates the effectiveness of small, 
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highly competent, early entry, surgical, quick reaction forces – the almost textbook 
example of a rapid reaction capability devoid of political trappings. Of course, they 
are not operating under the political and bureaucratic constrains of statutory armed 
forces, which allows them much more operational and tactical flexibility. The point, 
though, is that these forces are not only becoming an enduring feature of the African 
security domain; nor are they are making a case for the success of rapid and quick 
reaction forces. They are indeed also highlighting the critical vulnerabilities of many 
armed forces in Africa. The most worrying negative lesson to take from the presence 
and role of private military companies in Africa is the lack of appropriate and/or 
absence of professional statutory armed forces in Africa. More specifically, Africa is 
under-militarised and needs more well-equipped professional armed forces to build 
successful rapid deployment capabilities for AU interventions.
The role of private military companies and their success rate in often complex combat 
scenarios in Africa bring the nature of rapid reaction forces, the Rapid Deployment 
Capability (RDC) in the case of the APSA, into focus and, in particular, how and 
why these kinds of forces differ from the more standard type military forces. The 
idea of rapid reaction forces centres on the availability of well-equipped forces with 
a high level of readiness and the ability to act decisively at short notice in desperate 
situations of crises. Reliability is a key determinant of rapid reaction.13 African 
politicians, like their counterparts in the rest of the world, are risk-averse; rapid 
reaction forces are programmed to take risk head-on. Because of the fluidity of many 
of the security situations that require rapid reaction force interventions, these forces 
ought to be highly pliable; they need to have the inherent capacity to learn more 
rapidly to cope with the instability, complexity and rapid change of specific high-risk 
desperate scenarios of conflict. In a collective and co-operative security and defence 
environment the success of rapid reaction forces, according to Langille, is rooted in 
a combined operational and tactical capacity to plan, command, deploy and support 
combined forces at short notice; to generate collective political will, to ensure 
adequate financing and broad participation through sufficient multidimensional 
and multifunctional participation, to harness the overall competence of potential 
partners and to instil unity of purpose and effort among the various participating 
elements. High standards of cohesiveness and inter-operability will always be a major 
challenge in combined operations, especially in Africa.14 The point is that, as a military 
capability, rapid reaction has many components that require not only participation in 
depth but also preparation in depth.
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The preparedness of the ASF is thus not a matter of declaration. The availability of 
a rapid reaction capability, from a generic perspective, relies on a comprehensive 
approach. Operational readiness is a continuous iterative process that cannot 
be asserted through a once-a-year training cycle and combined exercise. Both 
deployability and interoperability are dependent on high levels of continuous training, 
flexibility in organisation and equipment, professional leadership and a cohesive 
doctrine. Derso is correct in arguing that the ASF faces a major challenge because 
different member states have different, but entrenched, standards for operational 
procedures, approaches, equipment, traditions and training backgrounds.15 The 
operational readiness of the regional brigades is not only dependent on training 
for skills development but also hinges on a whole range of tangible and intangible 
capacities that must be continuously exercised, tested, evaluated and adjusted. Here 
the military psychological preparedness of rapid reaction forces is, for example, 
hardly touched upon by APSA whilst recognised as an international best practice in 
combat readiness of such reaction forces. 
It is thus not too difficult to explain differences in the military preparedness of the 
various regional brigades of the ASF. Two factors are of particular importance in 
this regard – political will and military capability. The first concerns the level of 
commitment of the various troop-contributing countries in the respective regions. This 
commitment plays out over a broad spectrum, but specifically relates to the political 
will of the various countries in regions. A second consideration is the physical ability 
of the various countries to contribute militarily to the designated regional brigade of 
the ASF and the quality of that contribution. This relates, in essence, to the inherent 
capacity of the various militaries within the respective regions and, more specifically, 
their force projection capacity. Political will and military capability are shaped by 
two critical considerations. The first is the political situation and domestic political 
stability within the respective countries. The more countries are forced to focus on 
their domestic security situations, the more cautious they are to contribute to the 
development of a regional military capacity – for various obvious reasons. This is, for 
example, one of the key factors explaining the differences in the progress made in the 
development of SADCBRIG vis-à-vis ECCAS. The physical infrastructure within the 
region is a second critical consideration. Physical infrastructure facilitates combined 
training, exercises and operations. Deployment and sustainment of forces, whether 
for training, exercises or operations, are dependent on physical infrastructure – from 
the air, rail and road network to the availability of training facilities. Lastly, it helps 
to have a hegemonic type of country in a region that can take the lead in the creation, 
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development and sustainment of a rapid reaction capability. How these various 
factors are going to influence the future of the ASF and, for that matter, the future 
stability and security of Africa, remains an open question. There is after all nothing 
foreseeable in the foreseeable future.
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